Commentary

ere Will South Seas

k for Protection?

E political future of all the Euro pean communities in the South ic—from Australia, down to Pit —has been changing, through lational developments, since d War II. The pace of the je is accelerating, cept that a few of us recognised lenace of Japan, we felt secure up until 1940-42. The European is which planted us in the South in the 18th and 19th centuries ;d quite capable of protecting us nitely. w—as the United Nations tic surrender of Dutch New :a to a Soviet-backed Indonesia down —we appear to be isolated, xpendable. e Cold War, carried on tire by the Reds since 1945, has cut f from Europe; and now we that we may not depend upon d States. We are on our own. nout of the Red Dragon, thrust outh-eastwards from Asia, may ly be seen. It emphasises our llessness, and the uselessness of O. :ause America saved us in 1942 the Japs, we are inclined to that we similarly may be pro . against Red Asia. In 1942-45, /er, possession of the South c was necessary to the US in mpaign against Japan. The same leration does not enter into ica’s struggle against the Soviets, it or future. had hoped that sentiment would factor in bringing the Americans r help, in a crisis. Washington’s il abandonment of the Dutch, its encouragement of the Itering Soekarno, now give us measure of our own future ex lions. cold fact, United States itself is [ beset, in its own hemisphere.

Communist implantation in i which is being widened and fthened by Moscow, and the growing swing of the whole i American continent towards nunism, pose a problem for ington beside which the anxieties pr little European nations in outh Pacific count as nothing, wever. the whole Western world, I being demonstrated by the non Market discussions in Lon and Brussels, is in a state of

imminent, far-reaching change. Some thing yet may come of it to improve our prospects.

As in the past half-century, We should keep our eye on Germany— and France They both want Britain in the Common Market, so as to complete the Western barrier against Russia— and so as to prevent Britain, with the help of her own Commonwealth, building a powerful, rival Common Market right alongside them.

Britain, being pushed in that direc tion by the US, and being deeply troubled over her own economic out look, will join the Six in the Euro pean market—unless her own electors rebel.

When Britain goes into the Common Market, or even if she chooses deliberately to stay out, there will be changes in our South Pacific world which cannot now be visualised.

Much will depend upon the respective attitudes of Britain, France and United States.

The apparent intention of France to establish a nuclear weapons base at isolated Mangareva Island (see article on p. 44) could mean that France has recognised some obliga tion to protect her South Pacific Territories; but it probably means only that, being now deprived of the use of the Sahara Desert, France pro poses to use the lonely Pacific Island for bomb-testing purposes, as the US uses Johnston, and Britain does Christmas Island.

France has no love of her neigh bours, either British or German. The reasons may be found in many centuries of history. The TV screen never carried a more extraordinary picture than those recent photographs of De Gaulle being feted by crowds in Germany. Nothing like that hap pened when Konrad Adenauer visited France, recently- It would be comforting to have France on our side in protecting the South Pacific against Asia; but it is very unlikely. France suffered cruelly in trying to hold Southeast Asia and North Africa against nationalism’s tides. She cannot be expected to make sacrifices for New Caledonia and Polynesia, and her tenuous interests in New Hebrides.

If Britain enters the Common Market, France could become the greatest menace to the future in terests of the British Commonwealth countries. Because her huge agri cultural industries are moving rapidly

from primitive peasant individualism to big-scale power-farming, France already is gravely embarrassed by over-production of temperate-zone foodstuffs; and unquestionably she will try to take the places of Aus tralia, Canada and New Zealand in the British markets.

With Indonesia (in which the only big political factor influencing Soekarno is the Indonesian Com munist Party) right on our doorstep; with the principal Pacific Territories facing a well of political uncertainty; with Japan hammering at our doors, offering the markets which Britain now may close to us; with an un skilled young President fumbling with America’s rather terrifying problems of economics and defence—with all these, there is a call upon Australia, as never before, for statesmanship and leadership in the South Pacific. Given a union with New Zealand, Australia could speak as a solid European nation of nearly 14 million people.

But where are our statesmen? We have a brilliant leader in Australia’s R. G. Menzies—but, after that, our political “leaders” fall sharply away to insignificance.

The Australian public seems gener ally indifferent to Australia’s grow ing dangers—probably the result of reading too many newspapers wherein principles are subverted to sensationalism and profits, and of listening to radio services dominated by the squeals of teddy-boys and the monotonous quackings of Uni versity “news analysts”.

But there is now a perceptible uneasiness among the people of Australia and New Zealand regard ing their future. Perhaps the urgent occasion may yet produce the leaders, despite newspaper obfuscation and radio incompetence.—RWR.

Dangers 'tiot Great 1

Says Sir Hugh Foot

THE effect of the Foot UN Mission report upon public thinking in Papua and New Guinea, both Euro pean and native, was so disturbing that the Australian Minister for Terri tories found it desirable to go to Port Moresby and make a reassuring state ment (see p. 69) about Australian policies in P-NG.

In the circumstances, these extracts from a personal letter from Sir Hugh Foot, to a friend in Australia, are of special interest: “I was very sorry that our report on New Guinea got off to such a bad start in Australia. I remain con vinced that it would be very much in the interests of Australia to get a

really representative legislature estab lished so that the sound views of the people of New Guinea can be heard and respected . . .

“I make only two points about the proposal of our Mission that pre parations should go ahead for a repre sentative Parliament in Australian New Guinea and Papua, First, it takes a year or two to make these preparations, and my experience is that it can be a serious mistake to put this off. If no preparations are made it may well appear in a year or two that a representative body would be most useful, but it will not be possible to create it in a hurry.

“Secondly, what our Mission pro posed was merely a representative legislature. We well recognise that Ministerial Government must come at a later stage—and, in fact, even with a representative legislature, Australian control of policy and of finance would continue.

“I really don’t think that the dangers are anything like as great as some people have made out.”

It may be assumed that Sir Hugh was pushed one way by UN-US de colonisation pressures, and another way by his own wisdom and ex perience.

Mr. C. J. Stace, legal officer of the New Zealand Department of Island Territories, is to visit Niue in his capacity as Judge of the Cook Islands Native Land Court to deal with complex matters awaiting the court’s attention. He will also discuss with the Niue Island Assembly a pro posal to revise the land titles system of Niue.