Australians

1,000

Sacrificed

Unnecessary Jungle Campaigns in NG

THESE men need not have died” is the title of a striking article in Australian newspapers of February 7, by Noel Ottaway, a well-known war correspondent.

Mr. Ottaway gives effective phrasing to a thought that has been in the minds of most students of the Pacific War. In 1944, the Forces of the United States, having smashed Jap offensive power in the South-west Pacific, moved on north of the Equator, towards Japan. They handed over the whole area to Austra lain divisions.

As the Yanks moved out of Bougain ville, New Britain, and the Wewak re gions, the Australians moved in.

The malaria-ridden jungles of Bou gainville, eastern New Britain and nor thern New Guinea still were full of Japs; “but,” said the Americans, “don’t worry about them. Their bases have been smashed, their sea communications are totally destroyed, they are getting no supplies—just sit tight and let the jungle and the fever do the rest. The Japs will be defeated in Japan. ' Very wisely, once they had broken up the Japs’ organisation and driven them into the jungles, the Americans had made no move to follow up. They just re mained in their well-equipped bases, where their men could be properly fed and cared for, and left the rest to Nature.

BUT the Australian High Command, for some unexplained reason, de cided to organise campaigns to root those Japs out of the jungles. And so we saw months of cruel and bitter fight ing in Bougainville and northern New Guinea. The Australians probably killed 5,000 Japs; but the Japs and the jungle killed not less than 1,000 Australians.

Mr. Ottaway says that those campaigns were certainly not ordered by General MacArthur. It was apparent to any aver age intelligence that they were unneces sary, and a waste of life. 150,000 Japs were gathered in in these areas after Japan surrendered. The Australian jungle campaigns had not the slightest bearing on Japan’s decision to capitulate.

There are no better soldiers in the world than Australians—every nation acknowledges their dash, and courage, and genius in open warfare. But there never has been any praise for that mys terious institution called the Australian High Command. On the contrary, there has been much severe criticism and sus picion that responsibility for grave de cisions has been left with some very incompetent and over-fed professional job-holders.

The “PIM” will lay a penny to a gooseberry that the decision of January y 1942, to keep the 300 civilians in Rabaul when the Japs were invad ing (resulting in a terrible loss of life) can be traced back to the same bright intelligence which ordered the

wholly unnecessary Australian jungle

campaigns in 1945.