England Could Not Care Less

Editorial. . .

About South Pacific’S Problems

Despatch From R. W. Robson

London, July 22.

YESTERDAY, within a few miles of this place, the four Top Leaders (Eden, Eisenhower, 3ulganin and Faure) and attendant Ministers were struggling hard to find formulae wherewith to end the Cold War and the armaments race.

I Yesterday and to-day, England and South Africa are having a tussle here in the cricket-field, in their Fourth Test.

I Yesterday and to-day the “popular”

London newspapers, from edition to edition, are screaming with excite ment about the incidents of the cricket match. Only a few of the sober ones (which definitely are not read by the masses) are giving prominence to reports of the momentous conference at Geneva.

I That is the measure of England’s interest in international develop ment at Geneva, where the immedi ate future of the Western Powers, and the ultimate future of mankind, are being decided.

I That also is a fair indication of what the people of the South Pacific can expect from Britain in the way of interest in our future. Our future, in relation to Southeast Asia, is irrevocably bound up with Cold War events in Western Europe; and events in Western Europe will give shape to early developments in Southeast Asia. But 99.9 per cent, of people here do not know where SE Asia is.

THE leaders of the Western Powers moved political moun tains in order to get their three Governmental heads into personal consultation with Bulganin, the Soviet head. It was argued—and there was a kind of desperation in the argument—that if these four strong men once stood face to face, and were invited to gaze jointly upon this last decade’s terrifying drift towards World War 111 and ex termination under the atom bomb, ■ley would find some means of fettling their differences other than by “the arbitrament of war.”

I So a 6-months’ period of Musco vite cooing culminated at Geneva, P week ago, in well-staged demon strations of hearty goodfellowshin, With the Big Four toasting each §ther in the choicest wines, and old ,soldiers Eisenhower and Zhukov Ipgaging in a bout of hearty back

llapping.

I But to-day, as this is written, the ■Big Four Conference is deadlocked inability to find a formula for

(a) disarmament, and (b) the uni fication of Germany. It looks as if the Big Four will go home this week-end, amid a spate of soothing words —“we have discussed prin ciples, and the implementation of them must now be worked out by our respective Foreign Ministers”— but in the knowledge that little really has been accomplished.

As one can see it here to-day, it appears as if the Cold War (cease less subversive activities, increasing armaments, constant and intense watchfulness) will go on. Russia may alter her master-plan for world domination, but will never abandon it of her own free will.

THE crux of it all is Germany, of course. To prevent Moscow’s countless armies from over running Western Europe, Britain and USA must have a dependable partner in Western Europe. France, deteriorating politically and cruelly embarrassed by events in her African and Asian colonies, is more of a liability than an asset to her nominal allies. When this became evident, last year, London and Washington moved quickly to the rehabilitation of Germany; and Germany’s response has been re markable.

By hard work and high spirit, the Germans already have made Western Germany strong; and there is no doubt that, given half a chance, the now Communist-held Eastern Germany would line up with Western Germany. And a united Germany, given arms, is capable alone of smashing the now formid able Red empire of the Muscovites.

There is an age-old, deathless hate between Teuton and Slav; and, in a clash between the two, there is never any doubt of the result.

Moscow was infuriated to see its highly successful campaign for the “communisation” of China and SE Asia, and for the crippling penetra tion of France and Italy by count less Red agents, checkmated by the rapid rise of Germany in 1954-5 as an industrial and political force.

Since mid-1954, every resource of Moscow cunning and diplomacv has been turned upon the task of keep ing Germany out of the Western camp; and her apparently amiable agreement to meet the Big Three at Geneva is merely part of that effort.

Many high-sounding phrases were used this week at Geneva, but all boiled down to this: Russia would not accept the Western Powers’

plea (that the armaments race should end, and international security be maintained by pacts policed by UNO, and German uni fication permitted through free general elections in both divisions) unless the West gave an undertak ing that Germany would not be ad mitted to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. USA and Britain obviously were not going thus to abandon the strongest of the vari ous factors which have come to their aid since Russia raised her Iron Curtain and launched her cam paign of world-conquest nearly ten years ago. (Continued Overleaf)

THOSE who imagined that, at long last, Russia had had a change of heart, now know better. If Russia is soft-pedalling her Cold War, it is not because she is ashamed of what she has done to a peace-loving world since it formed its clumsy UNO in 1945-6, or is abandoning any of her plans to carry the hammer-and-sickle symbol into every nation. It is merely that she has been guilty of racial misjudgment.

China, which was to be Moscow’s mainstay and inspiration in the East during the painful process of establishing World Communism, is developing ideas of her own. Already, throughout the East, the term “Sinoism” (the outwards thrust of a new and aggressive China) is being heard. It is taking the place of the Japanese Co-Prosperity Sphere, which was so prominent in the 30’s and early 40’s.

There is persistent rumour that all is not well between Moscow and Peking. It is not to be expected that there will be any more similarity of view between Chou En-lai and Bulganin, than there is between Anthony Eden and Nehru. The viewpoints of such men are mostly definite, distinct and irreconcilable.

The Geneva Conference of the Big Four, therefore does not seem to offer any real hope of an easing of the Cold War. As Prime Min ister Eden has just pointed out, Russia started this Cold War in 1945-6, when the Western nations had disarmed almost to the point of nakedness; her sabre-rattling forced us all to rearm again to avoid Communist enslavement; and we are not going to again disarm unless we have certain pledges and assurances.

Russia will not give those pledges.

THAT is the position in Europe.

This is how it reacts upon us in the South Pacific (Australia, New Zealand and the South Sea Islands), as I see it here to-day: • The Western Powers are so deeply preoccupied with the problem of their own survival—in the event of the Cold War becoming hot —that they have no thought and few armed forces to spare for us. • Our very natural fear that a spill-over from Asia, southwards, will mean our eventual extermina tion is regarded with wide-eyed wonder by most people here. (I met a group of Conservative MP’s in a House of Commons room on Mon day, July 18, and tried to describe for them the conditions I had per sonally seen in Indonesia, Malaya and Singapore in May and June— the uprising of Asian races who hate the Europeans, and who surely will push us out as soon as they have the strength and opportunity; the steady weakening of the British hold upon the Europeans’ last re maining gateway in SE Asia; failure of the British to realise that, when they give away their Empire in India, Burma, Ceylon, Soudan, etc., they also are giving away protected markets for British goods—a n d anyone can see that unless Britain maintains her overseas markets, she is headed for economic disaster. Dis cussion was lively, but comments and questions indicated that these people cannot see the Asian and Pacific woods for the Western Euro pean trees.) • Britain knows little and cares less about our special problems— such as the future of Solomons and New Hebrides; Indonesian claims to

Western New Guinea; how best resist the increasing pressure upi us to permit Asian immigration in our Territories. Without a Cold W: Britain perhaps might try to me us, so as to hold her very valualf South Pacific markets. With a Co War on her hands, Britain finds a anxieties about Asia mostly an ei barrassment. • It is important to realise th while we of the South Pacific a forming ever-closer ties with tf United States, the official Brit:; dislike Americans, while the ncc official British are completely ; different about the national impoi ance of maintaining good relatio with the great friendly Power

America. I personally have heard the highest British officials ascribe much of their troubles in the Far East to “the blundering anti (golonialism of these untrained American diplomats.” * * * B My outstanding impression, based on scores of private interviews with official and non-official British in high places, is sharp disappointment with British failure to recognise that, in the South Pacific, there is another and—in a racial sense —a cleaner and more virile Britain, eager to protect what it holds and to establish happier and healthier Jiving standards for the common man.

I The United Kingdom British fail generally to realise that their in difference towards the South Pacific British and their aspirations is driving the latter towards North America.

I If present conditions continue for ■ftnother two or three decades, the then effective generation of people in Australia, New Zealand and the South Pacific Islands will have formed with Canadians and Ameri cans much stronger ties than with Western Europe. Already, whether icnsciously or not, we look to North America for protection against Asia my inquiries and discussions mere indicate that the present gen eration of dispirited Englishmen could not care less about it, anyway.