Purpose

They Died For No Military Purpose

The history of the final campaigns of the Australian Army in World War 11, by Gavin Long, follows the high tradition set by Dr. Bean in his histories of World War I. There is again the meticulous attention to detail, the descriptions of actions with the names of the principal participants and the numerous maps showing details of the terrain which make the whole action understandable.

IN the previous volumes, the history of the campaign is told in chronological sequence, but these final operations took place in

scattered areas Bougainville, Nev Britain, New Guinea and Borneo— making this impossible, so the ao counts are given of each campaigr separately.

Reading of them, the account: of the guerillas under the well-knowr names of Paul Mason, Eric Robinson Seton, Fairfax-Ross, Skinner, Bridge Ashton, are of great interest tc Islands readers.

An evaluation of Paul Mason wil be read with a chuckle by those who knew him and his methods, and the importance of these operations wil be noted. This is the first time thai these actions have been recorded anc their story is overdue.

In addition, there is an account oi the formation of AIB and its respon sibilities, which appears for the first time.

The volume gives some account of the comparative numbers oi troops of the various Allies engager in the Pacific war and shows that Australia was doing more than its share, in addition to more thar breaking-even in supplies undei lend-lease.

In view of this, the question arises of whether the aggressive operations against the by-passed Japanese ir New Guinea, Bougainville and New Britain should have been undei taken at all, and this is discussed.

The historian points out that it is not his duty to give the verdict, but he sets out the evidence for and against.

The whole matter is bound up with the question of command, and this, too, is set out. It seems that in military logic, Blarney should not have tried to wear both the hats of Land Forces Commander, SWPA, and Commander-in-Chief, Australian Army.

On MacArthur assuming command of the area, Blarney was appointed to the command of land forces, in cluding American, but MacArthur did not use an integrated staff as Eisenhower did, so that American

nd Australian forces suffered a eparation from the top.

For that matter, Blarney did not ise an integrated staff for his com nand of land forces, either.

Politically, MacArthur preferred to ise American forces for the libera ion of the Philippines, leaving the Australians to take over the peri aeters in the New Guinea area.

He did not require any aggressive ction to be taken, being content to it the Japs “wither on the vine”, but Hotted more forces than were ufficient for this purpose.

Blarney’s contention was that these apanese forces might recover their ffensive power; that Australian roops, left merely holding a peri leter would lose their aggressive ualities and that it was necessary 3 push out against them. (He /anted it both ways in his reasoning -how the Japanese would retain heir own aggression was not xplained).

The war historian does record rom time to time that the troops /ere “browned off”, knew they were ghting a battle which would make o difference to the end of the war, onceding that their bravery and fficiency under these conditions was /orthy of the highest praise.

The Borneo operations fall nearly mder this description, but not quite.

Wien they were planned, it was not nown when the Japanese would urrender, and had operations con inued until the next year the oil nd the ports might have been useful.

But, in all, it can be said that more ban 1,000 Australians were killed for o military purpose.

A by-product of these campaigns /as the rescue of many prisoners of /ar, civilians and natives who were uffering hardship as a result of apanese occupation.

Most, if not all, of this could ave been done without the hard ghting, by using AIB and ANGAU arties operating from the perimeters, bis releasing troops for more pro uction, which was badly needed.

The lesson of the command tructure seems to be that we are small country in population and esources, and will always be a lesser illy. Under these circumstances, it 5 better to have one homogenous orce under our own commander, /ho will act under the commander ppointed by the predominant •artner. —EßlC FELDT. (THE PINAL CAMPAIGNS. Australian 7ar Memorial. Our copy from Angus nd Robertson Ltd. 35/-.)