America, the Pacific, and World War III
pp. 7-8 · Read in the full issue
VS this is written, Mr, Spender and Mr. Doidge—Ministers for External Affairs respectively in Australia and few Zealand and also Ministers for acific affairs —are in conference in Aus ralia with the United States Assistant ecretary of State. They are working out etails of a Peace Treaty with Japan; nd a Pacific Pact of mutual protection nd security against Asia is in the back round.
It is not a comfortable discussion. The 'nltcd States, as part of her plan for eeping the Ru^so-Asiatic Communists t home, wants a friendly Treaty with a farmed Japan, because Japan obviously mst be our first line of defence against ,ed Asia. Australia and New Zealand are iger to stand in with the United States gainst Asia; but, with bitter memories f the Pacific War, they do not at all ke the idea of a re-armed Japan.
America is not much interested in a acific Pact. The only other non ommunist nation with a large popu ition, in favour of maintaining the acific peace, is India; and India, being lilitarily negligible and politically un epenable, is not regarded seriously y the Americans. Canada (12 millions) id Australia-New Zealand (9 millions) :e much too small to matter much in acific calculations. In any event, they ill ally themselves with USA —they have 3 future otherwise, America is much tore interested in getting the right sort ’ Treaty with Japan, a hard-fighting ation of over 90 million people.
But America, as a friendly gesture to er British neighbours, and so that she iay have free access to South Pacific ises, probably will enter into a Pacific act—on condition that Australia and ew Zealand will help her with the ipanese Peace Treaty. Australia-New ealand probably will agree, with extreme rtuctance, to the re-arming of Japan;
but they will try to get from America a guarantee against any Japanese aggres sion. That, in any event, would be im plicit in a Pacific Pact.
More than 50 years ago, before the Japanese smashed Russia’s naval power in the Pacific, Australia and New Zealand were as worried about Russian aggressive ness in the Pacific as they are to-day.
Then, they looked to Britain for protection —and did not look in vain. To-day, with Britain hamstrung by Socialism, and more or less pinned to Europe by the develop ing menace behind the Iron Curtain, the British countries in the Pacific no longer depend on the White Ensign for pro tection. Instead, they feel that their future in an uneasy world lies with the United States.
They are lucky that there is a United States. If there were not, or if the Americans insisted on staying at home, there would be no future at all for the European communities of the South Pacific . . .
The Jap, always a cunning bargainer in international affairs, has not changed his spots. He is trying, as the price of Japan’s support of America against Red Asia, to force America to agree to Japanese emigration to the South Seas, especially New Guinea. Australia is shout ing with anger at the very idea. America is being tactful and soothing.
IN the world to-day, the most important factor of international significance is the rapid re-arming of the United States. The vital decisions were taken less than three months ago; but already it is possible to discern a change in international tensions.
It is believed that certain elements in the Communist bloc have been pressing for war in 1951; but there are indicatiims that the top men in Russia now are going into reverse. They do not like the temper and developing military strength of the American nation —by far the greatest Power in the world to-day—nor the echoes of those atomic bombs recently exploded in the Western States.
As hesitation appears in their hitherto confident attitude —perhaps because of it! —there are unmistakeable signs of unrest and rebellion in some of Russia’s satellite countries, and even in Russia itself.
There are echoes of curious changes tak ing place in China.
It is far too soon yet to even hope for the avoidance of World War III: but those wise old British diplomats who al ways have insisted that the Muscovite conspiracy against the world will be destroyed from within may yet see their opinions justified.
There can be no hope for relief from the black clouds of the past two or three years unless United States continues resolutely with her preparations for war, and unless the Western European Powers are loyal to the obligations they accepted in the Atlantic Pact.
What is the Future of New Caledonia and French Oceania?
A REPORT published elsewhere in this issue gives an outline of a politico economic crisis which appears to be developing in Tahiti, chief island of French Oceania. Developments there should not be ignored by the United States and the British Commonwealth, which are vitally interested.
The French are masters of the art of suppressing any public discussion of their administrative difficulties. Despite that, there have been growing indications that all is not well in the relationship between Metropolitan France and the French Pacific colonies of New Caledonia and French Oceania. The report on page 25
is typical of the difficulties which seem to be developing.
These troubles generally stem back to the events of 1940-44, when France was so tragically divided between the Vichy ites, who surrendered to and collaborated with our enemies, and the De Gaulle ists, who remained with their Allies, and shared in our victory. Of all sections of the French Empire, New Caledonia and French Oceania were the very first to rally to De Gaulle.
In 1940 and 1941, New Caledonia and Oceania, completely shut off from France, were in a bad way economically, and were materially helped by Australia and New Zealand. From 1942 onwards, when American forces occupied the South Pacific, the French-De Gaullist countries were economically secure; and there was formed, in those critical war years, a warm comradeship between the Americans and British, on the one side, and the French-Pacific peoples, on the other. The British and French communities in the South Pacific do not forget that they were saved by the Americans from the Jap invasion.
K NATURALLY, and properly, New Caledonia and Oceania were restored in 1945 to the rule of France; but neither seems to have been very happy.
It is difficult to point to any one factor which is the cause of this. The trouble probably is due to the fact that the two French colonies especially French Oceania have maintained a warm and close friendship with the Anglo-American countries, and that a proportion of the officials sent out by France to carry on these Administrations are jealous of that friendship.
A great part of the machinery of the Government of France is in the hands of officials who supported the Vichy
regime of 1940-44; and the older non official citizens of New Caledonia and Tahiti like the Vichy-ites as little as the Vichy-ites like them. It would have been supposed that this war-time bitterness gradually would have disappeared—and it would have disappeared if the French Colonial Service had been wisely con trolled and directed. But there seem to be some very stupid people in Paris.
Again and again, since 1945, they have sent to their Pacific colonies men who were noted for incompetence, or political bias, or both; and these people have given much offence to the colonists, and aroused their antagonism.
Generally, the countries of the South Pacific, including Australia and New Zea land, are growingly pro-American, in that they hate Socialism, the little sister of Communism. That anplies quite definitely to the French Pacific Colonies: therefore, France’s steady swing towards extreme Socialism, and Red domination, is a factor not to be ignored in considering the future of these Islands.
The United States and the British Pacific Dominions have no territorial ambitions whatever in the South Pacific.
They have not in any way interfered with the internal affairs of the French Territories. In fact, they do not take sufficient interest in them. Not long ago, America closed up, in Tahiti, the Con sulate she had maintained there for half a century.
Yet, having noted some marked political and economic trends in recent years, it would not surprise this writer if, within a decade or two, New Caledonia and French Oceania weakened their ties with France, and sought closer relations with their Anglo-American neighbours. The genesis of it all may be found in the events of 1940-45. Any menace to Pacific security from Communist Asia would, of course, hasten the development.
Socialism Among The Nuts
SINCE World War 11, the British Socialist Government has hunted all private enterprise out of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands and, through the High Commission for the Western Pacific, it now runs the G & E Islands for the “benefit” of the natives.
As part of the set-up it imposes an export tax on copra of no less than 25 per cent, of the FOB price. Under the present MOF contract, that represents a deduction of £l3/8/9 Stg. per ton. After that, if the grower shows any profit on his enterprise, the Administration collects income tax. (See article elsewhere.) The British Ministry of Food seems to> have an extraordinary outlook concern
ing vegetable oil from nuts. It was this Socialist set-up which induced the British growers of coconuts to enter into a nine years contract, based on a Sterling price; and then, when the contract was nicely going, it devalued Sterling by 30 per cent., although copra is an international com modity, and holds its value in terms of gold.
It was the same set-up which went crazy concerning the production of pea nuts in East Africa, and which has now written off a loss of £36 millions on its “African Nuttery.”
“Bull in a china shop” has been for ages a synonym for confusion, stupidity and heavy loss. Maybe it should be changed to “A Socialist in a Nuttery.”

