The case of the tree that walked

tree that walked

In the late 19505, when Quonset still dotted the Micronesian land scape, curious military exercises used to take place in the Marianas. At the time, of course, the U.S. was running a sup posedly super-secret CIA train ing base on Saipan. Nationalist Chinese were being prepared for the invasion of the mainland, an idea as crackpot then as it is

today.

Nevertheless, that never stopped the government. Among the skills American trainers pass ed along to the Chinese was

camouflage, and an appreciation

for stealth.

How successful was the Un ited States effort? Obviously the mainland was never invaded

although guerrillas could have

been landed but by one ac count, the Chinese learned their lessons well.

In one exercise, U.S. Navy authorities on Saipan alerted

Trust Territory headquarters,

then located on Guam, to the fact that the “invaders” would travel from Saipan to Guam and “pene trate” the T.T. compound.

Not many days afterwards, the

Trust Territory High Commis

sioner’s secretary was leaving the main administration office.

As she strolled along the sidewalk she noticed something peculiar: it looked like one of the trees was moving. She stared at the plant, and sure enough, it was inching its way forward.

The “tree,” it turned out, was a Nationalist Chinese invader.

Somehow he had made it from Saipan to Guam, a 125-mile trip across open ocean, worked his way into the Trust Territory com plex, and found enough twigs and leaves to make his costume

complete.

The secretary, who recounted this tale many years later, swore it was true. Regardless, it is a wonderful story and, in some ways, foreshadowed the Mic ronesian preoccupation (some of it justified) about American spies in their midst.

Two events contributed might ily to today’s sad state of suspi

cion. The first took place in the

early 19605. President Kennedy,

smarting from United Nations criticism of the Americans “zoo

theory” administrative practices,

ordered a commission to study the Micronesian situation and of fer policy recommendations.

The team was led by Anthony Solomon, now with the Federal Reserve Bank in New York.

What resulted was, in retrospect,

fairly predictable stuff, given the

tenor of those times: more money and more education with the hope that in the East-West “struggle” for the hearts and minds of the developing world, the far-away Micronesian islan ders would enjoy America’s be neficence and seek a close polit ical relationship with

Washington.

Unfortunately, the recommen dations were classified (and re main so to this day). Still, in the early 19705, the talented Palauan

journalist, Francisco Uludong,

published a copy of the secret volume. “The Solomon Re port,” as it was known, became synonymous with a notion that somewhere in darkest Washing ton, officials had a master plan for Micronesia. Whatever took place in the islands was some how related to a U.S.

conspiracy.

Anyone who knows anything about how the American Govem-

ment operates particularly in relation to Micronesia knows that the conspiracy theory of ad ministration has no basis in reali ty. But that has not stopped the speculation and suspicion, which continue unabated.

The other event was of far more consequence. In the mid -1970s during a political status negotiating session in Hawaii, the CIA did indeed “bug”

Micronesians.

According to one high-level

Micronesian who was active in the negotiations at the time, most of the islanders had hotel rooms which were next to the elevator shaft. That made it easier to run wires to the rooms, he believes.

When the story broke, it be came clear some Micronesians had aided the American agents.

Drawing up a list of the culprits was an issue at the mid-1977 negotiating round on Guam, but

the idea was quietly shelved. The reason? One theory is that a number of high-ranking islanders might have been implicated.

There have been related events over the years: stories of Ameri can military officers trying to buy informants; sotto voce fears that the U.S. political status team had the services of former agents; tales that grow more col orful with each retelling of State

Department types spending long

evening hours at the telex machine on Saipan, sending off reports to Washington.

How much is fact, how much is fiction and how much is a symptom of the small island fas cination with gossip and intrigue is difficult to say. Certainly those events which did occur like the “Coconutgate” affair of the bugging have fed the fears.

Indeed, surreptitious intelli gence-gathering activity is one of the darker chapters of American Administration in the Pacific.

The few organised events and they do appear limited have affected U.S.-Micronesian relations for the worse.

Once the new political statuses are in place, this unsavory chap ter may be relegated to a footnote in the history of Micronesia. But that footnote will still be there as a reminder that at a time when Micronesian trust of America was total, the United States saw fit to spy on its island friends.

Trees may no longer waddle across government compounds, but one cannot help but look

twice at them.

Floyd K.

Takeuchi.

Notes from the North

Floyd K.

Takeuchi on Micronesia