How 240 Men Were Saved

Magnificent Achievement on New Britain Coast After Rabaul Fell

'THIS is another angle on how hundreds ■L of men soldiers and civilians escaped from Rabaul after the Jap invasion in January 1942. We are in debted for this story to J. K. McCarthy, who perhaps more than any other individual at that time helped to save these men. After he had shepherded them to Australia, he gave other distinguished service in the Pacific war and was, in fact, in Sarawak and Borneo, until July, 1946. He now is living in Victoria.

Other parts of the incredible story of Jap-dodging have been told by the Rev.

A. P. H. Freund, in the “PIM,” and by Commander Eric Feldt. in his book “The Coast Watchers.” Both have referred to Mr. McCarthy’s conspicuous part in the rescue of the remnants of RabauVs gar rison and Rabaul civilians: but, here, the whole story is told for the first time, enabling us to complete the picture of events in those early chaotic days of 1942.

Section I

LONG before war came to New Guinea, a secret plan had been made in which it was proposed to use guerilla irregulars against any enemy who might overrun the country. The plan called for the recruiting of suitable civilians and natives, who were to be armed and instructed, and for the laying down of supply dumps in which food, ammunition and medicines were to be stored at strategic points.

From 1919 onwards the far-sighted Royal Australian Navy had implemented a scheme of Coast Watchers in which selected civilians, planters and Govern ment officials at strategic points, were instructed how to report movements of suspicious shipping and aircraft in time of war.

On the outbreak of war in 1939, the RAN had expanded their plan and modern efficient teleradio sets had been made available to their Coast Watchers.

As already told in the “PIM.” Commander E. A. Feldt RAN had been appointed to command the New Guinea area. He had previously lived in New Guinea for many years and had served as Patrol-Officer and District Officer in most places.

In having Eric Feldt as senior naval intelligence officer in charge, New Guinea was lucky.

When the Japs suddenly struck at Pearl Harbour I was Assistant District Officer at Talasea, New Britain. The district was a large one and the Euro pean community was small; but what it lacked in numbers it made up in quality —amongst those planters and traders lived the finest of men.

Included amongst them were Ken Douglas of San Remo Plantation ; r Latham Hamilton, of Garua; Bert Olander and Roger Berman, of Numondo; Rod Mars land, of Lagenda; and the Ireland brothers, Charlie and Les. of Walindi.

At Iboki, 60 miles down the coast, was McNicol, a young man of Eurasian descent who was to later earn the RAN Distinguished Service Medal. Frank Henderson was my agricultural officer at Talasea; while at the Witu Islands were Reg Mills, Harry Murray (Bali) and Mrs.

Baker, Further up the coast, and actually within the Rabaul area, were Lincoln Bell, Frank Holland and Jerry Swanson.

These last three were timber-getters, and Bell and Holland in particular were known to me as splendid bushmen.

RABAUL authorities appeared vague about the guerilla plan which was to be implemented on the outbreak of war, and, lacking definite orders, I decided to act without them.

Henderson, Douglas, Hamilton and Olander conferred at Talasea, and we pooled all our resources. We selected suitable trustworthy natives and armed and gave them what training we could.

There were a few long-term prisoners at Talasea, and these men were released so that they could assist. They did not betray our confidence and were to remain faithful to the end. Added to our native police, these men gave us the nucleus of a force.

From Talasea westwards to Cape Glou cester we laid down dumps of rice, cases of meat, etc., at hidden points along the coast. Latham Hamilton and Charles Ireland were old soldiers of the First War —their advice was most helpful.

The teleradio was removed to a bomb proof shelter and practices in dismantling it and carrying it away were constantly made in case an enemy party should suddenly come upon the station.

Late in December the few white women living in the district were evacuated to Rabaul, and thence flown to Australia. Mrs. Baker of Langu Plantation, Witu, declined to go and remained at her plantation. *We badly lacked ships in the district and had only mv “Lolobau.” a 35-feet Administration vessel, and Ken Douglas’s tiny launch, “Dufaur.”

One of our first duties was to make the three emergency landing-grounds at

Talasea unsuitable for landing. The landing-ground at the station presented no difficulty; but the other two, Cape Gloucester and Übili, were at the extreme ends of the district, and 200 miles apart.

Marsland and I sailed for Gloucester, while Douglas went in his small boat to Übili. Deep ditches were dug across the strips to prevent any enemy use of them.

At Cape Gloucester we saw our first enemy planes. There were 30 or 40 of them and they appeared to be flying N-E.

The work on the strips took some weeks to accomplish and by the time we re turned to Talasea, Rabaul had been heavily bombed and it was clear that a Japanese invasion was imminent. At this time Roger Berman was suffering from appendicitis and he was taken to Rabaul by Bert Olander, of Numondo. Latham Hamilton was also keen to go and get first-hand news.

Although we had no doctor in the dis trict I was doubtful of the wisdom of such a trip; however, they sailed in a Chinese schooner and that was the last we were to see of either Berman or Hamilton. Olander escaped from Rabaul and played a great part in the events that followed. Poor Hammie and Roger must have arrived at Rabaul on the very day the Japs landed.

On January 21, 1942, Rabaul went off the air. Their last message was brief but it told us plenty: “Abandon your station.”

I now had only Mitchell, at Gasmata, and Con Page, at Tabar, Kavieng, to talk with on the air.

DURING this period the Burns, Philp 179-ton ship, “Lakatoi” was visiting the Witu Group and on January 23, she had been en route to Rabaul. She carried no wireless, so was unaware that the Japanese were landing there on that day.

Japanese seaplanes suddenly appeared and flew low over her and carried out a close inspection from the air. They did not attack, but one pilot waved to the ship. The master, Captain Farrow, de cided to turn back and on the following day he called at Talasea and dropped R. A. Robinson (senior plantation in spector for Burns, Philp) and M. L. Cross (a plantation manager).

The vessel did not wait but immediately turned about and, later, we sighted her from Talasea anchored at Cape Camp

bell, on the northern tip of Willaumez Peninsula, about 20 miles from the station.

Our only vessel, “Lolobau” was then anchored on the other side of Willaumez, so that we could not reach “Lakotoi” within within 24 hours.

Both Robinson and I would have dearly loved to use the “Lakatoi” but I was told that the master was not keen; he was a stranger to New Guinea waters.

Rabaul radio was silent but Gasmata constantly reported enemy air and sea movement. The air seemed thick with Japs at Talasea. It was the lull before the storm and high time we got out of the station. I advised Mitchell, patrol officer at Gasmata, to get out and set up a hidden observation post, as the enemy would surely overrun the country.

In the meantime, I was getting anxious about the rapidly growing number of civilians who had to be evacuated from the district. One of my last actions was to purchase the entire contents of the Chinese trade store at Talasea. The food would be valuable, and so would tl\e trade goods in hiring canoes, etc. Our plan was to get everybody to Cape Glou cester and thence over the Dampier and Vitiaz Straits to Salamaua, which was still clear of the enemy.

At the isolated village of Kariaiai, near Cape Raoult, 90 miles west of Talasea, we had already laid down food dumps, as I originally intended to take up my job of coast watcher on the western tip of New Britain and observe the narrow straits between New Britain and the Finschhafen coast.

We packed everybody on the small “Lolobau” after camouflaging her as best we could, and began the journey. In case we were forced to take to the jungle and spend the war in New Britain we decided on a strict system of rationing which applied to the Europeans even more than it did to our natives. Any hungry glances that might be directed to a boy’s bowl of rice were promptly noticed by the humor ous but nevertheless determined Robinson, who cheerfully threatened to shoot the European offender on the spot.

Reg Mills, of Witu, and Harry Murray, of Bali, Unea Island, were met down the coast; they had sailed a cutter and the launch “Aussi” over. They reported that Mrs. Baker and her maid, Miss*Leh mann, had also come over to New Britain, and were at a spot further up the coast. 1 STILL had the “Lakatoi” in mind and at an early opportunity sent a signal to the authorities' at Port Moresby requesting that as the ship would cer tainly fall into Japanese hands I should be permitted to either arrest and use her, or sink her.

The overcrowded “Lolobau” reached the Kombe native area, and I soon learned from the natives where Mrs.

Baker and her maid were located. They had gone up a large river, the Aria, and were still there with the small launch, “Langu,” Mrs. Baker was willing to risk it and try to hide from the Japs until the war was over; but as I had had no trouble in locating her I very much doubted the wisdom of her action, although I have always admired her courage and resourcefulness. I also was not so sure that the war would be over in a few months.

We waited at Nutanavua Island while Ken Douglas went up the Aria and in a few hours I was greatly relieved to see that Mrs. Baker had accompanied him back to our ship.

“I suppose you think I’m a damned nuisance, Keith,” she said, as she came aboard.

“I’m only too glad to see you,” I replied “I know you’ll be useful.”

I was right; later we needed a nurse

*See page 22 this issue.

to look after the men that were to come out of Rabaul.

ON January 30, at Kariaiai, I received a signal that had to take preced ence ovdr all else. Eric Feldt instructed me that as no signals had been received from Rabaul since Janu ary 23, I was to return to the Rabaul area and by means of my teleradio, signal information to Port Moresby.

If possible, I was to contact Hugh MacKenzie NOIC Rabaul now a Lieut-Commander in his old service.

“Mucker” MacKenzie was well known to everybody in New Guinea, and was the owner of Megigi Plantation in my dis trict. As a parting dig at my habit of trying to sketch people, Eric added that I was to bring out a cartoon of the Jap anese commander!

At the same time I received a reply to my request about the “Lakatoi.” I was ordered to take her over if I could locate her and send the residents out of New Britain in her.

On the “Lolobau” we all agreed that we should again turn back over our route and try and reach the “Lakatoi.”

Cape Campbell meant over a hundred miles journey over open sea. The weather was bad and, in order to dodge Jap planes, we must do it at night. It was a night mare trip in rain and rough seas, and particular trying for the two women with us. In addition we were beginning to feel the result of being on restricted rations.

Bitter disappointment awaited us at Cape Campbell, for the “Lakatoi” had long since gone. It was not until nearly two months later that we learned that she had sailed to Meto. Witu Island, and even as we were seeking her at Cape Campbell she was lying snug at Peter hafen, Witu.

But there was no time to spend in idle regrets. I had had my orders to get to the Rabaul area without delay.

The silence from Rabaul meant only one thing our small force had been de feated, and I had no doubt that the enemy had landed heavy forces there.

Con Page, now hopelessly isolated at Tagar, Kavieng, was constantly on the air, giving details of large Jap forces in the area. His spirit undaunted he took off time to curse any Japanese who might be listening. Brave Con! (Con Page was caught and killed by the Japs. He was posthumously decorated.) The disappearance of the “Lakatoi” meant that the civilians must make their way in a small ship to Salamaua. With R. A. Robinson’s consent I took over the BP Launch “Aussi” for the trip to the Rabaul area, and gave in exchange the Administration vessel “Lolobau.”

“Aussi” was smaller, but her engine was more silent and her shallower draught would enable her to sneak into little-known inlets along the coast. I placed Frank Henderson in charge of the civilians and advised him to get the “Lolobau” to Salamaua without delay.

Ken Douglas and Rod Marsland were both insistant that they accompany me to Rabaul. I chose Marsland. as he was the more experienced engineer and the younger man. Our native police had re mained loyal and I picked 16 of the best to come with us.

ON February 2 “Aussi” set out, while “Lolobau” sailed west for Cape Gloucester. Subsequently. “Lolo bau” reached Salamaua with a few days to spare before the Japanese landed there.

Robinson, Henderson, the Ireland brothers, and others made the trip and some of them later took the tiny ship to Queens

land, where they stepped off on Australian soil.

Mrs. Baker and Harry Murray did not go with them; but, after sailing west for 60 miles went ashore at Iboki Plantation, where I met them again later.

Ken Douglas was not to be left out of the fun. He refused to join “Lolobau” and, unknown to me until later, he quietly followed my launch tip the coast in his small boat “Dufaur” “just in case you got into trouble” he explained later. The Chinese storekeeper at Talasea, Leong Chu, accompanied him.

The weather was bad, but this was for tunate, as the poor visibility protected us from the Japanese planes which seemed to be increasing in numbers.

Enemy destroyers had been sighted at Open Bay; and, when we got near Pondo Plantation (actually in the Rabaul admin istrative district) it was reported that the Japs were in occupation.

Pondo Plantation lay between us and Cape Lambert and any Japs there would effectively bar our progress, as bad weather forced us to hug the coast.

Marsland and I decided to take the “back door” into Rabaul. We would ascend the Toriu River, before reaching Pondo, and then try to strike across the Baining Ranges to reach Malaguna and the highlands of Toma, which overlooked Rabaul.

Entering the Toriu, we were lucky not

to lose the ship on the bar at the mouth of the river; but Marsland, a champion swimmer and yachtsman of Tasmania proved his skill.

We went up the river as far as possible and then prepared to strike overland to Malaguna. The 3B teleradio set, essential to our purpose, although it did a splendid job, is heavy and requires about 14 men to carry it and its complement of battery charger and fuel.

Carriers were not to be had and my police were hard put to it to lug it over the rugged hills. In addition, we were meeting an unforseen difficulty in the hundreds of native refugees who were pouring out of Rabaul. Their barely coherent stories of our overwhelming defeat there were apt to destroy the morale of my police, and I feared that my authority would vanish unless we could achieve something.

For the first time, I learned that we had not employed native police against the enemy at Rabaul. I think that in not employing them in any capacity the Gov ernment if in fact the Government was t responsible made a tragic mistake.

To employ them as carriers on a supply line would have been something but to suddenly let them run free was a gross error of judgement.

One Rabaul native policeman whom I had known for years complained bitterly:

“We would have fought and helped your soldiers but instead of that our rifles were taken from us and buried, now we run like frightened women.”

I offered him a job, and, to his credit, he took it and did well. All the same we agreed that the times were, “No good,

top much.”

THE carrier position was hopeless; and on February 7, Marsland recon noitred Pondo and found that, al though the Japs had landed there, their occupation had not been permanent.

The manager, Albert Evenson, and Bill Korn had been interviewed by a Japanese naval officer, who had landed with a party from a destroyer. The Japs had sunk or blown up every ship or boat in sight, but they had not ill treated Evenson or Korn. The whitemen on the estate had been placed on parole and were still there. The first stragglers from the retreat from Rabaul had reached Pondo and were receiving food and medical attetion there.

Marsland returned to our camp with an AIF officer and 11 troops. The officer’s report on the fighting at Rabaul was clear and accurate, but it made dismal reading. All hope of resistance on the part of our troops had long since ceased.

The Japanese forces, many times greater than our single battalion, had crushed the life out of Rabaul in a matter of hours.

From the start, the AIF never had a chance. Aided by up-to-date aircraft, carriers and naval forces, the swarms of yellow soldiers had swept all before them.

This report was transmitted to Moresby on February 10 and was the first information that Australia received of the Japanese victory at Rabaul.

Marsland and I proceeded to Pondo and learned that there were many hundreds

of our troops scattered along the beaches that led from Rabaul to Cane Lambert.

For nearly three weeks they had been wandering, and starvation and disease had taken a heavy toll of them.

A few days before, I had listened to the news broadcast from Australia. It mentioned that an observer had reported enemy ships off Gasmata. To give the exact locality of the observer who was, of course, Eric Mitchell at Gasmata meant that the Japs would take im mediate action against him.

Poor Mitchell complained to me of the crass stupidity of our censorship and of the particular organisation that betrayed him in the name of “news” over the air.

The Japs did take action at once and succeeded in capturing Jack Daymond and Dick Squires the ADO and medical assistant.

Mitchell got away and remained in contact with me for some days but the Japs were after him. He later reported to me that he had lost his charger and his batteries were low. Soon his signals disappeared.

I sent “on the blind” in case he could still receive and urged him to cross New Britain to the north coast, where he could join me. Eric Mitchell had served under me as patrol officer in Talasea just before the Japanese war, and I always held hope that one day he would reach us on the north side.

No more was heard of him; his fate is unknown.

The loss of Mitchell meant that my set was the only means of getting com munications out of New Britain by tele radio. I blamed the uncensored broadcast for his loss. Later, we were to have a similar example of brainlessness on the part of our Australian broadcasting ser vices. The second case resulted in the

3eath of Percy Goode, at Kessa, Buka.

The story is told by Eric Feldt in his book, “The Coast Watchers.”

About 15 miles north of Pondo Plantation and on the coast lay Stockholm Plantation, the home of Mr. and Mrs.

Kyllert. The AIF officer whqs had given us the information about Rabaul had impressed a launch from Stockholm; but, during his visit to my camp, a native had taken it back to its owners. The officer returned to Stockholm to fetch it back.

I DREW up a plan while at Pondo for the rescue and evacuation of the hundreds of AIF troops that were now lying starving and dying on the beaches westwards and northwards of Rabaul. It was estimated that these men numbered about 400, while reports had it that a further 300 had retreated to the south coast of New Britain.

Colonel Scanlon, Force Commander, Lieut.-Colonel Carr (CO 2/22 Batt.) and Lieut.-Commander MacKenzie RAN. were said to be with these parties on the south

coast. My plan called for a patrol to proceed to the Lassul Bay area and attempt to organise the march of the 400 to Pondo, and thence down the north coast of New Britain to Cape Gloucester, and then to the mainland of New Guinea.

I requested Port Moresby to grant me authority to carry out the plan and on February 17, I received a signal from the GOC, 8 Military District (New Guinea) that I was to carry out the operation and had authority to do so “over all officers irrespective of rank.”

Pondo was to be our gathering point on the north coast. The large estate had ample accomodation for many troops and the European staff was still intact, I was pleased to see Bert Olander, of Numondo, there. He had managed to escape from Rabaul and was more than willing to help.

The job was going to be difficult. We estimated the mileage from Pondo to Sagsag on the extreme western tip of New Britain was 284 miles; added to that was the 50 miles from Pondo to the

Rabaul areas where troops were reported to be, which made the total 334 miles.

The trip to the south coast, across the narrow neck between Open and Wide Bays, added to the total and each day the physical condition of the men would become worse.

The supply question was bad; we had a certain amount of rice but not the quantity required to feed several hundred men. The native popu lation would help but 20 men would fully tax their resources. We made the standard ration h lb. of rice per day per man plus, one coconut and hoped for the best.

An itinerary was drawn up and the total distance was split up into 14 staging camps. The men would proceed in parties at regular intervals, so that the camps could accommadate them. Each party would be in the charge of an officer or NCO and it was expressly forbidden them to purchase food for themselves from natives. Such purchases would be made by the men in charge of the camps and each of those appointed was, of course, a resident of New Guinea.

WE split New Britain in halves. Ken Douglas was in charge of the half that lay west of the Willaumez Peninsula that finger of land at Talasea that, pointing north splits the district into two almost equal portions.

Bert Olander was placed in charge of the Eastern Area between Pondo ans the Talasea station. Rod Marsland was appointed QIC shipping and transport although he had only a single vessel, we hoped for canoes.

Frank Holland, engaged in the timber business near Open Bay, was anxious to play a part. He was an expert bushman, resourceful and brave. A good Com mander of men, either white or brown.

Frank had been known to me for years.

I offered him the difficult task of patrol ling to the south coast of New Britain.

Six of the native police were selected to accompany Holland across the hostile and evasive native area of Mokolkol, lying between Open and Wide Bays.

Carrying the minimum of food and equipment, Frank set out. He was to bring as many men as possible back with him, for the occupation of Gasmata by the enemy now barred the south coast road to the western-end of New Britain.

The only AIF officer at Pondo, now returned with Kyllert’s launch. He agreed to join us in the scheme; we now had two launches.

In the meantime the Japanese had occupied Salamaua and Lae. thus effec tively plugging one of our escape routes.

Con Page still courageously living on “borrowed time” at Tabar and Purse house who had a teleradio in the hills of Finschhafen sympathised with us on the air.

Bert Olander proceeded with the AIF officer and party in the Stockholm launch to Valoka, where he apprised Ken Douglas of the scheme and of Ken’s part in it. They prepared to set up the base camps according to the plan and arrange canoes, food supplies, etc. The launch was then to return to Pondo and, with “Aussi,” pick up troops which I would bring from the Lassul Bay areas.

But we were not to have the use of the Stockholm launch after all it pro ceeded to Salamaua after dropping Bert Olander at Valoka to meet Ken Douglas.

This incident will be referred to again later.

ALBERT EVENSEN, at Pondo, was glad to see Marsland and me arrive there. An efficient man in charge of the largest white and native staff in New Guinea, he was well used to com mand and although he was willing to assist and give everything he had to our troops who had reached Pondo before

my party, he insisted, and rightly, that he was still in command of his own property and native staff.

Pondo estate was a very large concern, owned by W. R. Carpenter and Co. Its extensive area of coconut calms supplied raw material for the production of des siccated coconut which was manufactured there. In addition, the plantation main tained timber mills which produced wood for packing cases, and it had also ship building facilities capable of constructing large wooden vessels.

Included in the European staff were Messrs. Anderson, D’arcy Hallam and Bill Korn, whom I have already men tioned.

When the Japs arrived at Pondo Evensen had no option but to give his parole to them. Shortly afterwards, the first troops from Rabaul arrived at the plantation. Evensen gave them food and allotted accommodation to them and indeed did all he could for them but strongly objected when they commenced helping themselves to the stores and food which were his property.

This led to arguments and even threats, and when I arrived at Pondo I was warmly welcomed, by Evensen and Korn.

Evensen explained his case to me and I sympathised with him. He was admit tedly in an unenviable position; having given his parole to the enemy he would receive short-shrift if it were known that he lent assistance in succouring Austra lian soldiers.

We got over this difficulty by pretend ing that I had “forced” him to give me assistance, and I wrote a letter for him that, in the event of his capture by the Japs, would tend to prove that I had “forced” him to help us. Evensen and Bill Korn told me that they would not attempt to escape themselves.

This decision they were to adhere to in spite of my later efforts to persuade them to throw in their lot with us. Pondo had had a teleradio set, but Evensen had not used it since the Japs had landed

at Rabaul. There were now about 20 soldiers at Pondo under a Sergeant- Major; these had been receiving food and medical attention from the Pondo stocks. (The second and concludina instalment of Mr. McCarthy’s narrative will be pub lished in February.)