And who is to blame?
p. 43 · Read in the full issue
Miriung certainly opposed the BRA’s campaign of violence but he had also become a thorn in the side of the central government
By Dr Karin von Strokirch
It may never be known who ordered the assassination of Theodore Miriung. In his attempts to peacefully resolve the Bougainville conflict, the island’s premier alienated sections of the Papua New Guinea government and defence forces, as well as members of the
Bougainville Revolutionary Army.
Nevertheless, assertions by PNG authorities that the BRA had most to gain by his death are misleading. Miriung cer
tainly opposed the BRA’s campaign of
violence to achieve its aims, but he had also become a thorn in the side of the cen tral government.
Miriung was appointed premier of the
Bougainville Transitional Government in early 1995 because he was a moderate whom PNG sought to work with to isolate the seccessionist BRA. The government recognised it could not control,, much less overcome, the rebels by military force alone.
Yet Miriung was by no means a mal leable puppet for the central authorities.
From the outset, he chose a middle path between the two sides to the conflict.
The initial goal for Miriung’s govern ment was to achieve a ceasefire coupled with a resumption of essential services to Bougainville. The next plank in his cam paign was to reach a consensus between the BRA, Miriung’s own BTG and Bougainville members of parliament over the desired political status for the troubled island province. The final stage was to negotiate a political settlement with PNG.
Miriung was instrumental in bringing an end, albeit temporary, to hostilities.
Thereafter his strategy and that of the PNG government began to diverge.
For Miriung and other moderates, the Sir Julius Chan government’s rhetoric of seeking a negotiated solution to the crisis was far from convincing.
PNG did not support initiatives pro posed in the Pan-Bougainville peace talks
hosted by Australia in December last year.
Indeed, PNG forces attacked the BRA delegation on its way back to
Bougainville after the meeting. Prospects
for peace became more remote in March with Prime Minister Sir Julius’ announce ment that the ceasefire was over and the BRA’s “darkest hour had come”.
Signs of conciliation emerged in June as the PNG government reached an agree ment with Miriung to contemplate a degree of autonomy for Bougainville. Yet, by excluding the BRA from discussions over the scope of autonomy, PNG ensured that any political settlement would not be endorsed by the rebels.
The gulf was widening between the BTG and Port Moresby over their pre ferred strategies for resolving the Bougainville crisis. Miriung’s vision of autonomy for Bougainville was proving to be more expansive than that of the national government, and he saw little hope of a settlement without a ceasefire and full participation of the BRA in sub sequent negotiations.
Notwithstanding Miriung’s position
and past failures at achieving a military solution, in June, the PNG Defence Forces launched a fresh offensive against the BRA. The BRA hardened its position and refused to countenance anything less than outright independence in return for negotiating an end to the conflict.
By this time, Miriung had become highly critical of PNG policy on Bougainville. From his perspective the military offensive was destructive and futile. He viewed the continuing depriva tion of Bougainville civilians as “inhu mane” and condemend extra-judicial killings by the PNGDF as “evil”.
Miriung thus called for a referendum on Bougainville’s future political status.
Clearly, Miriung was neither as mod erate nor as pliable as PNG had originally hoped. The military restricted Miriung’s freedom of movement. Miriung reported
that senior PNG defence personnel had labelled him a “criminal” and a BRA col laborator.
Tensions mounted in September when PNG Defence Minister Mathias Ijape alleged Miriung’s involvement in a BRA attack at Kangu Beach in which a dozen PNG soldiers were killed. Ijape unsuc cessfully called for Miriung’s removal as premier. Thereafter Miriung was subject to surveillance by PNG security forces and by the anti-BRA Resistance vigi lantes which PNG funded and trained.
Events came to a climax in late August at the Bougainville Inter-Church Women’s Forum held to promote peace.
The premier was to have officially opened the forum but was prevented from even attending by armed PNG forces. This was despite prior approval of the forum’s right to proceed from all parties to the conflict.
Traditional chiefs and local people ral lied in support of Miriung, issuing a con demnation of the PNG government and security forces for their treatment of Miriung and obstruction of a peace settle ment.
Sir Julius’ shock at Miriung’s death and announcement of a state funeral in his honour have a hollow ring. Miriung was an advocate of moderation and non-vio lence but many PNG authorities found his principle stance and vision of autonomy for Bougainville unpalatable.
Without wishing to endorse the dubi ous record of the BRA, it is clear that the PNG government failed to rein in actions by the PNGDF and renegade ministers which were jeopardising the peace pro cess. This placed Miriung in a vulnerable position which ultimately cost him his life. ■ Dr Karin von Strokirch is a lecturer in International Relations in the Department of Politics at the University of New England in New South Wales, Australia
