In Manus Negotiations

Australia, In Pacific Affairs, Is

Snapping And Snarling At America

How Canberra Politicians "Missed the Bus"

In Manus Negotiations

AUSTRALIA has been shrilly scolding the United States because the ruler oi japan, General Douglas Mac- Arthur, has permitted the Japanese to (a) send a whaling expedition to Antarc tic waters; (b) recommence .working the phosphate deposits at Angaur Island, in the Palau Group (Western Carolines, north-westwards of New Guinea), Australia feels that her national dig nity has been outraged, or her sovereignty invaded, or something—no one seems very clear as to what all the howling is about.

Apparently, Australia now thinks that she has some kind of monopoly over Antarctica (never, until now, manifest in any shape or form); and she says that it is most improper that MacArthur should re-establish the Japs in the Palaus, within a few hundred miles of Austra lian territory.

In both these matters, MacArthur’s motive was never even hinted at by either Australian politicians or news papers—yet it is plain to any intelligent person. In the forefront of the many great problems that victory brought to America is that of feeding Japan.

In 100 years of “Westernisation,” Japan developed an economy which demanded the export of vast quantities of manu factured goods, in return for foodstuffs and raw materials—only so could Japan’s 100,000,000 be fed. Since the Tokio Sur render, Japan has been unable to export.

Consequently, the Japanese have been forced to strain every resource in order to produce foodstuffs at home. To the extent that they fail, America is obliged to send in foodstuffs—and the quota for starving Europe is correspondingly reduced.

It was a perfectly reasonable thing t 9 send Jap expeditions to the Antarc tica after oil and whale-beef, and to encourage the Japs to recommence the stimulation of their home-country crops by again digging fertiliser out of Angaur.

THE Americans, trying desperately to keep the world from going into Red revolution—of which there is still the gravest danger could have been pardoned if they had ignored the squealing of the Australian politicians and their now well-organised teams of starry-eyed nev/spaper Yet they have replied very soothingly to Canberra, and are trying to placate the bombastic Dr. Evatt, who is at present visiting MacArthur in Tokio “to discuss outstanding problems.”

In world affairs, including UNO, the United States (140,000,000 people) speaks with one clear voice. The British Em pire (87,000,000) speaks with five voices (Britain, Canada, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand), often contradic tory and in some things each British voice has as much weight as the American voice. So far, Uncle Sam has retained all diplomatic courtesy but is it any wonder that, at times, his patience seems to be wearing a little thin!

The bumble feet of Australian poli ticians are seen as clearly now in the international field as in the Aus tralian industrial field, where there is hopeless inefficiency and increasing con fusion Of that, there is no better il lustration than in the history of the Manus sea and air base, created by the Americans at such enormous cost in the

northern part of the Mandated Terri tory of New Guinea between 1943 and 1945.

WHEN the war was over, America was prepared to maintain the base, on the assumption that Australia would consent to some sort of title. It would have been quite easy to have lopped Manus off the Mandated Terri tory of New Guinea and attached it to the American-controlled Mandated Terri tory of Caroline Islands, immediately to the northward.

But at the very suggestion, the Trades Hall diplomats in Canberra were up in arms. Australia, shouted Dr. Evatt, would not part with one yard of her precious territory, to anyone. But if America who/he graciously admitted, really had helped to win the war in the Pacific would ask her nicely, Australia might be prepared to share the Manus base with the United States Navy, on some sort of reciprocal ar rangement.

The Americans, with a tired smile, withdrew everything from Manus; and Manus, for many months, has been lit erally folding up.

Australia, more recently, has been try ing anxiously to convince the nations— and especially herself—that she can run Manus quite efficiently, with perhaps some American assistance. But Ameri cans are not interested, any more.

The military writer of the Melbourne “Herald” published the following article on June 16. It sums up the position admirably: Despite all the political smoke screens that are being put out from Canberra, there is no doubt that Australia “missed the bus” on the Manus Island negotia tions.

America did want to come into Manus.

Chief of Naval Operations told the United States Senate Naval Committee that the American Navy wished to have major Pacific bases at Honolulu, Guam, the Philippines and Manus Island.

To-day, the course of diplomacy and the policy of economy have forced the American Navy to trim down its de sires. Manus Island has been dropped from the list.

This means that an island which America developed into a great wartime naval and air base covering our northern approaches now becomes entirely our responsibility.

The official Commonwealth Govern ment attitude is that, by tacit under standing with the Americans, help would be forthcoming if a threat to us devel oped in this area.

There will be further consultations between the two Governments. There may be, at some future date, a plan of exchange duty between officers of the United States and Australian Navies.

Having lost the substance of a posi tive American agreement to man the whole Pacific line, the Commonwealth is consoling itself with a theory that the line can be just as strong if Aus tralia acts as caretaker for this end of But the American system of island bases in the Northern and Central Pacific is strong only because naval task forces, planes and the resources of great armament, engineering and mer

chant shipping industries stand ready to Manus would not be in that state of use it. instant readiness. Only regular use by

We can put nothing remotely ap proaching that weight of steel into our area. We can probably afford to keep the grass cut back from the Manus Is land air-strips. We cannot by ourselves do much more.

THERE is no sound reason to expect that Britain can make up for our lack of naval and air power.

British strategic planners are thinking in terms of a Middle East-Aden-East Africa limit to the effective range of their future resources.

We have no guarantee that they can maintain large forces even as near to us as Singapore. ** There have been indications that they would like us to help them in the de fence of the Indian Ocean approaches.

This hardly suggests that Britain will have ships and planes to spare for the South-West Pacific.

WE are brought back to the truth that there can be no realistic defence of Australia without American aid.

In a crisis there is no doubt that the United States would be willing to give us all the help she could. If wars were leisurely-affairs, and required no elabor ate preparedness, our grass-cutting party on Manus could sit back and wait for the Americans to move in and mount guard.

But the last Pacific crisis came sud denly. We must assume that any future war would strike even more swiftly.

It might strike in a way which would force the Americans to concentrate on operating from the bases where their supplies and docking facilities were im mediately available.

large formations of ships and aircraft in peacetime can keep the elaborate or ganisation of a modern base in efficient shape for war. rE US Navy’s proposals, outlined to the Senate Naval Committee in February, 1946, would have given Manus real strength if they had been carried out. Australia has no substi tute for that strength.

American public opinion does not readily welcome commitments to defend foreign territory. This political factor began to tip the scale against an Ameri can-Australian agreement on the Manus base when it became clear that we wanted not only to retain full sovereign rights to the island into which America had put some £4O millions of strategic value, but to gain reciprocal access to bases under the American flag.

We have been left with our sovereign rights and our defence problem.