Zealand
p. 43 · Read in the full issue
New Zealand
NEW ZEALAND’S decision to break with the United States over the question of nuclear-powered ship visits and its exclusion from US co operation under ANZUS has been met in part by a renewed effort within the South Pacific, in what is being seen as a growing partnership with Australia.
New Zealand has a total armed force of 12,600 regulars and 9325 reservists: the 5800-strong army is made up of two in fantry battalions, one artillery battery, one light armoured squadron and an SAS squadron.
The 2600 strong navy is equipped with four Leander class frigates, four large and four inshore patrol craft, three survey ves sels and one oceanographic vessel.
The 4200-man air force has 43 combat aircraft and seven armed helicopters. It is organised around two FGA squadrons with Skyhawk aircraft, one maritime re connaissance squadron equipped with Orions, one counter-insurgency squadron made up of Strikemasters and one ASW helicopter squadron equipped with Wasp helicopters. This is supported by three transport squadrons of C-130 Hercules,
Andovers and Sioux and Bell UH-IDH helicopters. There is also a training wing.
One infantry battalion with support ing logistic units is presently deployed in Singapore, but is to be withdrawn. A 35man force is deployed to the Multi-Na tional Force (MNF) in the Sinai.
The NZ Government’s Defence White Paper, released early last year, points to a greater defence self-reliance and a greater capability to operate within the South and Southwestern Pacific. A major program for the modernisation and expansion of the RNZN has been announced to achieve these aims. This includes a new fleet tanker, a new multi-purpose logistic sup port ship and the projected one-for-one re placement of New Zealand’s frigates during the 1990 s probably in conjunc tion with the Australian Light Patrol Frig ate program.
There can be little doubt that the col lapse of ANZUS, problems of decoloni sation, superpower rivalry and external intrusion have changed forever the con cept of a tranquil and remote Oceania.
The region’s states still remain gener ally pro-Western in their outlook, but are now beginning to appreciate their new im portance and are moving to extend their international contacts. As a result, the re gion’s political and strategic environment has become much more complex as some island nations are beginning to question conventional security arrangements.
Such problems, however, should not be over-emphasised. There is a vast wellspr ing of goodwill and co-operation, and a common awareness within the region of the need to contain US and Soviet aggres sion and for closer economic and military ties. With luck and increased respect for the opinions of others the Pacific could be allowed to live up to its name. □
