Too much

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Too much on Wea?

THE June 1989 article, ‘Did Wea gun down the Accord’, by Mr David Robie, concerning the murder of Jean-Marie Tjibaou and Yeiwene Yeiwene, and the death of one of their assassins, Djoubelly Wea, unfortunately lacks balance and contains errors. Accordingly it could mis lead an uninformed reader. To begin with, the attention given to Wea is almost equal to that given to the two leaders whose death he plotted. An un informed reader could be given the im pression that Wea’s stature and import ance was broadly equivalent to that of his victims. This seems odd, since although Wea was well known as a long time militant campaigner for independ ence, his influence scarcely extended beyond the small village of Gossanah in the north of the outer island of Ouvea.

In contrast, Tjibaou and Yeiwene were the leading figures in the Kanak nationalist movement, and senior and

widely-respected participants in New

Caledonian politics. Both also had a high reputation in the region. Had he been spared, Tjibaou’s qualities as a statesman probably would have ensured that in the longer term he played an important part in South Pacific affairs.

Moreover, the comments made on Wea are all highly positive, which seems an odd way to mark the memory of a man who apparently cooly planned and executed the murder of the leaders of his people. Thus we are told that he was “• • • a maverick but respected leader”, • . . typical of the new generation of leaders”, the . . undisputed leader of the Ouvea militants”, and . . an unlike ly assassin: a respected and long-time advocate of non-violent action”. In addi tion, we are told that he . . was a man of humility, preferring to live simply and to conduct his activist life by example”, who, unlike . . some other elected Kanak leaders [none specified] . . . shun ned the use of his salary for personal benefit.”

The presentation of Wea in these heroic terms could be read as an en dorsement of his crime. Moreover, the “non-violent” label seems especially in congruous. After all, Wea strongly sup ported the violent “active boycotts” of the elections in November 1984 and May/June 1989, and supported the armed hostage-taking of the gendarmes on Ouvea, which although no doubt intended as a symbolic exercise which would end through negotiation neces sarily carried the risk of casualties. After

the tragic outcome of the hostage-taking.

Wea isolated Gossanah village from the outside world, with armed teenagers guarding the barricades, patrolling the

village, and intimidating opponents.

Moreover, Wea indulged himself in wild and violent rhetoric which had little to do with the hard realities and limited options in New Caledonian politics. The emphasis on Wea’s simplicity and dedica tion also, at least by implication, could be read to reflect badly on Tjibaou and Yeiwene. Such aspersions would be com pletely unwarranted; they also lived simply, putting the cause to which they were dedicated above all else.

Yet despite the dedication, integrity and high calibre of the dead leaders, the article’s comments on them have a carp

ing quality, especially compared with the

eulogistic treatment of Wea. The article contends, quite incorrectly, that the two men were . . struggling for their sur vival against younger hardline leaders.”

In fact, as Tjibaou’s success in bringing the great majority of FLNKS supporters around to support of the Matignon Accord demonstrated; and as the vacuum left after their deaths con firmed; their leadership was under no serious challenge, despite criticism from the extremist fringe of the nationalist movement. We are told, correctly, that Tjibaou . . was a spiritual man, a visionary”, but no mention is made of his human warmth, of his great skills as a speaker, leader and political tactician, and of his deep commitment to econo mic development. Neither is any men tion made of his achievements as Mayor of the northern municipality of Hien ghene, as head of the territorial govern ment from 1982 to 1984, and as Presi dent of the Northern region from 1985 to 1988. We are also told, in a mislead

ing oversimplification, that Tjibaou’s rise

to prominence in the nationalist move ment dated from the Melanesia 2000 Cultural Festival in 1975, which he orga nised and inspired. Then a slur is put on this noteworthy achievement by the dis torted and unsubstantiated claim that he was “backed” in mounting the Festival by Noumea’s right-wing mayor, Roger Laroque and the “ultra-conservative business establishment”.

Meanwhile Yeiwene Yeiwene, despite his much greater stature than Wea, is given only scant attention. We are told that he was “representative of an entrep reneurial group of Kanaks”, an assertion which no doubt would have left him mystified, as it would anyone who knew him. He is described, correctly, as Tjibaou’s loyal deputy, and his arrest at Christmas 1987 is recorded, but no men tion is made of his dynamism and charm, or of his skills as a tactician and

orator. The article also tails to mention Ins role as a leader of demonstrations, and as a master of symbolic protest, in

cluding, tor example, his Septemer 1984

“takeover” of Mare airport. This incident involved the temporary “confiscation” and daubing of slogans on the helicop ters and plane of visiting DOM-TOM Minister Georges Lemoine and his en tourae, to the great embarrassment of the French administration. Yet while fail ing to record Yeiwene’s true merit, on the other hand the article comments dis paringly and misleadingly that .. he faced increasing criticism from some FLNKS members [none specified] who regarded him as being full of platitudes and reluctant to take action.” 1 he article also contains factual errors.

The names “Machoro” and “Cortot” are rendered incorrectly as “Machuro” and “Courtot”. The French newspaper refer red to is “ Le Monde", not “De Monde".

Since its formation, the FLNKS has in cluded five, not four, political parties, namely the UC, the PALIKA, the UPM, and PSK and the FULK. (However it is true, although this is not mentioned in the article, that the FULK which is a small party with very limited support has, in practical terms, excluded itself from the movement, and may be formal ly ejected at the next congress in August or September). Rather than halting de velopment programmes and Kanak training, as the sixth paragraph on page 13 seems to suggest, the Matignon peace plan in fact embodies these measures.

Meanwhile, the report from Paris accom panying the article states incorrectly that the French government had announced the postponement of the June regional elections, following the deaths of Tjibaou and Yeiwene. The French government did suggest a postponement. However the FLNKS leadership insisted that the elections go ahead as planned.

In addition, the article’s attempt to draw a parallel between the death of High Chief Atai in 1878 and that of Jean-Marie Tjibaou in 1989 is strained and absurd. Atai was slain after a period of warfare, by members of a rival tribe, in an era when an overall sense of Kanak nationalism was non-existent. In contrast the unarmed Tjibaou, the ack nowledged leader of the Kanak national ist movement, had travelled to Ouvea, with his stalwart deputy and other senior colleagues, to heal wounds and make peace. But he was betrayed and slain, his arm stretched out in a gesture of open ness and friendship.

Stephen Henningham

Research Fellow, Department of Political and Social Change , Re search School of Pacific Studies , Australian National University.