Defence within ... or without
p. 35 · Read in the full issue
DOES New Zealand need a defence force?
It’s a question that crops up every now and again and the arguments have probably never been as persuasive as they are today.
The fall of communism in Europe and the apparent ending of Soviet expansionism have removed half a century’s need to prepare to fight the Red Peril. As a Defence White Paper published earlier this year noted: “There are no direct threats to our security”.
The country’s economic plight, which is forcing dramatic cuts in social welfare spending and unprecedented trimming of government expenditure in many other areas, enforces the case against maintaining a costly defence establishment that has no obvious enemy. (Defence has not escaped the cuts. Its spending, which has been around two per cent of gross domestic product for many years, is heading down towards 1.6 per cent. But it still consumes more than $1 billion a year.)
The country’s anti-nuclear policy has been in place for more than six years without any of the dire consequential predictions of its opponents coming true. New Zealand survived and there are even signs that the United States may be learning to live with it.
Little wonder that people even those who could never be accused of being isolationist are again asking whether we actually need to continue spending all that money. Is a defence force a bit of a luxury when economically the country is like a poor boy with the seat hanging out of his pants, they ask?
They are not alone, for countries around the world are looking to be able to reduce defence spending in the light of the ending of the Cold War and the consequent easing of international tension.
These are questions of considerable interest to Pacific Island countries. Tokelau, Niue and the Cook Islands have a very direct interest, for New Zealand is constitutionally responsible for their defence. The Treaty of Friendship with Western Samoa has implied obligations, and membership of the South Pacific Forum and the large number of island people in New Zealand make it impossible for this country to overlook regional interests in its foreign and defence policies.
In addition, New Zealand has mutual assistance pro grammes with defence training in one form or another as the main purpose - with the Cooks, Western Samoa, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga and Vanuatu.
To them it would probably be unthinkable that New Zealand should dismantle its defence forces and abdicate its responsibilities and training assistance. If it did, they would almost certainly feel the need to invite other countries to fill the gap a situation that could revive, rather than diminish, tensions in the area.
Anyway, the National government is not about to declare the defence establishment redundant or renege on its commitment to the islands any more than its Labour predecessors would, although they probably had a larger share of pacifists, neutralists and isolationists in their party ranks.
Despite the budgets cut (which the defence establishment insists have been directed at infrastructure rather than operational capabilities) New Zealand forces will continue to be seen in the four- or five-a-year exercises they conduct in the
region.
These give the island states’ military, paramilitary and police forces training that does not cost them a great deal and the New
Zealand Army tropical experience they have not been getting so readily since pulling out of Singapore in 1989.
Since the withdrawal of military co-operation with Fiji after the 1987 military coups, these exercises have been shared more widely with other Pacific countries, giving them more regular links with New Zealand and the defence forces more experience of their neighbours.
To mutual benefit, New Zealand usually combines military exercises with civic action in the form of medical or engineer construction activities which benefit the local communities.
New Zealand forces also maintain a ready ability to assist whenever the natural disasters which hit the Pacific all too frequently strike. The New Zealand Army spent 25,000 man days in the South Pacific last year - and much of it was on reconstruction work following Cyclone Ofa.
New Zealand’s interest is not, of course, entirely altruistic. The White Paper identified three
potential situations which might call for a limited deployment of New Zealand forces in the region the need to evacuate New Zealand citizens, a terrorist threat or attack, and requests for assistance in dealing with low-level threats to law and order.
“Within the South Pacific, security problems will continue to be internal rather than externally inspired,” the paper said.
It deduced that the island states were of little interest to larger powers and had few instabilities that could be exploited.
“New Zealand’s interests are, however, affected by the continuing ability of Pacific Island governments to provide a stable environment for economic growth and social develop ment. Their success, or lack of it, will shape the region’s political stability, migration patterns and the calls on New Zealand’s resources.”
Being able to respond to “low-level contingencies” in the Pacific is thus a key plank of defence policy.
New Zealand has a body called the Ready Reaction Force - effectively an infantry battalion group of up to 2000, including mortars, light artillery, armoured reconaissance vehicles, engineers and logistic support for such
contingencies.
The snag is it does not have enough suitable air or sea transport to move and sustain such a force in the region. As the White Paper pointed out: “Our current airlift capability may not be sufficient for even limited low-level contingencies, and we have no dedicated sealift.”
The Air Force’s five Hercules transport aircraft are about 25 years old and increasingly costly to keep flying. The Navy’s tanker carries fuel but has. little room for stores.
It is this sort of irrational gap (a bit like buying a Mercedes Benz when you can’t drive) that stimulates arguments against having a defence force at all. The anomaly was identified in the 1987 defence review, but although the government is finding money for the new Anzac frigates it has made no provision for the logistic support ship the White Paper said was “a further and essential part of our ability to mount effective operations in the region”.
The White Paper said the capability to deploy “a sizeable force to every Pacific Island” was not warranted. It suggested a converted merchant ship that could go to islands which have seats of government of significant centres of population.
A review on the question is under way but, given the budgetary limitations, nobody in Wellington is holding their breath for a fast government decision. □