The Death-Defying Japanese

The Month's New Reading

With Judy Tudor

The Death-Defying Japanese —and Singapore

What makes a “war crime?” One may be permitted to /onder and to ask after reading Singapore—The Japanese Version by Masanobu Tsuji, now a member of Japan’s Upper louse but who was, during the Pacific war, Colonel Tsuji, ’hief of Operations and Planning.

Eut.-General Yamashita,

general officer commanding the Japanese forces in Malaya and japore, was executed as a war final in Manila after hostilities, mel Tsuji, however, who planned campaign and was in Borneo he time of Japan’s military col e in 1945, was instructed to appear” and preserve himself his country’s reconstruction, tfis he did, wandering around D-China in disguise, for some s until cleared of all charges, hether you consider Japan’s at : on Singapore—or her attack 3 earl Harbour, for that matter— justified must colour your lion as to just how culpable was mel Tsuji, the planning officer, irding to the Colonel, of course, attack on Malaya and Singa : was entirely logical, once you pt the premise that Japan fid have been in the war at all. i one on the Allied side of the e is likely to adopt the Tsuji ication, which is couched in the lest terms anyhow. Although m had, he says, regarded war “inevitable”, because America Britain had denied Japan vital dies including petroleum, after China “incident”, it was Hitler’s ck on Russia in mid-1941, that e Japan really serious about the ness. le Japanese began to feel then it was a case of having to be ; to win it; that if they delayed long, they might miss out ;ether. (r some time, however, the War Is of Japan could not make up r minds whether to make war Russia through Manchuria; or in all their faith on a south is thrust.

Liberating SE Asia ; history has now recorded, and lone of us down here in this of the world are ever likely irget, the ultimate decision was the southern adventure, which, lentally, allowed Japan to hang idditional halo around its own I —the “liberation of the count

less oppressed millions in Asia”.

The main reason why Colonel Tsuji has written this book at all seems to be in order to refute Winston Churchill’s claim made in Hinge of Fate, that the onslaught by Japan on British and American forces in the Pacific and South East Asia had been long prepared, and that the Japanese troops who took part in the Malayan campaign were well-trained jungle troops.

Tsuji proves—to his own satis faction, anyhow—that their’s was a war without long preparation; that not until a few months before had the southwards thrust (as against the northern drive into Russia) been decided upon. And that the Japanese troops, far from being jungle-tested, had never seen a tropical jungle, but had, instead, (Over)

been trained in the sub-arctic con ditions of Manchuria.

Nonetheless, in spite of what he says about this aspect of affairs, it is clear from what he records else where in the book, that as far back as September, 1940, the Japanese High Command had decided not to “include America and Britain out” in the war they knew was coming.

This was in retaliation for the freezing of Japanese funds in the US, and the ban on the export of scrap metal to Japan following the worsening of relations with the Allies when Japanese troops moved into Indo-China after the collapse of France.

And, in early 1941, some thought

to jungle warfare was being given in the setting-up of a special unit on Formosa, to which Tsuji was appointed as officer in charge of the Research Department.

In this job his chief study was Malaya—the military geography of it; and the equipment, tactics and supplies that would be necessary to carry out a campaign there.

The Impregnable Fortress

In this assignment he was helped considerably by a Major Asaeda, who specialised in cloak-and-dagger jobs and at one time, disguising himself as a coolie, infiltrated through Thailand into Malaya and

was able to bring back valuable ir formation.

Even at this early stage, the Jap anese were well aware that the £1 millions that had been spent lavish] on the “impregnable” fortress c Singapore had provided armamer only for the seaward-facing side c the island, leaving the rear defence; facing the Straits of Jahore, con spicuously absent.

The author is scathing in hi criticism of this defect—and wit] reason: and even more so for th feeling of complacency that the pro paganda about the “bastion of th East” engendered in British force in Malaya and the British publi at home.

At no time was it Tsuji’s plai to make a frontal attack on Singa pore in the face of its fixed guns; it was always his plan to thrusi down the Malay peninsula and nil Singapore off from behind.

Two days after Hitler started hi! war with Russia, Tsuji was appointee an assistant member of the Head quarters General Staff and in Sep tember of that year of 1941, the Japanese began in earnest their preparations for a war to the south.

In that month also Tsuji was appointed a staff officer to the forces in Indo-China, where one of his first jobs was preparing the aero dromes to accommodate the planes that would cover the planned Jap anese landings at Singora, in Thai land, and at Kota Bharu, over the border in Malaya, Where the Vichy French were;

in giving permission to con these airstrips, the Japanese : ahead and built them, anyhow, by early December, 1941, the ding Divisions were ready for arkation at Samah and Hainan id, while the headquarters staff equally ready at Saigon. The ings took place, as planned, on mber 8, and the rest is history, le 70 days between the Japanese ing and the final collapse of apore is one of the decisive aaigns of military history and fact that, 35 years later, the nese lost all they had gained not alter it, bat was the reason for the sh defeat? Tsuji attributes it, in to criminal British complac and faith in the Singapore ess, in part to Japanese rior planning: but most of all he patriotic fervour and self fice of front line Japanese ;rs and men.

The Dream Plan Tsuji’s reckoning, Britain had rior forces all along the line, pt in the air, yet in 10 short is, by one means or another, the nese —riding down the well d roads of Malaya on battalions cycles or fighting in the rubber tations —were able to push the monwealth forces the whole ;h of the peninsula, over the sway into Singapore, cut off water supply and end the Daign. is book is not without its sense le oriental ridiculous. While the Daign was still in the planning i, Tsuji had a dream and when roke he went to some pains to pret its symbolism, e upshot of this was that he nised a “death defying volunteer i” that would disguise them s as Thai troops for the land at Singora, where they would over some genuine troops (by ;ry), who would be put at the of a column which would head he Malayan border, e British Army border guards, I unable to distinguish genuine from Japanese, would swallow pock-and-bull story they would up and let them through, th this manoeuvre in view, a uniform was acquired and copies made. Then came the rise landing at Singora that 5d out to be such a surprise even the Japanese clerk in the ulate, who was supposed to been there to welcome them arrange the bribery and cor on was still in bed asleep, aji and a small party had to :h to the Consulate and knock up—by which time the military police and the army on the alert and the Japanese n plan of bloodlessly penefrat the Malayan border had to be doned.

Stgapore The Japanese

lON. Published by Ure Smith. alian price, 35/-.)