Territory Could Appea

A New Trust Territory Could Appea In N. Guinea

By a Staff Writer

The announcement, on Noveml 26, that The Netherlands is willi to subject the Dutch policy in i lation to Western New Guinea ] the “scrutiny and judgement of t United Nations” seemed to foreci changes of considerable interest ] the Australian Territory of Pap and New Guinea.

NEXT day, however, Netherlan announced that, whatever I might think, West N. Guin would not be surrendered to I donesia.

In the past two or three yea there has been increasing liaia between Netherlands and Austral on administrative matters in Ni Guinea. In relation to native heal and education, and the gene] objective of raising the nati standards of living, so that N( Guineans eventually may gove themselves, the Australians and t Dutch face almost exactly the sai obligations.

The complicating factor is t insistence of the ruling party in I donesia that Western New Guin should be part of Indonesia.

The Dutch (supported by An tralia and the Western peoples gene ally) reply that there is j reason whatever—ethnic, historicl political—why the Papuans of We New Guinea should pass into t] control of the Indonesians.

President Soekarno keeps the iss alive as a means of deflecting publ attention from the misgovernmd and miseries of his own 85,000,0 people in Indonesia.

In November, the leader in Malajl Tunku Abdul Rahman, moved I bring Netherlands and Indones together to effect a settlement. T 1 announcement on November 26 fc lowed a conference at The Hagi between the Tunku and the Prin Minister of Holland. Clearly, tl new movement was towards settfl ment through United Nations.

Another Trust Territory?

The Tunku proposed then to pel sonally interview the heads of tl Indonesian Government.

Indonesia, as expected, reacts unfavourably. It would not agree I submission of the matter to UN. I During November, small arme bands of Indonesians which ha sneaked into N. Guinea were beid hunted by the Dutch.

The Tunku, early in Decembe: withdrew from the discussion Obviously, he could do nothing wi« Indonesia, UN almost certainly would favoq

'gestion that West New Guinea id become a Trust Territory of Thus, it would be lost to the lesian President as a subject diversionary howling. 5 Dutch, while unwilling to with Indonesia, would be glad i rid of West N. Guinea. It is tly and embarrassing Territory, is possible that, whatever In da says, West New Guinea will rrendered by the Dutch to UN Prust Territory, with the Dutch ng the Trusteeship; and that then will be a close admin ive tie-up between Dutch and alian New Guinea, that should come about, it fc be a suitable occasion for a • definition of the future re iship between Australia, the Australian Territory of Papua, Prustee New Guinea. )ua is for all time an integral of Australia; but —as has been ed out lately, ad nauseum— ee New Guinea may go any j, in the future. It is time to asise that there is a funda al difference between the two tories, now joined in an ad trative union that becomes in ingly embarrassing.

Danger in Red Indonesia

closer connection between the r “republic” of Indonesia and South Pacific countries—which ;t certainly would follow a fer of Western New Guinea to lesia in any shape or form — I be difficult and dangerous, ner or later, Indonesia will into the control of a Com st Power and then the archi oes of the East Indies will be virtually a land bridge between and Australasia and Oceania, itralia, now the dominant r in the Southwest Pacific, not want Indonesians here; emphatically, not Red Indo- QS. >re have been ugly and leant changes in Indonesia in last couple of years, but iers have been told little them. Attention should be ;ed again to three of them: rhe political adventurer, irno, has dismissed his Parlia and set up a nominee Govern to rule according to the prin e s of “guided democracy”— ocracy” being the ideas of irno’s gang, and the “guide” supplied by Soekarno himself, illy, it is a precarious dictator- Soekarno is being kept in : for the present by the Army, political and economic condi of the country could scarcely >rse. rhe Indonesian “government” out the Dutch professional commercial classes, with the 1 purpose of clearing the way Indonesians. But the Indo

nesians stayed where they were, and about 21 million Chinese, who had moved into Indonesia after World War 11, in tens of thousands took over business from the Dutch. Now the “government” is driving out the Chinese, who are departing almost daily in shiploads, while all in dustries based on transport and the distribution of goods become steadily more depressed. • The Indonesian Communist Party (better known as PKI) under a strong and ruthless leader, Dipa Nasuntara Aidit, is steadily moving into the position where, as Soekarno’s rule collapses, it hopes it may take over. Twelve years ago, PKI numbered perhaps 10,000. About 1955, it had 165,000 members. When

it held its 6th Congress, in Sep tember, 1959, it claimed 1,500,000.

Last July, trying to force a way into the “government”, Aidit sharply criticised Soekarno for his failure to provide adequate supplies and security, and his inability to deal with Western New Guinea. The Army retaliated promptly by arrest ing several Red leaders. Soekarno then came to the rescue of the Reds, as he has done before.

Apart from the Army (whose future strength is unpredictable), the only organised barrier between the PKI and control of Indonesia is Masjumi and other political parties, which are primarily Moslem organisations. The Army may col lapse, but the Moslems will never accept Communism,