Closes On
pp. 15-17 · Read in the full issue
‘Open Door’
Micronesia
From a Honolulu correspondent
Under the aura of the new “open door” policy of the government of President Jimmy Carter, officials from the US Government and Micronesia met for four days in Honolulu in late May for continued discussions of the future political status for Micronesia.
These were the first such talks to be held since the disclosure of the CIA bugging of previous negotiating sessions, a practice which has been condemned and foresworn by the Carter administration, with its widely-heralded promise of open government.
However, in spite of the public claims for openness and candid ex pression, the US officials declared the meetings closed to the press and public, claiming that the Microne sians none of whom was ever identified insisted on it being that way.
Since this meeting was billed a$ a “round-table discussion” and not a continuation of the formal negotia tions, no one expected any concrete proposals or conclusions. Rather, the participants regarded the meet ing as a “feeling out” session, with each side looking for a change in the posture of the other, and in the end finding none.
Heading the US team was Am bassador Philip Manhard, a newcomer to international diploma cy, whose credentials for the post seem to be his seven years spent as a prisoner of war in North Vietnam, making him the longest-held cap tive. (Since he was not in military service at the time of his capture, one is forced to speculate about the nature of his assignment in Indo- China.) Standing by to assist Mr Manhard were nearly 30 high-ranking rep resentatives from the federal departments of State, Defence, In terior, Justice, and Commerce, and from the US Coastguard.
On the Micronesian side were 72 official delegates representing various groups within Micronesia;
the Trust Territory Administration, the Congress of Micronesia, the Joint Committee on Future Political Status, the Law of the Sea Delega tion, each district administration, each district legislature, and district Political Status Commissions from the Marshall Islands and Palau.
After polite and perfunctory opening statements by the US delegation and the Congress of Micronesia, the critical issues began to surface; Micronesian demands for a full account of the CIA bug ging activities in Micronesia, and the breakup of the TTPI through separate negotiations with Palau and the Marshall Islands.
In response to the Micronesian demands for release of the US Senate investigative report on the CIA bugging activities, the Micronesians were told, in effect, to bug off.
Mr Robert Oakley, a Deputy As sistant Secretary of State, left no doubt with his pronouncement that “the issue is closed”. So much for the anticipated openness of dis cussions.
Assistant Secretary Oakley also presented the current US policy regarding the unity of Micronesia, which is no different from the old policy under the previous admin istrations: the US insists on some form of political unity for the rest of Micronesia, having already made separate arrangements with the new Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas.
Maintaining all the while that the US was not threatening, Mr Oakley proceeded to underscore what might result from any further frag mentation of Micronesian unity; “We are concerned that a departure from the concept of some form of unity would complicate the pro vision of aid and services and make their administration more cumber some and expensive.”
In plainer talk, the US will cut the purse strings unless the US-imposed unity of Micronesia is maintained. No amount of diplomatic language can disguise that message.
In the face of US insistence on preserving the unity of Micronesia, the delegations from the Marshalls and Palau persisted throughout the four days in making their demands for separate negotiations.