policy on sea law, Micronesia

Political

Currents

Islanders troubled by new US policy on sea law, Micronesia

Two aspects of the policy of the new Reagan administration in the United States have troubled Pacific Islands leaders.

The first is the decision that the laboriously-negotiated agreements with the various political components of the US Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI) will be subject to ‘full review’. The second is a similar decision in relation to US policy in that other long-playing drama, the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). In the first of the two following articles Dr JUAN R. FERNANDEZ, associate professor in the Graduate School of Public Administration, University of Puerto Rico, comments on the decision affecting the TTPI. Dr Fernandez’s article, forwarded personally by him for publication in PIM, is adapted from a talk he gave to a conference at the St Thomas campus of the College of Virgin Islands in March. Theme of the conference was Recent Developments in US-Offshore Relations.

The second article deals with the Reagan administration’s bombshell announcement in March that it was reviewing its policy on the law of the sea.

1. Micronesia, profit and loss

The main events that have taken place in Micronesia (US Frust Territory of the Pacific Islands) during the 1970 s all •elate in one way or another to ;he most important develop nent that took place in that period the division of the erritory into five separate units.

In 1969 the United States government, responding to in sistent requests from the Con gress of Micronesia, agreed to commence negotiations as to he future political status of the rust territory. Shortly after vards however these were tailed when it became very lifficult to harmonise vlicronesian and US interests.

Sy April 1972 the US Govern nent suddenly announced its lecision to negotiate separately vith the Mariana Islands dis rict, and by December of that 'ear the two sides were holding he first formal round of nego iations. After four sessions the ather complex process ended vith the approval of a Covenant o Establish a Commonwealth >f the Northern Mariana slands in Political Union with he United States of America, "he covenant was signed by >oth parties on February 15, 975 at Saipan. After being ndorsed by the Northern Tarianas Legislature as well as >y the voters in a plebiscite, it vas submitted to the US Con fess where it obtained final pproval by the Senate in r ebruary 1976 and was signed nto law by President Ford on

March 24 of that year. These governmental actions did not result in a new Marianas com monwealth. By its terms, the covenant would be effective only after the Marianas had drafted and accepted a consti tution something that was achieved in 1977 and the President of the United States had declared that the trust arrangement for all of Micronesia has been terminated a matter that is still pending.

Meanwhile, and through a much more difficult and tortu ous process, negotiations were carried out with the other parts of the trust territory. These concluded just last year with the approval by the parties concerned of a Compact of Free Association between the United States, the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia and Palau. Accord ing to section 411 the compact will go into effect once all the following steps are completed: a) approval by the government of Palau, the Marshall Islands or Federated States of Micronesia in accordance with its constitutional processes; b) the holding of a plebiscite as stipulated in section 412 of the compact, and c) approval by the government of the United States in accord ance with its constitutional processes.

It must be noted that the Reagan administration has re cently announced that the com pact is scheduled for a ‘full

review’ by all concerned agencies. So it seems that we are far from seeing the last chapter of the painstaking pro cess that has already lasted through more than 11 years of difficult negotiations.

What I intend to discuss is how what has taken place and is taking place in Micronesia is being perceived from the Caribbean, and to reflect on the impact it might have in this area and especially in Puerto Rico.

American officials have been quoted as stating that neither the Compact of Free Associ ation with Micronesia nor the Northern Marianas Covenant has any bearing whatsoever on the political status of Puerto Rico or of any other area. That position is consistent with the historical United States stand which in simplified form can be put thus: 1) the US is not a colonial power; 2) the US has never had colonies, therefore, 3) the US does not have a colonial policy.

Neat and simple but also very disingenuous. United States policy has been described as a ‘flexible approach which tailors political status to the particular requirements of each area’. The fact is that such ‘flexibility’ has been very well used to suit United States needs and/or desires. It is that flexibility which has allowed the US to deal differently with the Philip pines, Alaska and Hawaii, Guam, American Samoa, Micronesia, the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico. It is not too far-fetched to suspect that the so-called flexibility may have another side to it a side

which has allowed the US government to do whatever it wants under the guise of de fence, security or some other alleged imperative. That kind of ‘non-policy’ allows the US to have at present no fewer than five different kinds of territories within its orbit, and it is invoked to claim that what is done in one of them does not affect the others and vice versa. Frankly, this policy of ‘not having a policy’ appears to be a most convenient device.

This kind of self-serving manoeuvring on the part of the US ought to impel all the pertinent offshore areas to de velop stronger links and to establish a closer relationship than has been the case to date.

In fact the transcendent import ance and relevance of this conference lies precisely in its potential to serve as an initial step for the promotion of a better integration and articu lation among us. It is high time that every one of us got to know much better and in much more detail what really is going on in each one of the areas. We should no longer allow a so called ‘flexible approach’ to be used against our peoples’ legit imate desires for improvement.

Much less should we tolerate

that such desires be dismissed by some US official saying that what has been conceded else where has no bearing whatso ever on the other situations.

That is simply no longer accept able. Now that Micronesia has been the first to engage in what to some extent has been bilat eral negotiation and is or was at the brink of getting what she wants we should all do our best to see that that is ac complished. We should all put our efforts together so that no ‘full review’ based on a so-called ‘flexible approach’ is used to con her out of what is rightly hers.

As far as Puerto Rico is concerned the compact of free association that has been agreed to by the US and Micronesia’s representatives should serve as a stimulus for the improvement of its present commonwealth status.

If there is one point of agreement among Puerto Rican leaders and the people in gen eral it is that our current situation is highly unsatisfac tory and that change is needed.

Those of us who favour auton omy and free association must strive for the attainment of the improvements that will trans form commonwealth into a legitimate and acceptable pol itical status both domestically and internationally. For that the Micronesian experience may well serve to orient our endeav ours in the right direction.

But, what about our partner to the north? Is it capable of rising to the heights required by the contemporary world? It is indeed ironic that as decoloni sation is coming to an end the United States is being in creasingly perceived as the last great coloniser. Will it be that the closing chapter of the decolonisation story will be smirch the country that after World War II was the hope of the oppressed peoples and countries?

Indeed, things have changed and the image the United States now projects is far from being the one it had in that not so distant past. The way Americans have dealt with their offshore areas has undoubtedly been a factor promoting that negative image. The rumblings coming from the new adminis

tration are not the least encour aging. First we are told that the Compact of Free Association that resulted from more than eleven years of hard nego tiations and that was duly initialled last October by US and Micronesian representa tives is scheduled for a ‘full review’ by the Washington side.

In addition, the acceptance of the resignation of Ambassador Rosenblatt, who had so ably headed the American team in the negotiations with the Micronesians for the last difficult three years, has also been a source of deep worry.

The intended ‘full review’ without Mr Rosenblatt’s par ticipation and in the context of such recent actions taken by President Reagan as the with drawal of a fisheries treaty with Canada from consider ation by the Senate, holding up American participation in the Law of the Sea Conference, and the dismissal of a commission appointed by President Carter to examine the claims of native Hawaiians growing out of the annexation of their islands by the US in 1898, does not bode well for Micronesia.

But it also may prove harm ful for the US if they don’t deal fairly with this situation. It is high time for the US to shed the requirement for subordination that has so obviously character ised American policy in its dealings with the offshore areas.

Of course, it is within its powers not to do so, but that would be at a price. Though it is true that in the international scenario we may not be all that relevant, on the other hand we are not completely powerless.

The offshore areas would be in a much better position if we could present a more united front opposite US intentions. I be lieve we should strive for this.

Moreover, in the contempor ary world there are other ways and other forums in which we can be heard. That possibility should not be ignored either.

Certainly, it would be more enlightened and convenient for the US to avoid all that and to deal differently, and in a fairer, more equitable and even handed way with its offshore areas. Unfortunately, from here and now, there is not much

room for hope.

Juan R.

Fernandez.

2. The scuttling

Of Unclos

The Reagan administration threw a huge spanner in the works of the seven-year-old United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in March when it announced that it was ‘reviewing’ its policy on the whole matter. The an nouncement came just two days before the final session of the conference was due to begin.

Now, a new UNCLOS session is scheduled for Geneva in August.

The US action has caused dismay among many developed countries and outrage among developing countries, not least those in the Pacific. Most of the precious seabed mineral re sources potato-like nodules containing nickel, cobalt, manganese and copper lie on the floor of the Pacific. Islands leaders have repeatedly voiced the hopes of future economic

benefit to their countries flow ing from these resources.

Reporting from Washington in The Sydney Morning Her ald, Australian journalist Mike Steketee wrote in April: ‘Most of the members of the 158 delegations have become con vinced that the US is out to scuttle the proposed treaty be cause of pressure from private American mining interests. ‘There are also dark mutter ings in the recesses of the Reagan administration that the proposed treaty is all a Soviet plot . . . ‘Five mining consortia have developed the technology to the point where mining (the seabed) could become feasible in several years. Four of those five consortia have substantial US participation. ‘This is where the clash of interests occurs. The mining

companies say that, if they go to the trouble of mining the deep sea, the profits should be theirs. ‘The developing countries ob ject to the US plundering re sources it does not own.’ (The principle adopted by UNCLOS is that the seabed minerals are ‘the common heritage of man kind’).

The compromise in the draft treaty is the creation of an international authority to con trol development of the nodules. ‘With the lofty name of The Enterprise, it would issue li cences to private companies for mining and it would charge a royalty, much as national governments do now. ‘ln addition, The Enterprise would be entitled to establish a mine for each one developed by private industry. ‘The profits from this, together with the royalty, would be distributed to poor nations. ‘lt would be one step towards narrowing the gap between the developed and the developing world a gap that has widened greatly in recent years, mainly because of soaring oil costs. ‘Some elements in the Reagan administration believe this all smacks too much of a Soviet-inspired model of central planning. ‘The perceived Soviet plot comes from the fact that the Russians, while they have their own abundant reserves of the minerals found in the deep sea, want to limit US access to them so that the Americans have to continue relying on potentially unstable suppliers in Africa.’

Steketee described the man ner in which the US about-face was effected as ‘an object lesson in how not to conduct diplo macy’. He recorded the follow ing sequence of events: • On March 7, two days before the final session of UNCLOS was due to begin, the administration sacked the head of the US delegation, George Aldrich, and most of his senior staff. • One US delegate learnt of his dismissal while reading a newspaper on his way to the conference. • American allies, including Australia, found out about it in the same way, despite the administration’s lavish prom ises of a new era of co-operation.

• James Malone, an in coming assistant secretary of state, was appointed to replace Mr Aldrich. • Because of Mr Malone’s limited background in law-of the-sea issues, Leigh Ratiner was added to the delegation. (Mr Ratiner, from 1977 to 1979, was a lobbyist for Kennecott Corporation, a lead ing member of one of the deep sea consortia and the company most vocal of all in its oppo sition to the treaty.) Steketee summed up: ‘While the administration has been extraordinarily taciturn, it is clear that the “policy review” is a euphemism for rewriting the treaty to give the mining com panies a bigger return some thing which probably is imposs ible at this stage or keeping it in limbo indefinitely. ‘ln the meantime, the American companies could well decide to start mining, since they already have the backing of a unilateral US law on seabed mining. ‘That would mean the nego tiations that Mr Elliot Richardson, a former head of the US delegation, described as “the most significant single event in the history of peaceful co-operation since the founding of the United Nations” would dissolve into a more typical bout of international wrangling.’

Asking questions

on Vanuatu

Two distinguished citizens of the new nation of Vanuatu visited Australia in March- April as guests of the Austra lian Government. They were Grace and Sela Molisa, respect ively deputy secretary of the prime minister’s department and general manager of the Vanuatu Co-operative Feder ation.

They travelled extensively throughout Australia during their three-week stay, and dur ing their visit to Sydney the husband and wife team agreed to be interviewed by PIM.

PIM used as a basis for the interview several points raised in a letter we had received from an expatriate resident of Vanuatu who, while friendly to the government, made a num

ber of criticisms of its work since independence. The Melisas answered the questions with great poise. Only once or twice did a note of impatience appear at what they evidently saw as poorly informed atti tudes on the part of the writer.

Point 1: The government has made little progress in econ omic development since inde pendence.

Comment: We don’t want to make excuses for the lack of action in this field, but the fact is that the condominium powers made no preparations for the setting-up of an independent state. This has left us with many problems of all kinds, not least in the economic field. It is doubtful if any other country has faced problems of such magnitude on attaining inde pendence.

On top of this, we have had the problem of the Santo se cession. This again we believe to have been a unique set of cir cumstances.

We know that there should be proper economic planning, so that the country can take off on a sound fooling. But we’ve had to neglect things that we knew to be essential. However, de spite the difficult beginning, we are doing all we can to steer ourselves on to the right course as quickly as possible. For example, a National Economic Development Committee has been set up. It has the job of charting a course of economic development for the next five or 10 years.

A second thing we believe to be important is that the public service survey being done by experts from the United Nations Development Pro gramme should be complete by about the middle of the year.

This will give us an idea of the kind of public service our country can afford.

What happened at indepen dence is that the condominium powers landed three separate administrations in our lap British, French, and joint and left it to us to sort things out. One thing was obvious: they were too expensive.

Some salary levels were too high, some too low. It was crazy. The British and French had entirely different ideas. A trained British nursing sister

was getting the same money as a French trainee nurse. Trained British specialists were paid the same as a French messenger.

We have high hopes that the UNDP survey will help us greatly in sorting out the tangle.

Point 2: There are only three French-speaking soldiers in the Vanuatu Defence Force and I would like to know what advantages members of the force enjoy that are not avail able to other people.

Comment: Taking the second point first. The Vanuatu Mobile Force is the correct name of this new body. These people are policemen. After returning from Papua New Guinea, they do three months training in police duties. As civil servants, they get exactly the same pay as anyone else coming into any department.

On the first point, we believe there are at least 10 or more French-speaking members in the force from Erakor village near Port-Vila.

In general, we’re surprised that anyone who’s lived in the country, and who understands anything about it especially about the French education system, and its links with the Catholic Church would ask this question.

Point 3. There has been much discussion of the circum stances surrounding the sack ing of the expatriate former managing director of Vanua Navigation, Claus Bjornum.

Why did it happen?

Comment: Vanua Navigation is a shipping company which is owned 10% by the Vanuatu Government, 50% by the Vanuatu Co-operative Feder ation, and 40% by the Noumea based Sofrana Unilines. It is concerned with freight handling, principally in Santo and Port-Vila.

Sofrana in particular thought that the previous manager was too ‘soft’ towards the Co operative Federation. So, from November 1, 1980, Mr Bjornum was brought in as managing director, with par ticular responsibility for stevedoring. He was a very tough guy, very professional in stevedoring matters.

On January 26 Mr Bjornum sent letters to company em ployees. Fifty-two of them were

informed by letter that they were dismissed.

The government felt that there was a political motive in the action, and objected par ticularly to the fact that no notice had been given to those who were sacked. This, in sum mary, is why Mr Bjornum’s work permit in Vanuatu was terminated. (Sela Molisa, as general man ager of the majority share holder company in Vanua Navi gation, continued: I was in formed four days before the people were sacked. If it had been brought up at a board meeting, I could have argued it out as a director. After it had happened, I was called to the prime minister’s office, and I expressed my view that I would have preferred some expatriates to be sacked.

The order dismissing Claus was authorised by the prime minister.) Point 4. Opposition member Father Gerard Leymang charges the government with surrendering control of Vanuatu’s affairs to expatriate advisers and his charge seems plausible to anyone who has an evening drink on the terrace of the Hotel Rossi.

Comment: We were pleased to see this statement by Father Leymang.

Back in 1979, the political situation reached the point where it was agreed that the Vanuaaku Party (VP) would participate in government, and so the Government of National Unity was formed. In accord ance with the principles of the VP, its ministers moved into government with entirely local staff. Their intention was also to work without expatriate ad visers.

But the political situation was very difficult, and compromises had to be made. So each VP minister took on two advisers, one British, one French. But their staffs remained all Black.

But Chief Minister Father Leymang, on the other hand, was entirely surrounded by Whites. No Bislama was spoken in his office. He even had a French submariner as his first secretary.

That’s why we’re so pleased that Father Leymang has woken up.