The news magazine of the South Pacific · since 1930

Pacific Islands Monthly, 1 October 1965Vol. 36, No. 10

Urgent Need To Build Up

p. 17 · Read in the full issue

New Britain Defences

By Ron Levi

If we are to have a defence force established in the New Guinea area, and it looks very much as if we are, then it is of the utmost importance that the planners give grave considera tion to the building up of the island of New Britain before

anything else.

BRITAIN is the strategic hub of the New Guinea Islands, md no defence of the New Guinea nainland is possible unless this sland is secured and held.

The Japanese were well aware of his fact when they made it the ►bjective of their initial attack on 4ew Guinea in January, 1942.

They went straight to New Britain nd secured it before making another love, south or east.

In the case of war in the New juinea area, New Britain would be ery much in the same position, and serve the same purpose as

Malta during the North African Campaign in Word War II as it is easily defended, besides being the geographical pivot for the whole area.

If we examine the problem of defending New Guinea today we will recognise that any attack will come from the same direction, and follow the same pattern as it did in 1942, and will be mounted in one of two ways.

It will either be infiltrating, guerilla warfare from across the border, or a lightning total attack.

In the first case, with New Britain well secured and in our hands, it is the ideal advance base for strike and patrol aircraft, and a jumping off place for airborne troops.

This is because—and this is im portant—it is well protected from the possibility of sneak guerilla at tacks on airfields by the surrounding ocean.

One has only to take a cursory look at the effectiveness of guerillas in Vietnam to realise the importance of this.

Secondly New Britain is ideally situated for aircraft sweeps over the border.

If the old wartime strip at Vunakanau were brought back to operational standard, it would provide a strike base within 650 miles of any part of the West New Guinea border.

As an alternative base, Hoskins, further south, would be 500 from the border.

If we are to expect a total attack,

New Britain must be strengthened and made secure NOW, as un doubtedly it would be the focal point of the initial attack because: • The invader would have to protect his flank. • It is the logical situation for an advanced naval base and stores depot because of its well-protected, deep-water harbours, besides being the geographical centre for a push south and east.

Undefendable

Whoever holds New Britain holds the key to the defence of the New Guinea mainland. With New Britain in enemy hands the mainland is undefendable.

The whole of New Britain’s 800 or 900 miles of north-eastern coast line is open to an enemy. The Jap anese knew this, even though they were in virtual control of all the islands to the east and north-west.

With it in our hands, well-equipped and well-manned, any attack from the only other alternative route could be thwarted.

When will this attack come? In my opinion, at the end of the war in Vietnam, whether the Communists win or lose.

Don’t let us be caught twice un prepared.

The Communist drive southwards is already well under way, and pro gressing very favourably for them.

The Vietnam war is almost won, Indonesia is primed and ready for an all-out switch to Communism.

There is only New Guinea left!

If you trace the route from Peking through Vietnam, along the Indo nesian chain of islands to New Guinea, then turn sharply south to Brisbane, it looks remarkably like a giant sickle.

ore trained men such as Sergeant [?]uwe, of Popondetta, Papua, a member the Pacific Islands Regiment, are eded to defend New Britain, according the author of this article. Sergeant [?]uwe is showing how to fire the M-60 general purpose machine-gun.

This map shows the position of crescent shaped New Britain and its chief town, Rabaul, in relation to Australia, the main land of New Guinea and other Pacific islands.