Solve The Solomons-Fiji Problems By

Encouraging Indian Migration To Bsi

Review of South West Pacific t>y JUDY TUDOR

IF the group of Islands in the SW Pacific known as the British Solomon Islands Protectorate were to sink suddenly and perman ently, the event would cause few ripples on the economic ocean.

The 17,000 tons of copra which it produces annually, as its chief reason for being, could easily and quickly be compensated for by in creased production in more acces sible and more bountifully endowed Territories.

If one could ignore the fact that it is now a home for 95,000 Melanesians, that possibly would be the best solution of the problem of the BSlP—in one blow it would re move what is obviously little more than a financial embarrassment to the UK Government, and also the risk that, at some future time, over crowded Asia might regard it as a legitimate field for migration.

The greater part of what we now know as the BSIP was proclaimed a Protectorate by Britain in 1893, and the rest was acquired and added to it between then and 1900.

The reasons for the Proclamation followed the usual pattern. There were about 50 Europeans living in the Group and, in the previous half century, a prodigious number of missionaries and others had man aged to have themselves murdered by the natives. But this was at the fag-end of Britain’s Victorian era of colonising zeal; and the factors that make for growth, vigor and prosperity in a Colony have always been lacking from, or denied to, the Solomons.

In 1905, Lever Bros, began estab lishing their coconut plantations in the Protectorate, planting up, eventually, 20 000 acres, and this was and still is the hard, economic core of the BSIP. There always were few private European plant ers in the Solomons, and since World War 11, there have been even fewer.

Since annexation, of course, colonial theory has changed greatly.

In those days, it was assumed that a Colony should contribute some thing to the common wealth; pro fits were not then sneered at. Later, the theory that we, the European governing body, merely held a colony, at our own expense if neces sary, until such time as the native inhabitants were fit to run it themselves, was embraced enthusi astically.

Very, very recently the latter phase has been tempered by the thought in high places that if suf ficient of the Late Victorian profit making could be wedded to our altruism as to take some of the

burden off the unfortunate tax payers, it would be a good thing.

And, with this last phase of all, has come the corollary that each country must have a Future, and people therefore speak portentously about The Future of the Solomons.

Well, what is the future of the BSIP? Has it one?

European Enterprise

fIIHE Solomons, to-day, are produc- JL ing about three-quarters of the copra that they produced before the war. One reason for this is the obvious one that great areas of coconuts were destroyed during the war and virtually no new areas have been planted since.

Officially, however, the view is that the development of the copra industry is the only means by which the BSIP can hope for an early improvement in its economic posi tion. This may be so, so long as the present demand for copra holds. But a one-crop economy is always dangerous and if the BSIP is to have this nebulous thing called a Future —if, indeed, it is not to remain static —new industries are essential. These could be based either on private, individual enter prise, with capital introduced from outside the Protectorate; or based on native enterprise, heavily bolst ered by Government money and Government guidance.

Since gold was discovered in Fiji and New Guinea in the 30’s and 20’s, there has been a correspond ing interest in gold in the Solomons; but, to date, nothing has been found in payable, workable quantities, and, to-day, any gold find would have to be at least three times richer than a similar find in the early 30’s to make it payable.

But gold still is a possibility, although more as the lucky marble in a lottery than as a factor in a sober summary of future prospects.

BSl’s future seems to lie in its agriculture, possibly in its forests. (In this latter department, although there is a small export of logs from near Honiara, there is no mill to serve the timber-hungry township).

After the war, planters were actively discouraged from returning to their plantations. The British Government paid no war-damage compensation, and no assistance was given in transport or in re establishment such as was afforded, albeit reluctantly, the planters of Papua-New Guinea. BSI planters returned in small privately-owned ships, taking their goods and chat tels with them, and beginning from scratch again on their bombed-out

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plantations. As soon as they began again to produce they were attacked ferociously by the Internal Revenue Department with a newly devised income tax.

It is small wonder, then, that there has been no clamouring at the gates by strangers to invest money or grow new crops in the BSIP. Such enterprise as there has been in the Solomons since the war has been connected with the wasting asset of war-scrap or of the taking-in-each-other’s-wash ing variety in Honiara.

It is interesting to note that although Papua-New Guinea was equally beset by Socialists after the war, it has at least acquired some promising new enterprises: also that although it has at least two British firms —one making cutch from the mangroves of Western Papua and the other surveying hydro-electric potential in the same region with a view of refining bauxite —no British firm has fav oured the Solomons with anything of a similar sort.

The first essential of a new large-scale industry in BSIP, as elsewhere in the Pacific, is a re liable and adequate labour supply.

Ihe official opinion is that the labour potential is by no means fully utilised —while private opinion

is that the labour force at present presenting itself is totally in adequate for any large scale step up of production, and that more over, it is, on the whole, inefficient labour.

Cost of importing food to the Solomons, plus local wage rates, does not make it cheap labour, either. Semi-skilled jobs of car pentering, etc., which in Papua are performed by Papuans, are done in Honiara by Fijians and Indians brought across from Fiji.

TRAVELLING in a ship for the A 16 to 24 hours it takes from Santa Anna and Santa Catalina, up along the coast of San Christoval Island into the long inland passage between the larger islands of the Solomons Group, and so to Honiara half-way along Guadalcanal, the traveller is struck by the forbidding look of these islands and the feel ing that they are lands without people. Few villages can be seen along the shores by day and at night there are gaps of many miles between village fires.

The total land area of the Solo mons is 12,000 square miles. The population is about 95,000 natives, of whom over 40,000 live on the 1,500 square-miles island of Malaita.

Compare that with Fiji, which has

a total land area of about 7,000 square miles and a population of 313,000.

BSI has a similar land policy to that of Papua-New Guinea —that is, native land can be leased through the Government from the native owners.

But at this stage it is probably opportune to ask ourselves what

BSIP has to attract new enterprise, new capital and new blood that can not also be supplied by other Terri tories better endowed with trans port services, proximity to markets and without the income-tax factor that must be considered in the Solomons.

Native Enterprise

AS an alternative to European enterprise, let us consider the case for an economy based on native enterprise. This obviously was the plan of the immediate post war years, when Socialism was in full flower and private individuals were actively discouraged from re turning to the Solomons.

If the Solomons are to be de veloped to a first-class Pacific territory by this means it is going to take a great quantity of Govern ment money, a great deal of time and an even greater amount of patience.

During the war, the American forces had a farm at Ilu, about 12 miles out of Honiara, and this pro duced large quantities of vegetables for the local forces. This appears to have been one of the factors in the decision to put the capital at harbourless Honiara. The Yanks had produced bountiful supplies of vegetable crops—ergo, with this and the fertile plains on the east coast of Guadalcanal, native peasant farming could be established forth with.

Rice was then scarce and ex pensive, and natives like to eat rice —so planners immediately decided to experiment with rice at Ilu. The seed was imported from Fiji— although most of the rice grown in that colony is of the submerged variety and the rice to be grown at Ilu was dry rice.

T*?e ? r ,°K grown at Ilu shot up like Jack’s beanstalk to about six feet high—probably due to the wrong variety of seed being used and possibly because of a high residue of fertilisers left after US army “truck” farming, it set a heavy crop of grain; but, when it was mature, it was too heavy for

the long stalks, which toppled over and could not be successfully har vested.

The second attempt was a com plete failure, due to drought. The rice experiment was then abandoned.

A tremendous rice-harvester is standing idly in a shed at Ilu, with out any work to do.

But the plan to grow rice locally has not been entirely abandoned.

Rice is grown at St. Joseph’s Catholic Mission school, near Ilu — and, as it is a success in New Guinea, there seems no good reason why the right varieties should not be grown satisfactorily on Guadalcanal.

Hu at present is the home of about 30 or 40 cattle, imported from New Zealand and Fiji for experi mental purposes, and a few large white pigs. No crops are grown. r!E failure of experimental agri culture in the Solomons can not be attributed to the local De partment of Agriculture. For the whole of the Solomons, the agricul tural personnel of all grades, from the chief executive officer to the tractor mechanic, could be counted on the fingers of one hand. To in troduce agriculture to natives on a large scale —and this must have been the plan at one stage—it needs a big team of vigorous, enthusi astic agricultural officers, and a great deal of cash. Papua-New Guinea is 50 years ahead of the Solomons in this department; yet here, too, progress is impeded by lack of qualified officers, particularly on the veterinary and scientific side.

Although Guadalcanal is the largest of the Solomon Islands— -2,500 square miles— the population is only about 15,000. The villages around Honiara are few, indeed, and on the road between the town and Ilu not one is seen. North of Honiara, there are one or two very small villages.

The plains in this part of Guadal canal may be the most fertile land in the Solomons; but the natives show complete indifference about it.

They have not even sufficient energy to provide an adequate fresh vegetable supply for Honiara.

The comparatively small island of Malaita contains almost half the population of the Solomons. The island is poor in natural resources, and the old law of survival makes the natives the most vigorous and energetic in the group. It was Malaitamen who traditionally were the workers in the Solomons—until post-World War 11, when they de veloped a new nationalism which usually goes under the name of

“Marching Rule.”

If there is scope for native in dustry, and an economy based on that, it probably exists with the Malaita natives; but this also probably means their partial trans plantation to the less populated areas of the Solomons. There seem to be no official plans for anything

of this sort—if, indeed the Malaita natives themselves would counten ance such a move.

Why Not The Fiji-Indians?

r[ERE is another possibility for the future of the Solomons— but one which may cause horror in certain places, and the imple mentation of which would call for a considerable amount of courage.

Fiji and the Solomons still have many affinities. But while in Fiji there is a large, landless section of the community—the Fiji-Indians,

who make up half the population— in the Solomons are large areas of land lying idle for want of people or inclination or plans to develop them.

Why not cancel out the two problems by giving the Fiji-Indians a stake in the Solomons, and afford ing them the opportunity of provid ing the Solomons with this Future of which so many speak so glibly?

The Fiji-Indians, of course, may not be interested. They could, how ever, be given the opportunity of offering. At present, except for a

few artisans who are brought in temporarily they are apparently not allowed into the BSIP.

If Papua-New Guinea can grow rice, peanuts, coffee, cocoa, kenaf and fibres, why cannot these things be grown in the Solomons? Why not let the Fiji-Indians have the opportunity of proving that it can be done?

It is not suggested that the Indian community should be shifted entirely from Fiji. Whether that is desirable or not, it is not practic able. Fiji is accommodating her present population (150,000 Indians and 130,000 Fijians) comfortably enough.

But in Fiji, as in BSI, it is the future that is ugly. Both Fijian and Indian communities are growing rapidly: and trouble will commence before another 25 per cent, increase is recorded. But the shape of the picture might change very much if the future surplus population of Fiji-Indians were given land-owner ship and opportunities in Pacific Islands similar in character to the islands of Fiji.

The migration scheme could be carefully controlled and sponsored by the governments of Fiji and Solomons. Land and technical assistance could be made available to the migrants; and, in their train, in course of time, would come the artisans and the skilled tradesmen, new enterprises and organised transport.

“And what would happen to the poor Solomon Islanders?” asks someone. “In half a century the place would be over-run by Indians,” yells someone else.

And why not? If not Indians it will probably be someone else. Only for the might of the American armed forces, Japanese would now be colonising the British Solomon Islands, just as they colonised Micronesia between 1920 and 1940.

It is too bad for the Islanders that the time has now passed when the mere fact of being was sufficient excuse for inhabiting the earth.

Are the 17,000 tons of copra which the Solomons now produce sufficient reason for their continued existence under the present set-up?

If the handful of Europeans and the 95,000 Solomon Islanders can not do more with their country than that, is it not better to plan realistically for some one who can, rather than wait, hands folded, until in the fullness of time popu lation pressure from Asia forces the issue?

This problem, of course, is not one peculiar to the Solomons. But the Solomons are the least developed of the fertile islands of the Pacific.

There, more easily than in most territories, it would be possible to take time by the forelock and an ticipate the inevitable, and while there still is time to shape it to our own ideals.

Such a step would need bold

planning; the obstacles are obvious and many; there would be no lack of critics to denounce the plan. The Indians may not be interested—or they may prove a dismal failure at the job of pioneering.

But the alternative? To carry on as at present, with UK disinterested: a few unfortunate officials, caught midway between better things in the West Indies or Fiji or Africa,