The Adraf

New Caledonia

The Adraf scandal

THE French auditor-general Francois

Asselineau recently lifted the lid on loyalist corruption in New Cale donia’s Land and Rural Development Agency (Adraf). His confidential report accuses three senior members of the RPCR, New Caledonia’s main pro- French party, of taking over the running of Adraf from 1986 and perverting its legal functions, in particular, by denying Kanak land claims. Asselineau also im plies criticism of the supporting role played by the then French High Com missioner, Jean Montpezat, who was president of Adrafs board.

Adraf was set up in 1986 by the right wing Chirac Government to replace the Land Reform Board which was itself set up in 1982 by the Socialist Government.

The old board’s job was simply to buy and redistribute land to Kanak tradition al owners. Adrafs role was to buy and redistribute land equitably among all New Caledonia’s ethnic populations in

order to develop the rural economy.

Asselineau’s commission of inquiry was ordered by French prime minister Michel Rocard when he visited New Caledonia in August last year and was confronted by the FLNKS with evidence of Adraf s scandals. So far only an edited summary of the commission’s findings has been made public and it spares the three RPCR leaders: Adrafs former director Denis Millard, the former depu ty director Philippe Gomes, and Territo rial representative Harold Martin.

The full report, 23 pages plus tables and appendices, says the RPCR members ran Adraf as a clique, giving selected board members privileged access to essential documents. This clique would meet secretly, before Adraf board meet ings, and decide upon land purchases and sales which were then presented for rubber stamping at the full board meet

ing. The auditor-general also found key

information was withheld from the full board.

The crux of Asselineau’s criticism rests on what he sees as Adrafs deliberate policy of denying Kanak customary land claims and stirring up trouble not only between Kanak clans and European

landowners but also between Kanaks themselves (see main story). This hidden political agenda meant Adraf abandoned its statutory obligations.

It avoided the legally-required Crown Lands Department valuation except in 3.4 per cent of the cases. Of the 129 purchases with a Crown Land valuation, 86% or 111 parcels of land were bought for between double and triple the official value. The report says in many cases a valuation was obtained only after Adraf had bought the land and these valua tions were done by Philippe Gomes’ father-in-law, a land surveyor not a land valuer. Properties bought by Adraf were overvalued on average by 37 per cent.

As the flip side of this over-valuation, many purchasers were given knock-down prices and deferred loans at low interest rates.

The auditor-general’s report cites several examples of the RPCR clique misusing Adrafs power. They allocated 22 parcels of land to members of the Adraf board or their families. Other allocations were made for electoral or political reasons. Asselineau says these decisions “largely contributed to Adrafs reputation for favouritism and partial

ity”. He quotes from several applicants who spell out their links with the RPCR or the anti-independence cause as reason for favourable consideration. In August 1987, Adraf allocated nine properties to individuals whose applications had been drawn up by Gomes and another 10 properties were allocated to individuals who’d never applied for land.

Adraf was obliged to redistribute land for economic development. But the re port found that generally the Adraf cli que allocated land without a verified eco nomic development proposal from the recipient. The price to be paid and the terms of payment were frequently settled afterwards. Asselineau gives numerous examples of the bizarre outcomes of “these hasty allocations which illustrate the careless examination of each applica tion”: • In August 1987, Adraf allocated just over 375 hectares at Houailou to an in corporated society still being set up. A year later the group still didn’t exist and its development programme was, of course, equally nonexistent.

• In August 1987, eight properties

were allocated to Wallisians (Polynesian immigrants from the French territory of

Wallis and Futuna) at La Foa to set up a

piggery. Adraf approved this piggery

without any commercial feasibility study and even though it contravened the

town’s by-laws.

• Again in August 1987, Adraf agreed to split a La Foa property between two purchasers but later it was discovered the boundary line went straight through the only house on the land. • In February 1988, Adraf allocated six hectares of land to one European without realising, firstly, the land wasn’t economically viable because it was liable to flooding, and secondly, that one hectare was already leased to a company called Enercal.

The report also accused Adraf of be-

coming an intermediary in private land

transactions with 27 properties being bought and then allocated to someone nominated by the seller.

Asselineau says Adraf failed to adhere to its requirement to redistribute land to all ethnic groups in proportion to their populations. This failure was notable with regard to Kanaks: of 717 Kanak applications for land, only 136 were approved. Another aim of getting young

farmers onto land was met for Euro peans but not for Kanaks. And Adraf often gave Kanaks the poorest land (steep terrain, lack of water, distant from road or sea).

Asselineau notes an “unfortunate” comparison between the 581 rejected

Kanak applications, including many

from fathers of large Kanak families, and other results of Adrafs policies:

• 23 European recipients already

owned properties;

• Those 23 Europeans, who already owned a total of more than 4488 hec tares (an average of more than 195 hec tares each), were allocated an extra 3951 hectares (an average of more than 171 hectares each); • 34 recipients weren’t born in New Caledonia; • At least 77 recipients had secure jobs as public servants, municipal work ers or employees of the SLN nickel com pany.

Asselineau describes Adrafs internal management as “wasteful” and characte

rised by flagrant overspending on items

ranging from cars, petrol vouchers, orchids and plants for the Adraf offices

to hiring helicopters. □