Can the US recover

in the Pacific?

The US influence in the South-West Pacific has been recently very much weakened. The event most directly contributing to bring her troubles to a head was New Zealand’s refusal to admit nuclear ships and Amer ica’s consequent breaking of their military alliance. This quarrel initially caused con siderable dismay and concern among the Pacific Islands coun tries. Indeed, the Prime Minister of the Cook Islands, a country having a special relationship with New Zealand, was so appalled at the thought of the consequences of the withdra wal of American nuclear protec tion that he conceived the best hope for his country’s safety lay in a formal declaration of neutrality.

So we all held our breath.

And what happened? Nothing.

The Russians did not leap into the breach. New Zealand was not bombed. In fact, of course, the Russians seized a golden diplomatic opportunity and ex pressed their sympathy with Wellington’s position. The months passed and New Zea land still existed carefree enough outside the American umbrella without any devastat ing consequences for itself or the Region. And gradually Paci fic Island countries became aware of a fresh option avail able to them. The Cook Islands’ neutrality was regarded with new eyes.

But old habits and ways of thinking die hard. American has among the nations of the South Pacific, and certainly in my own country of Papua New Guinea, a rich resource of friendship and affection. Even the years of tuna-boat diplomacy and both my own country in 1982 and the Solomon Islands in 1984 were faced with US trade sanctions when they arrested US boats fishing illegally

Russia’s new policy towards the South Pacific and its implications for regional security were key issues discussed at a recent Washington conference entitled “The Red Orchestra Instruments of Soviet Policy in the South West Pacific” and sponsored by the Hoover Institution.

Papers covered Soviet objectives in the region, Libya’s developing links, and efforts by elements in the media, the trade unions, the churches and the peace movement to promote anti-American sentiment.

Tony Siaguru’s paper was a conference highlight. A member of PNG’s Parliament, leader of the “League for National Advancement” party, a former Minister in the Somare Government and a former Secretary for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Mr Siaguru spoke with considerable authority. His frank warning that US policy continued to alienate South Pacific opinion startled the mainly American audience. His criticism of the US administra tion for its refusal to sign the protocols of the SP Nuclear Free Zone Treaty rankled those in the audience who had been involved in the decision. But his general critique of American indifference to the region touched responsive chords among those urging the US to lift its game.

From a special correspondent.

even tuna-boat diplomacy left much of that resource intact.

When the Americans negoti ated a broad fishing agreement with the countries of the region, finally providing us with appropriate returns for access to our marine wealth, a major souring of relations was re moved. With this evidence of a re-invigorated American in terest in our welfare, a new era seemed heralded.

And yet at the very moment almost of a new, auspicious direction in responsible leader ship by the US in the South- West Pacific, we were abruptly dumped back to square one by the US’s refusal to sign the protocols of the Treaty of Raro tonga.

There has been much mis understanding about what ex actly those protocols deman ded. Certainly there was a declaration of a nuclear-free zone by the Treaty, but in substance the articles were far

from being the blanket embar go on nuclear armaments that some American commentators have made out. One Australian journalist, indeed, headed his piece: “The Raratonga Treaty: a not-so-nuclear free zone”.

And, in fact, a keen awareness of American nuclear concerns was evident.

In particular, a loophole per mitting US nuclear ships a presence in the area was pur posely left in. The major aims of the Treaty were, or course, to try to pressurise the French over their Moruroa activities and convey a general warning against nuclear waste dumping in the ocean. Rawdon Dalrym ple, Australian Ambassador to the US, commented: “There was no joy in this treaty for (anyone) that wishes to upset the security status quo in the South Pacific. We see it as a valuable opportunity for the US to reaffirm its abiding interest in the security, stability and wel fare of the Region”.

Signing the protocols was, if you will excuse the pun, the acid test of America’s friend ship. And thus surfaced the American dilemma in the South-West Pacfic.

The dilemma is simply that America finds it impossible to combine with conviction the two roles of superpower and good neighbor. Wellington’s defiance had served to expose the essential conflict. Once the US right to determine what was and what was not good for the security of the South-West Pacific was challenged from within the region, then the real basis of her policy stood re vealed.

We must assume the US weighed carefully the pros and cons of its own intransigence in dealing with Wellington. Why then did she not temporize in the interests of regional solidar ity? Another two years would have seen a general election in New Zealand and an official poll made it clear the electorate were evenly divided, if not very confused, over the nuclear ships issue and the need of the American nuclear umbrella.

The answer must be that the US was apprehensive of the demonstration effect of the New Zealand action on its allies elsewhere, in Europe and the Far East particularly. In other words, global consideratons, not regional interests per se, determined the strategic think ing she applied to the South- West Pacific.

At the same time the US has not given up a direct appeal to those tenets of an old faith, and it has launched a new dip lomatic drive, still sea-borne, but naval rather than piscatorial as before.

Both these approaches have been inaugurated quite recently and my comments here are based entirely on Papua New Guinea’s experience of them,

so they may not serve to generalise to the region as a whole.

On short acquaintance, I suggest neither approach is reassuring from the Pacific Islander’s perspective.

American naval diplomacy amved in Papua New Guinea a few weeks ago m the j*>reon of Admiral Lyons the US Pacific Reel commander, in whose care we in the Region could presumably be entrusted one day if things go wrong internationally.

The Admiral kindly spelt things out large and plain in case we Melanesians had difficulty grasping the issue.

“When you do business with the Soviets, there is no free lunch”, he warned. “They are clearly after more than fish. It’s got to be the most expensive fish in the world”. My only comment on that is that if the Russian tuna is the most expensive in the world, the ATA’s must have been the cheapest, The Admiral sagely sug-

gested we should be sure of our surveillance capacity before let ting in the Russian trawlers, again with unerring skill hitting on the spot left tender from our experience with the American tuna boats.

Frankly I think the American effort m need to be a Me more subtle Somone needs tQ remind Admiral tfs Russians who are supposed to be th(e bears Unbelievably, the Japanese effort has hardly been a cut * bove Admiral’s as far as P Q P ua New Guinea has been concerned, Altruism has always been difficult to establish in the en tanglement of commercial and political interests that so characterises the Japanese pre sence in the South-West Pad fic. However, given the import ance which the US obviously attaches to the mission pressed on Japan, one would have thought the latter might have proceeded with more care.

In Mr Kuranari’s Suva speech on 14th January, we had the standard calls for recognition of the transcendental ties binding those on the Rim to those in the Basin in the development of the Pacific for the common good a long recognisable indication, together with comments on the beauty of our islands, that we are about to be asked to follow someone else’s interests. Aid hand-outs were assured, though as usual those receiving were not to be allowed to determine the modalities.

Pronounced Mr Kuranari: “In the spirit of neighbourly friend ship and open-mindedness, Japan seeks to work with the Pacific Island countries in con tributing to their development”.

How did these sentiments go down in my own country of Papua New Guines? A cynical observer may well have felt the timing had been arranged by the Russians. We were in the middle of a brawl with the Japanese Fishing Association: it

was threatening us with govern ment aid and trade sanctions if we insisted on raising our traw ler licence fees to a commercial level. Shades of the ATA. The sequel to that, by the way, and I am sure you have already gues sed it, is that the Russians have intimated their interest in a fishing agreement with Papua New Guinea. The government says it well treat any Russian proposal on its (commercial) merits.

The latest development is that talks with the Japanese Fishing Association broke down when the latter rejected com pletely all suggestions of com promise. Mr Kuranari mean while, in a statement issued in Tokyo disclaimed all re sponsibility for commercial mat ters. Again, shades of ATA.

Do you wonder then our reactions were mixed when at the official reception for Mr Kuranari, in reply to the wel come speech of our Foreign Affairs Minister, the guest of honour, declining to speak, in stead showed his skill with a display of conjuring tricks. Was there a hidden message for us we wondered?

So what are the prospects in the South-West Pacific? Well here’s my own personal prog nosis for what it’s worth.

Unless the US can demons trate that its policy in the South- West Pacific is not simply re sidual to its global strategy concerns, then as the situation clarifies with time the appeal of some form of internationally sanctioned regional neutrality is going to grow. Conservative leaders and old friends of the US such as Ratu Mara and Michael Somare may not lead such a movement, but their will to oppose newer, younger, more radical leaders will be much eroded. Mew Zealand, increasingly a pariah as far as the US is concerned, will pre sumably be happy, if not anxious, to give such a move ment its blessing and direction.

Nor should one forget Aus tralia. She prizes her leadership role in the South-West Pacific and has shown a lot of empathy with Pacific Island aspirations.

She has also always been a firm advocate of the protection of

Tony Siagaru

the American Umbrella in the area. Clearly there are potential contradictions. At the moment Australia is prepared to make sacrifices for US interests. But Australia like the Pacific Island countries suffer greatly from the US and Japanese trade restric tions.

So far Mr Hawke has resisted pressures at home to link trade and strategic issues. But for how long is such a one-sided arrangement expected to last? •Already Australia’s response to Mr Kuranari’s call for a Tokyo- Canberra axis has been cool.

And the Russians? I think the US has to accept they are in the South-West Pacific to stay.

America’s own benign neglect opened the door and Russia seized her opportunity. She is now proceeding with care and caution, studiously avoiding any possible cause of confront ation with the US on the one hand and providing every reassurance to the Island coun tries on the other. The very arrival of the Russians has de stroyed the bogey-man myth. If the US was to manufacture an international incident in the Re gion, island sentiment might well side with the Russians.

Pacific Island leaders are cer tainly sufficiently aware of the dangers of allowing Russia a political toehold in their coun tries to take the necessary pre ventative measures. But it would be hard for anyone to deny that the presence of the Russians has brought and con tinues to bring, directly and vicariously, much economic benefit to the impoverished Pacific Island states. Even if Russia is paying over the mar ket price for facilities, we stand a little taller with this form of aid than we do with the usual tied hand-outs.

In contrast with her intransi gence over Wellington’s de fiance and the Raratonga Pro tocols, the US was swift in her courtship of the Pacific Islands coutries to counter the intrusion of Russian trawlers. A $6O million fishing agreement over five years was a considerable sweetener to make up for years of benign neglect under tuna boat diplomacy. But, of course, here the US was dealing with what was primarily a question

of regional security. This distinction was lost on many Pacific Island leaders who com plained bitterly of American inconsistency when the fishing agreement was followed by re jection of the Raratonga Pro tocols.

The US is now faced with an accelerated Russian commer cial and diplomatic expansion

in the Pacific Island countries at the very time the dilemma in her own policy-making has broken the pro-US solidarity of the region (the two of course are not unconnected). How has she set about retrieving the situation and to what effect?

In a move which gives impli cit recognition of the constraints of her own situation, America

has called on her non-military strategic partner, Japan, to play a major role in revitalising, not so much pro-Western senti ment, as the traditionally held concept of a West-East polarisation: a more subtle approach to try and bring about once more the coincidence of regional and global security fears and needs.