Verdict on Britain in Pacific War

It all seems a long, long time ago, fhat Pacific war of 1941-45, but it still provides fodder for historical research and reappraisal. At a distance of over 30 years, this can at least be done without emo tional involvement and this Dr Peter Lowe sets out to do in Great Britain and the Origins of the Pacific War.

The origins of Britain’s in volvement in the Pacific War, says the author, stretch back into the 19th century but for his present work he has placed the emphasis on the years be tween 1937 and the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbour, December 7, 1941. He then poses the question as to whether Britain should bear some responsibility for the war and whether or not it could have been avoided.

His conclusion is that neither Britain nor the United States was primarily re sponsible for the conflict that it was the logical result of Japanese aggression, ambition and concept of itself as crea tor of a so-called co-prosperi

ty sphere in SE Asia and the Pacific.

By 1937 Britain was alrea dy in decline as an Asian power although few then realised it and was soon to be engaged in a full-scale war with the Axis Powers in Europe. It tended to regard the growing aggression of Japan in the Pacific as an American affair and Churchill and others were careful not to rock the boat so that this remained so.

The actual attack on Pearl Harbour, which brought the United States into the world conflict, created an initial euphoria in Britain and the Commonwealth which soon gave way to a “sober realisa tion of the truly world dimen sions of the war now being waged.”

Both Britain and the US fell down in underestimating the strength and fighting qualities of the Japanese, believing that their successes in China were due to weaknesses on the Chinese side. When, or if, they came up against trained

Western troops it would be a different story, or so it was believed.

They were soon undeceiv ed. The first seven months of the Pacific War was a period of unrelieved disaster for the Allies, with the sea battles of the Coral Sea and Midway, now regarded as a turning point, but unrecognised as such at the time.

Of all the disasters, the most serious was, undoubtedly, what happened in the Malayan Peninsula and in Singapore where the British were fully responsible, and where the Japanese found them totally unprepared.

The British forces were, ac cording to General Pownall, who was in process of taking over command during the first weeks of the Japanese at tack, “out-generalled, outwit ted and outfought ... a great blow to the honour and prestige of the Army ... We have been outmatched by be tter soldiers.”

The morale and efficiency of the RAF units were

affected by the general malaise that had white-anted the service units in Malaya before hostilities began, and sank even lower when the Japanese showed from the start great air superiority.

The Navy never recovered from the sinking of the Prince of Wales and Repulse which Churchill had sent, against advice, to the area in the hope of impressing the Japanese.

The Malayan campaign wai at an end in a matter of weeks A different history of the wai in the Pacific might have beer written if the British forces there had been better pre pared and better led.

Thirty-three years latei much of what the Unitec States, Britain, the Nether lands and Australia wen fighting to preserve has hap pened anyway. Was it al worthwhile? In the context o that time? Certainly. Jud] Tudor. (GREAT BRITAIN AND THE ORIGINS OF THE PACIFIC WAR. Oxford University Press >21.)