Two big challenges face new

Governor of American Samoa

By Thomas Kaser*

The appointment of John M. Haydon as the new Governor of American Samoa continues a tradition of high turnover and political legacy in that territory’s No. 1 position.

Haydon, former president of the Seattle (Washington) Port Commis sion, is to succeed Owen S. Aspinall on August I—the second anniversary of Aspinall’s appointment. He thus becomes the 38th Governor of Ame rican Samoa since the islands were ceded to the US more than 69 years ago. Counting acting governors— some of whom succeeded other acting governors—Haydon is the 46th chief executive of the territory.

The status of being Governor of American Samoa seems to have changed over the years. There was a particularly high turnover of gov ernors during the years of admin istration by the US Navy (1900- 1951), apparently because it was neither fun nor fashionable to be king of such a remote castle. The average tenure of naval governors was about 21 months, with some unusual exceptions: two governors left after serving two months on the job, and one committed suicide in the rambling frame mansion that has been the governor’s home since about 1903.

Increased status

Since the administration of Ame rican Samoa was turned over to the US. Interior Department in 1951, the status of being governor has increased considerably, and the position has become largely a political plum.

Without passing judgment on the abilities and accomplishments of Samoa’s civilian governors, it re mains clear the job has acquired distinct political ties. For example, Democrat James Ewing was bounced in early 1953 by the incoming Eisenhower administration after serv ing just over three months on the job. He was replaced by Republican Lawrence M. Judd, who in turn stayed only five months because of failing health.

Republican Peter Coleman (now the No. 2 man in the US Trust Ter • The writer is a former Government Information Officer, American Samoa.

ritory of Micronesia), was replaced by Democrat H. Rex Lee as the Kennedy administration took over in 1961. And the territory’s two youngest civilian governors. Demo crats John C. Elliott and Owen S.

Aspinall, were sons of influential American politicians.

The indication is that American Samoa’s civilian governors are stay ing longer than the naval governors did. Whereas the average tenure for naval governors was 21 months, it has been 27 months for civilian governors.

But perhaps the wide range of tenures makes the term “average” a misnomer; three civilian governors stayed four months, three months and five months, respectively, while the two longest governorships in the territory’s history (75 months of H.

Rex Lee and 54 months of Peter Coleman) were those immediately before Aspinall.

American Samoa’s governors have become known for various accom plishments—or a lack of them. H.

Rex Lee, the man who got the money from Washington, was a capital im provements or “building governor”, although his successful transfer of more powers away from the governor and to the territorial legislature is

largely overlooked by his critics, particularly those from outside the territory who claim he brought too much too fast to American Samoa.

Aspinall, who sought an identity of his own following Lee, has em phasised the development of beauti fication, parks and recreational facilities.

American Samoa’s turnover pro blem—among governors and other stateside employees—is not unique or unknown: it is common in other American territories.

There have been suggestions that the US establish something similar to the British colonial service, which would train administrators to serve entire careers in outposts such as American Samoa.

The US has a federal civil service programme, but it remains sensitive to political winds, particularly at the top levels. There are many observers who feel that turnover brings fresh ideas and fresh energies to a ter ritorial assignment.

Somewhere between

William Norwood, a Democratic appointee as High Commissioner of the Trust Territory until he was re placed recently by Edward Johnston, a Republican appointee, suggests that the ideal system might lay some where in between the American and British systems.

Norwood acknowledges that he was both appointed and replaced by political influence; he also believes the incumbent political party in Washington is entitled to put its own men in the various governorships and ambassadorships around the world (although there are “political” ambassadors and “career” ambas sadors).

But he says that continuity ana direction in the territories could be

Challenges in Samoa

better served if there were—for each party—a pool of efficient and informed administrators who have more knowledge of the people and culture of a given territory than would a banker from Philadelphia or a lawyer from Chicago.

The apparent assumption in Washington over the years has been that any intelligent person with “executive skills” can become Gov ernor of American Samoa, And to an extent this is true; the governor re receives visiting dignitaries, watches spending, and must possess a certain maturity and insight for making im portant decisions.

But there are deeper challenges to the territory’s chief executive. And two challenges, in particular, con front John Haydon as the 38th Governor of American Samoa.

One is turnover itself. Too many stateside employees are coming and going through the territory. In some cases, projects, policies, and even laws established in recent years have been neglected. Numerous projects have been started, but follow through is an entirely different matter.

Personality conflict

Since the beginning of this decade, the Government of American Samoa has managed to keep most of its statesiders for about two years. Some statesiders expecting more favors or flexibility than the government provides break their contracts and leave before the two-year contract period; a few stay on to become old timers.

The main reasons for turnover after the regular two-year period are: little chance for advancement, person ality conflict (not uncommon in the often tight and intense stateside community of American Samoa), desire to return to more comfort able stateside living, and lack of future for a statesider in Samoa.

There is no retirement plan and it is illegal for non-Samoans to buy a home or property.

The other, more important, chal lenge facing John Haydon is to make the government of American Samoa not just of the people and for the people, but also by the people.

The most unfortunate aspect of the US administration of American Samoa over the last 69 years has been the unwillingness of policy

level administrators—in Washington and Pago Pago—to engage in even cautious experimentation with self government.

The common view, mostly un written and unspoken, is that Ame rican Samoans are not ready for self-government.

The trouble with this assumption is that no one has made even in cipient moves to test its veracity, or lack thereof.

Little thought is given to the fact that self-government need not be an overnight, off-the-deep-end occurrence.

But someone has to make the first major moves in that direction, and

there must be follow-through.

Technical advisors will be needed in American Samoa for years to come, but now is the time to display trust in the administrative skills— active or latent—of more Samoan leaders at the policy level. Mistakes will be made; setbacks will be ex perienced; programmes will miss their mark. But that is what experiments are for.

Until John Haydon, or some suc cessor, at least tries to implement the full meaning of the Samoa-for- Samoans concept. American Samoa will only be marking time in its search for a modern identity.