From Policy
pp. 35-36 · Read in the full issue
to Alliance
In recently published statements, both Admiral Lyons and Admiral William Crow the current chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and former commander of all US forces in the Pacific agree on the basic objectives. Many senior officials in the Reagan administration have pursued the “way West” with great vigor. These in clude the President, who often refers to the importance of the Pacific Basin.
The policy must be implemented by a strategy. As part of a strategy, one poten tial approach would be the negotiation of a new Pacific Alliance Treaty with some collective defence and basic economic co operation as its objectives. Along with the United States and the ASEAN countries, the following nations are all potential participants. • Japan is our most important Pacific ally, and must be encouraged to accept fur ther defence responsibilities. • Canada is often overlooked as an im portant component of US Pacific pol icy. The Canadians’ ability to work in the maritime world could be extremely helpful in the critical battle for the Aleu tians during a major conflict with the Soviets. • Australia is a traditional ally and a strong player in the global currents in the re gion, particularly in the southern and central Pacific regions. • China has played a dominant role in the region for centuries. Although it is a controversial choice for membership in the Pacific alliance, China can make an important and growing contribution in the Pacific Basin. The Chinese armed forces are limited by outdated technol ogy but are maturing in military skill.
Naturally, there are many issues that must be worked out between China and the alliance’s more traditionally Western states. The Chinese, for example, have often commented that they prefer a neu- ►
◄ tral course, and simply are not interested in a security arrangement with the US or any other major power. Nevertheless, in light of the potential for increased Chinese economic involvement in the region, and growing Soviet naval presence in the Pa cific, the Chinese may reconsider. • South Korea is facing the most direct military threat of any country in the Pa cific. The South Koreans would be in terested in expanding their defensive network. Relations are still tenuous with Japan, reflecting differences dating back to World War 11, but these might be worked out. • The ASEAN states might be convinced to join in a broad Pacific alliance as ad junct signators to the pact, particularly if economic benefits, such as a Pacific Common Market Scheme, could be developed.
The basic premises of the agreement could include some or all of the following, which could be refined in a working con ference and signed at a Pacific summit.
Pact of Non-aggression: This might be the extent of the initial level of defensive alignment in the treaty, depending on the signators. The negotiators would attempt to work for a limited collective defence scheme if possible, but may have to settle initially for a pact of non-aggression.
Mutual Defense: This would be pos sible if the Pacific alliance were to replace
the current patchwork of agreements be tween the US and Japan, Canada, Aus tralia, and several minor powers.
In order to include China, this section of the treaty would have to be carefully ne gotiated and tightly circumscribed to pre vent the US from automatically being involved in any outbreak of land warfare between China and the Soviet Union.
One possibility would be to use a draft treaty that called for non-aggression gen erally, consultation on all defence mat ters, and cooperation in all naval engagements. Another difficult negotiat ing point would be the lingering hostile overtones of some regional relationships notably between Japan and South Ko rea, China, and the Philippines stem ming from the Japanese occupation during World War 11.
Preferred Trading Status: Given the economic basis of much of the Pacific al liance, the treaty should include provi sions for a possible Pacific Common Market with preferred trading status be tween the partners.
Joint Military Exercises: As a logical outgrowth of the alliance, the signators would conduct joint military exercises and possibly form a Standing Naval Force Pacific.
Exclusion of Soviet Basing: This would be an understood corollary of the treaty’s security arrangements.
The Law of the Sea Treaty: The follow ing principles of the Law of the Sea Treaty are largely accepted as international law today; • Establishment of exclusive economic zones out to 200 nautical miles from the coast; • Negotiation on maritime-related prob lems, using consensus techniques de veloped in the Law of the Sea negotiating format; • Rights of strategic passage, particularly through all archepelagic states; • Environmental and scientific research consultations as outlined in the Law of the Sea Treaty.