Commentary

Coffee Industry

eds Help Now

-OBABLY the biggest factor in the New Guinea coffee confer ence ending the way it did, in ley, in March—with buyers re ig to guarantee to take more 2,000 tons of this year’s crop, NG planters “very unhappy” page 22) was the survey made year by the Commonwealth au of Agricultural Economics, e Bureau’s survey of the coffee stry came up with the estimate by 1970, about 7,000 tons of 3 per year would be coming out apua-New Guinea—an amount t equal to Australia’s total nt annual consumption, is information was circulated 1 Australian coffee buyers and ey took fright and decided to n their heels right then, while was still time, it was a natural ?h reaction. en the buyers’ association first nteed to take all of the Terri coffee, the Territory was pro g about 900 tons a year. Last production was 1,750 tons; and iroduction is estimated at 2,800 The buyers have guaranteed ce only 2,000 tons of this, but price that under the circum -3s seems more than reasonable. ■ crux of the whole situation course, that the availability of in Australia is far in excess ; demand; that although the roducers have not got all they d in fixed prices, they are con bly more than the price at Brazilian coffee can be landed stralia. buyers say they don’t mind > NG coffee at world price but ’eel that the NG planters are istic in wanting to fix their rice; they don’t see why they be expected to subsidise the ost structure and air freight rrangements of the NG in is one side. There is another growers’. They were en ed to plant coffee at a time world demand outstripped ; and when Australian import ng and dollar restrictions >d considerable protection, in the years that the coffee aturing, the situation changed, tificial protections have been Jd and world supply is now excess of demand. Unfor ty, in New Guinea there is r factor—the cost of produc ts gone up and not down, and estion now arises as to just mch responsibility Australia assume in seeing that the

Territory coffee producers not only don’t go insolvent but make a reasonable return on their invest ment.

It seems generally accepted in principle these days that all Euro pean settlers in a native country are expendable, but (probably for tunately for the European coffee planters) the Australian govern ment through the P-NG Adminis tration has got a vested interest in seeing that the native producers— who are responsible for a large slice of P-NG’s exported coffee—are not economically disillusioned by the present impasse in the coffee in dustry.

An illiterate native who was per suaded that coffee was an excellent investment in 1956 cannot see why, in 1961, it should not be worth the trouble of picking and processing.

It is the sort of unexplainable economic situation that could have far-reaching repercussions quite un connected with a mere coffee slump.

The planters themselves have already pointed this out.

The only remedy the Australian government has at hand is through a subsidy (and it is anti-subsidy); or through the Tariff Board, which could recommend a customs duty on foreign coffee.

It was the indirect result of Tariff Board recommendations that the Papuan rubber industry was eventu ally put on a firm basis. These de liberations stretched over about three years.

If anything like this period is spent backing and filling over NG coffee, this important NG in dustry could end up as dead as the once promising kenaf industry. ☆ ☆ ☆

How P-NG Bureaucracy

Rewards Its Pioneers

rE case of Michael J. Leahy (see p. 29) should remain per manently in the records of Papua and New Guinea as a warn ing to all pioneers, and to private enterprise generally.

“Mick” Leahy was a goldminer in the Morobe area about 35 years ago.

Also, he was an explorer—he and his brother Dan were with James L.

Taylor in 1931, when they discovered the New Guinea Highlands. When the Japs invaded, in 1942, Mick and his brothers gave notable service as soldier-scouts, in the New Guinea jungles.

After the war, the Leahy brothers re-invested all. they owned in New Guinea, as planters. Mick chose cattle-farming, on the plateaus me? Mdrkham Valley.

Cattle-farming was one of the in dustries that New Guinea’s highest officialdom advocated, before it be came bemused with plans for forc ing all primary production into the hands of natives, and chasing white settlers away.

Practical Leahy, knowing that cattle tick infection in New Guinea was inevitable, made his own plans for “tick control”. Administration theorists, believing they could keep the tick out, forced him to adopt other measures.

In the end, Leahy was justified.

His cattle herds became infected, under the conditions enforced by officialdom, and he was faced with the prospect of losses from red water fever (which develops when tick infestation is not controlled).

He put the issue clearly before the Departmental czars, but they still demanded “eradication” measures and forced Leahy to comply.

The end was that Leahy’s herd were affected by redwater, and he lost thousands of pounds worth of stock.

The long struggle, extending over years, naturally had produced bitter feeling between Leahy and Depart ment. Mick Leahy never minces words. He carried his grievance to law, and sued the Administration for damages. The Chief Justice of the Territory’s Supreme Court, after careful review of the evidence, awarded him £4,000, and costs.

The Administration appealed to the High Court of Australia and, on legal technicalities, the verdict was reversed.

All who know the circumstances will agree that the Supreme Court verdict represented justice, and the High Court decision a mechanical— if perfectly correct—interpretation of the law, bereft of merely human considerations.

Mr. Leahy has given New Guinea a lifetime of service—as a goldfields pioneer, explorer, soldier-scout, and cattle-farming pioneer. Surely, when he suffered heavy losses because of the Administration’s default, he was entitled to compensation. That, at any rate, was the opinion of Leahy’s contemporaries and of the Terri tory’s principal judicial authority.

But the Administration, on legal technicalities, has escaped from its liability. It snarls angrily at planters and traders who, having succeeded in their enterprises, take their money out of the country. But here, when it had a chance to show gratitude in a practical way to one of the few who have ploughed their profits back into New Guinea, it ducked and dodged away from its moral obligations.

The point of it is that the Leahy case should never have got as far as the courts.

Whatever the legal considerations, 9 n the grounds of humanity and justice, the Administration could have compensated Mr. Leahy for losses which it caused him. A pay

ment of £4,000 would have been u mere drop in the more-than £2O millions per annum which it spends —and partially wastes—each year on “administration”.

Yet, what is the use of harsh comment at this stage! The matter may be safely left to history. ☆ ☆ ☆

£l2m. For Development:

But Plans Obscure

IN a way that suggested timidity and lack of confidence, the Fiji Government in March announced a “development plan” under which a sum of £12,192,000 would be spent in the five years from now until 1965.

At first glimpse, it is a pleasant sight. The Colony is faced with two clamant needs—more jobs for a con stantly increasing number of unem ployed, and much more develop ment, expertly calculated, to feed a rapidly growing population which now exceeds 400,000. £12,000,000 of special expenditure could achieve much.

But an examination of the details of the plan—admittedly difficult, because the Government’s announce ments were in a series of ill-con nected pieces, and attended by many provisos raises dou b ts as to whether the plan is what the Colony so urgently needs now.

For example, it looks as if a large proportion of the suggested £12,000,000 will be earmarked for the reconstruction of the Suva docks. New docks are needed, but not so urgently as is large-scale de velopmental activities, planned so this large population can be adequately fed and sheltered.

Following its 1959 inquiry, the Burns Commission submitted a plan designed most carefully to take care of Fiji’s needs between 1960-1970; proposing expenditure of over £12,000,000 between 1960 and 1965; submitting an order of priority for the various public works; and in sisting that if its plan was to be effective, it must be carried out as a whole.

An essential part of the plan was that a Development Commissioner should be appointed to guide, co ordinate, and fix priorities in accordance with the over-all scheme.

As everyone knows, the Burns plan was thrown aside because of the refusal of the Fijians to accept some of its most important recom mendations. The Fiji Government insists it has accepted more than 90 per cent, of the Burns plan and that its latest developmental plan is in accordance with the Burns report. That is quibbling. The small number of Burns recommendations rejected are the major ones; and the idea that a developmental plan on Burns lines can be implemented

by the Colonial Office officials who now serve as the Government of Fiji, instead of by a qualified De velopment Commissioner, is fan tastic.

Evidence of that is seen in the recent series of disconnected an nouncements about development.

The Government says, at one stage, that £2,500,000 will be spent on Suva docks between now and the end of 1964 out of the Colonial Development Fund. It announces in another place that the builders of the new Lautoka docks have been authorised to proceed with the Suva docks. Then it says, elsewhere, that Britain will provide half the money for the docks on condition that Fiji provides the remainder with a local loan!

There is no real indication that £12,000,000 will be available.

Classing the need to feed the growing Fiji population as of para mount importance, the Burns Com mission recommended measures to make much more land available for primary industries, and for this, new roads were given first priority.

The Colony’s road system now is shockingly poor and inefficient.

But out of the suggested £12,000,000 which the Government put in the forefront of its develop mental plan, only £713,000 is ear marked for roads between 1961 and 1965, and there is no real indica tion of whether they are to be de velopmental roads.

Conning over the Government’s various announcements, it can be assumed that the Government’s heart is in the right place.

For example, it proposes to make up to £lOO,OOO available for subsidis ing new planting of coconuts, and coconut planters will be allowed to deduct their expenditure on new planting from their taxable incomes.

It proposes to give substantial financial help to a New Zealand group which plans the development of a timber industry on a big scale.

It offers limited subsidies to the Emperor Goldmining group, to en courage it to undertake an approxi mate £750,000 expenditure needed to develop apparently rich lodes at deep levels (although it has so far refused to carry on with the sub sidies it has made to this goldmining industry in the past, and which the Emperor interests apparently expect to continue if they are going to pro ceed with development).

These plans are all to the good.

The Government’s obvious inten tions are admirable—but this manner in which it is proceeding with the colossal task of co-ordinating a practical development plan with the finance made available by the Colonial Developmental Fund, and with solution of the embarrassing economic and political problems created by rapid over-population, gives rise to despair.

The Colony has reached a stage

where it no longer can be compl managed by the kind of boss r available for this class of Cover ship under the Colonial C system.

It needs a general manager, Development Commissione someone of that class, who is < petent by character and experj to guide and shape the Adminii tion of this kind of country, w there is still only limited talen self-government, but where a raj growing population demands penditure of very large ove: funds on developmental actn calculated to produce more food employment.

The Colonial Office system v, applies to Colonies like Fiji, t adequate, and sometimes reir ably successful, in the past, reached the end of its practical fulness. The officials who have < to high authority and emolun as a reward for long servic clerical and administrative have not got the qualifica essential in a general manager tough, competitive world; and 1 are the qualifications now ne in the Government of Fiji.

Sincerity, courtesy, probity charming hospitality—qua which distinguish most Col Office servants—are not suffici Fiji’s Administration is 1 carried on very much in the ma of the last 50 years—just as i crisis had been created by < population, and just as if that < had not been recognised planned against by the experie men of the Burns Commission.

One wonders where it will e; The Fiji Colonial Secretar just returning from the long tro leave which is peculiar to the Administration. During his abs the Finance Secretary actec Colonial Secretary and someone acted as Finance Secretary. Nex Governor is due shortly to depa long leave. Presumably, the Col Secretary will act as Gove while the Finance Secretary wil as Colonial Secretary, and som else will act as Finance Secre These are the three principal in the Government of Fiji. Fu: comment is not needed. ☆ ☆ ☆

Those Niue Supermen

WHAT distinguished physicis Ernest Marsden has had h recently about the appj ability of the Niue Islander withstand the high radiatior their little island (see p. 133 very interesting. Unfortum some Australian newspapers gone completely off the deep and insisted that what Sir Ei has really discovered is a new of supermen. What rubbish! > super grins those Niueans mm displaying!