Problems Over

France Faces Labour Problems Over Pacific Nuclear Base

France has run into a couple of problems in obtaining labour for its projected nuclear testing base at Mururoa Atoll, in the Tuamotu Archipelago, and asso ciated projects elsewhere in

French Polynesia.

ONE is that few of the 3,000 Tahitians living in Noumea are eager to return home to work on the base; the other is that Tahiti does not want members of the French Foreign Legion to be included in the labour and tactical troops.

The Governor of Tahiti, Mr. Aime Grimald, found that most Tahitians in Noumea were reluctant to go home to work on the base when he made inquiries among them recently to find out what skilled labour was available.

PlM’s Noumea correspondent says the Tahitians generally have adapted themselves to life in New Caledonia; that they have good jobs there, and in many cases own their own homes.

Opposition to having members of the Foreign Legion as workers on the nuclear base was expressed in a unanimous resolution passed recently by Tahiti’s Territorial Assembly. The resolution was to be sent to President de Gaulle.

French Defence Pattern The Assembly said in the resolu tion that it had been officially in formed that two battalions of Legion aires—labourers and engineers—were to be sent to French Polynesia, and it expressed astonishment that it had not been consulted.

The Assembly acknowledged the military value of the Legionaires, but said that “grave inconveniences” could follow the contact of a peace loving population with elements noted for their violence. It asked that any military labour force should be drawn from forces other than the Foreign Legion.

Mr. Grimald told the Assembly that it had exceeded its powers in protesting against the Legion. The Assembly then agreed to soften the wording of the resolution, but it re mained unanimously opposed to the arrival of Legionaires.

A recent article by the French Minister of the Armed Forces, Mr.

Pierre Messmer, makes it clear that

the building of the base at Mururoa is a result of France’s determination to become an independent nuclear power.

The article was published in the Revue de la Defense Nationale for May. A translation of it was sent to RIM by the French Embassy in Can berra.

Atlantic Alliance In his article, Mr. Messmer said: “The choice made in 1949 to associate France with its neighbours in Europe and in the United States in the Atlantic Alliance led to the creation of NATO and almost led to the European Defence Community.

“This alliance has permitted Europe, thanks to American protec tion, to resist Soviet pressure and to reconstruct itself materially and even militarily.

“From the start, the chief problem of the Atlantic Alliance has been the possible use of the atomic weapon, for, since 1945, and for a long time to come, the nations have been divided into two categories: those which possess atomic weapons and the others.

“Only the first are capable of de fending their freedom and their life; the others are doomed to subservience or satellite status.

“The nuclear weapon does not permit France to become one of the world’s giants, but it does permit it to be a quantity to be reckoned with as soon as its vital interests are at stake.

“That is why the Americans and Russians are hostile to the appearance of national nuclear forces which make their policy of hegemony more diffi cult, and risk compromising its re sults. That is why the nuclear arma ment of France is at the heart of

French-American relations.

“Later, it will come into the fore front of European policy, for Europe cannot build itself into an entity merely on the basis of economical and technical communities, although these are necessary.

“In order for Europe to exist, it will have to assume the burden and the responsibility of its defence, and, for that, possess nuclear weapons.

“When we reach that point, we shall see that France’s possession of national nuclear weapons will be a keystone in the building of Europe, and, because of this, the subject of the most impassioned debates.

“The dominant characteristic of our military policy is the decision

taken by General de Gaulle to give France a nuclear arsenal, and this decision has such consequences that it will direct the destiny of our country for a long time to come.”

Mr. Messmer said France would have three systems of armed forces, one of which would be the strategic nuclear force, or striking force. TTie “first generation” of this force would comprise 50 Mirage IV bombers with a range of 1,550 miles without re fuelling, and of 2,975 miles with re fuelling in flight by C-135 tanker planes.

Each plane would carry a fission bomb with a blast equivalent three times that of the Hiroshima bomb.

The first planes with the first bombs

would be operational before the end of 1963, and the 50th plane would be delivered by the end of 1966.

Beginning in 1968-69, the “first generation” force would be succeeded by a “second generation characterised by the thermonuclear bomb and the missile”.

Mr. Messmer said that France’s military budget was 3.7 billion dollars, or 22 per cent, of the national budget.

He added: “France knows and feels that it can only be defended with good weapons, i.e. with atomic weapons. A military policy that or ganises the manufacture of those weapons will give the French people confidence in themselves and will justify the sacrifices asked of them.”