Commentary
pp. 25-26 · Read in the full issue
nd Purpose And
■ter of South
fic Commission
sTTS and developments in the mth Pacific have moved fast le creation of the South Pacific ission—l4 years ago. :ould be time for the six ;ible nations (Australia, , France, New Zealand, United md The Netherlands) to make ounting, and see whether the and estimates which formed :kground of the Commission ve been justified.
Commission has performed iseful service, in the gathering -ordination and filing (in a readily accessible) a great data covering economic and onditions in the South Pacific ■ies, and in the Trust Terri- Micronesia. any realist will say that it aut reached the limit of its jss, and that the huge sum ds each year could be more ;ly spent in giving practical a many of its more important rience has shown that the >sion in practice, has been, increasingly limited by: ► rather isolated location in nch Territory of New Cale ; complete lack of authority kind—it can do no more ither and classify data, and reports hopefully on to its iber Governments. The latter, and more, are being ssed by the Territories’ for “self-government” and problems of too-rapid popu ;rowth; and they have less s time and inclination to ic conscientious work of the Lesearch Council, e Commission has no stand ever in relation to administra [t has been helpful in the i of experience between nents. It has not achieved like what was hoped in the ation of administrative ry in relation to economic, political conditions, alteration in the charter or it under which the Corn functions, the organisation
e changed immediately in
purpose and power. Instead of being merely an expensive and ornamental advisory body, it could become an instrumentality for economic and political development, to help a num ber of South Pacific Territories out of grave troubles caused mainly by a too rapid population increase.
Elsewhere in PIM there is an article based on a recent summary published by Professor K. B.
Cumberland, of the University of Auckland, a man who has given much helpful study to Pacific Islands affairs.
A logical deduction from his arrangement of facts is that there is urgent and growing need for a South Pacific Plan, to control and shape growth and development in Western Samoa, Fiji and Tonga in particular, and probably in the Solomons, New Hebrides, Gilberts and New Guinea, as well.
The organisation, and the money, and the knowledge required for this are already in being, or in sight, in the South Pacific Commission. But some vision and determination, and some firm strokes of the pen, are needed to bring about the change.
The membership of the Com mission should be altered, or modified. Western New Guinea, sooner or later, will pass from Dutch to some other control, and that lets The Netherlands out. Apart from little Eastern Samoa, the United States has no territorial interest in the South Pacific; but it has an interest in the fate of the South Pacific because of its connections in Micronesia and Hawaii, and because of its enormous political and economic influence in this area.
The whole responsibility for the future of the South Pacific Territories lies with Australia, Britain, France and New Zealand, in that order of importance.
In theory it should be possible for the three British countries, and France, to co-operate in providing, either through the South Pacific Com mission, or directly, the kind of organisation envisaged by Professor Cumberland. But, in practice, there is little hope of it.
The French always seem jealous and withdrawn. They do not co operate readily with any country, and British countries least of all. Who can blame them—their relations with “perfidious Albion” have rarely been happy!
The establishment of the SPC in fn e S Ch r e . mt ° ry ’ and the obligation to duplicate most records in French —although practically all Pacific Ocean countries now are English speaking—have made the SPC 2i dy a “ d reduced its already limited value in South Pacific administration generally.
PaSfi/ rearrange the South and ? m e SS1 ° n ’ 80 that France and United States may have less S“ y i and ry ,ess of the and Nel? ? , aV S Allstra,ia . Britain and New Zealand to carry on the organisation with enough authority hU % t u em to co-ordinate and deal with the political, as well as the economic and social problems
Territories?** y
Indonesian 'News' As
Received via Canberra!
AS part of the Soekarno campaign tr. tor seizure of Dutch New Guinea, the Indonesian Embassy in Canberra has commenced publication ot a weekly “news service”. The following are typical paragraphs: Indonesian bank notes, which have been vahd currency in West Irian (West New Guinea) for some time, have gamed a stronger position, be cause of the faith placed in them by the people. Dutch notes, on the other hand, have decreased in value, ac cording to a member of the National Defence Council, Mr. J. A. Dimara, who is also General Chairman of Indonesia’s organisation for the liberation of West Irian. He was making a statement on reports he had received from the West Irian mainland.”
“Mr. Dimara said portraits of President Soekarno were being eagerly sought by the people, some of whom treated them with reverence. He said the people were expecting more por traits of the President, together with Indonesia’s national red and white flags, which the President recently ordered to be flown throughout West Irian. A large scale circulation of Indonesian bank notes was also de sired by the people, to replace Dutch notes and thus paralyse the colonial economy,”
The naivete of the Indonesian propagandist is almost beyond belief.
The Indonesian rupiah, reflecting the condition of the unhappy country’s economy, is worthless out side of Indonesia—traders will not have it at any price. The Dutch currency, on the other hand, is usu ally quoted at par or at a premium in other currencies. (Oven
The Bureaucrats Make
War on the Buka
TO read Territory Minister Paul Hasluck’s statements on New Guinea’s Buka tax fight anybody would think it was a clear case of right triumphing over evil. Mr.
Hasluck sings praise of the Admin istration’s handling of the trouble, which he says everyone should be grateful for.
But the Minister confuses the issue.
It is true that the handling of the Buka arrests by the P-NG Con stabulary and the field officers on the spot deserves praise. Mishandling there could have meant disaster.
But the police were there because their job is to see the law is carried out. They weren’t responsible for the situation.
In the words of a PIM corre spondent, how was the brush fire allowed to develop into such a blaze?
It’s not good enough for the Min ister to insinuate that the problem is explained by pig-h ead e d trouble makers, so fanatical that they planned to breed a master race. The trouble at Buka didn’t start over night. . , Head tax, a pre-war measure (and an unpopular one at that), was re introduced into P-NG in January, 1958, in face of opposition. Many European and native members of the Legislative Council protested that it would cause trouble. Simogun warned that the native people had not been prepared for it.
Trouble arrived quickly. Less than eight months after introduction of the tax two Tolai were shot dead, and others injured, at Navuneram near Rabaul, during a tax skirmish with police and patrol officers.
At the P-NG Legco meeting in September, 1958, there were renewed protests. Mr. E. A. James described head tax as a “catastrophe—bad in every way”. Former District Com missioner lan Downs, warning that fhe initial fears were fully justified, said that in terms of both money and prestige “no good arguments for con tinuing the tax can be produced .
Already 60 per cent, of patrol offi cers’ time was being wasted m ef forts to collect the tax is difficult areas.
Mr. Dudley Jones, representing the Tolai and Buka areas, said the tax tended to steadily destroy what ever happy relations existed between the field staff and the natives.
The results of the judicial inquiry into the Navuneram shootings, an nounced shortly afterwards, indi cated, as expected, that the imme diate background to the tragedy was
found in the operation of the head tax, although there was a much wider dispute going back some years.
The judge suggested that much benefit could be got if the Adminis tration gave closer attention to the causes of the trouble.
Mr. Hasluck admitted that there was need for “constant, patient and penetrating effort” to understand complex native problems, and he promised to do something about im proving Administration public rela tions with the natives.
But while he was still excusing the situation at great length, the tax problem was continuing to give much trouble elsewhere. Who should have been protesting at that very time but many of the east coast villages of Buka! They hadn’t paid their first year’s tax, and they weren’t going to pay the current year’s. After long argument, the position on Buka was temporarily dealt with by sending out a patrol with 18 police in January, 1959.
And so it went on. There have been many warnings, and trouble in many places. The Buka trouble was never cleared up, despite the Administration would call its “best endeavours”, and resulted in the near-tragedy of February.
The position at Buka is similar to Navuneram in that the head tax is part of a wider field of complaint, but the tax has been the touch point.
Admittedly, a “wider field of com plaint” is a difficult field to plough, involving as it does half-baked cargo cults. Basically, some of the Buka believe that the “cargo” that has been kept from them by the Administra tion is the “cargo of success”. They are attempting by non-co-operation to force the Administration to yield up the secret of success. “Tolala” sheds further light on their outlook in his valuable comments on p. 38.
But by what reasoning does the Government think it can help matters by going to war with the Buka over a head tax? If, as the Minister says, these people are fanatics, in the grip of a cargo cult, must they at the same time have “political advancement” and “a sense of responsibility” liter ally beaten into their heads? Head tax was introduced to show them they have responsibilities, but in view of the sorry records so far, is it worth the lesson?
Personal tax collected throughout P-NG in 1960-61 was only £146,867 out of a total revenue of £22,248,000.
How much was spent in collecting it? What is it going to cost us for this latest Buka exercise—the char tered aircraft, the masses of supplies, the court cases, the paper work—not to mention goodwill!
Is it all worth it? Scrub the head
tax. Recompense the Administr by diverting to New Guinea ji fraction of the Australian mi which are thrown away every under the Colombo Plan.
Putting The 'Nauruan
Point of View 7
NAURUAN Head Chief Hai Deßoburt might well hope a satisfactory solution to the pn of a future home for his peopl be found. But he ought not surprised if, as he says, ther been a tendency for people o Nauru to disregard the Nai wishes. His own Council is r responsible for that.
Apart from the one occasion Raymond Gadabu, speaking “c cuff”, put his people’s viewpo the United Nations—to the si and chagrin of the Australian G ment back home —the Nauruan done nothing at all to publicise point of view. As it is, they to be very thankful indeed fc Gadabu.
The Nauruan Local Cover Council has allowed the Aus Government to call the tune, ai could be forgiven for thinkii Council was merely a tame com of scared servants instead of 2 elected by the Nauruan people their views forthrightly, and pi This matter of a new home ha discussed at length for years, bi outside of Nauru has heard ab The Nauruans have left i publicity to the Australian G ment, represented by the Minis Territories, Mr. Hasluck, and t course, is a tried and true met consigning any public matter to The Minister has had nothing and he has seen to it as usu members of his department ha nothing to say.
But in any event it so r that the Nauruan point ol doesn’t happen to be the C ment’s, so the Nauruans hope little too much if they expect a] from that quarter.
“People outside Nauru”—n Australians —will continue t regard the Nauruans wishes un hear what the Nauruans’ wisl and the reasons for them.
This means the Nauruans not lose any opportunity to p point of view publicly. They h too many important opportuni this in the past through ac official “advice”, whose obje merely been to keep the question away from discuss Australia and New Zealand.