Remarkable Record of Secret Service Unit in South
pp. 43-44 · Read in the full issue
Pacific War
'THIS story of a unit of a few hundred men—who laid the foundations for a great part of the defeat of the Japanese in the Western
Pacific —was published in the “Sunday
Mail” ( Brisbane) in August last.
MANY of the men have been decor ated with high honours. But be yond a mention of their names, they have had no publicity. Not even the citations have been published.
Allied Intelligence Bureau is the organisation they work for. They are the Secret Service agents of the South west Pacific area.
Their operations have been completely “hush-hush,” and even now only part of the story can be told. They have had the tremendous help of a few score trained and trustworthy natives.
Won Awards
AWARDS already include 11 DSC’s, nine MC’s, one DSO, one OBE, two MBE’s, 14 Mentioned in Despatches, three DSM’s, three DCM’s, three MM’s, three American DSC’s. 12 US Legion of Merit awards, six US Silver Stars.
One of 75 natives also decorated got the DCM, three MM’s, two MBE’s, and one the MBE (Civil). The rest of the natives received Loyal Service Medals.
Among the 400 men or so in the AIB, only about 18 have lost their lives, in spite of the hourly dangers of the work.
Sevently-nine have been decorated, and 125 more recommended for decora tions.
How Aib Began
WHEN the Pacific War first flared up in 1941, Australian Navy Intelli gence was working the north coast of Australia and the Pacific Islands. They were under a unified Navy command which called itself “Ferdinand” as its code name.
When General MacArthur took com mand, and the Allied Supreme Command was formed, the Allied Intelligence Bureau was formed in July, 1942, of Navy, Army, and Air Force men com manded by an Australian Navy officer.
Into the unit they drew quickly men who had been planters and traders in the Islands forming the arc round the northern coast of Australia, men who knew much of the territory and who had had contact with the natives.
By this time the Japs had swept through the Dutch East Indies, New Guinea, New Britain, and the Solomons.
By submarine and Catalina plane men of the AlB—a few white officers and native boys—were secretly landed behind the Japanese lines or just in front of them.
Take the story of the Australian who lost his life in Hollandia, for example.
An American submarine took a hand ful of white men and one Indonesian interpreter, who could speak the native dialect of the area, and some native boys, and in darkness crept in to the beach.
In a rubber boat the party went ashore.
The boiling surf was too much for the small craft, which overturned, losing them their wireless sets and provisions.
By the time they struggled ashore the Japs seemed to know that something was afoot. For nearly two days the AIB party fought it out with the Japs. Some of the men escaped, but the leader and two other men lost their lives. One of the colleagues of the leader of that party
described him as “the bravest man I have ever known.”
Paved Way For Landing
rAT was one of the veiy few cases of failure. But it didn’t happen that way on Guadalcanal, where the AIB landed a party when the Japs were speeding south.
The Japs didn’t know it; but every thing they did there was under constant observation. By small walkie-talkie sets the Secret Service agents passed on the news.
The Allied Command in Australia knew that the Japanese were building the Henderson airfield on Guadalcanal.
Let them build it, was their comment; but let us know when it. is nearly ready for use. And. for weeks on end, cut off from all help, the AIB men and their native boys, watching from the hills or creeping through jungles to contact loyal natives, learned all that was going on.
Meanwhile, the Americans were pre paring a landing force. They wanted to have an airstrip ready for use when they landed, so they let the Japs go on build ing the Henderson field.
Then one day, out of the Guadalcanal blue, came the AIB message that the airstrip was ready. That was when the Americans attacked. That was the start of the drive that swept ever northwards towards Japan.
There is another story, too, of the party which had a night rendezvous with a submarine off an island reef.
Some hours before the appointed time, native boys, moving silently along jungle paths, brought news that Japs were go ing to swoop on the post. So the men destroyed their gear. They put off in their rubber boats, sure that a submarine would rescue 'them eventually—which it did, after they had been out 12 hours.
All escaped safely.
With the Australians for a long time were two US sergeants who had been rescued by our men after their plane crashed. They joined the band and worked with it.
Intelligence men on this work lived on their nerves, and needed relief every six months, if possible. They were never made to go more than 12 months in the one area.
Supplies were constantly dropped to the men. Over the last 12 months, Intel ligence parties in New Britain received 50,000 lb. of stores by parachute.
The Allied Forces defeated the Japan ese in the Coral Sea and Java Sea battles largely because of the work and daring of the AIB men.
Hundreds of miles inside Japanese con quered territory, they had established observation posts.
These posts wirelessed brief code mes sages that a convoy was passing such-and such a post. Natives brought messages telling where the convoys had landed their men.
Watchers saw and radioed that the
Jap task forces were setting sail from New Britain and New Ireland.
They assessed strengths and allowed the Allies to prepare a force sufficient to defeat them.
The posts radioed the news that a Naval force was headed this way or that, and gave the strengths. Because they had such a complete and reliable check on the Japanese ships’ movements, the Allied Navies were ready to smash them with warships or planes.
Training Of Natives
AND if the Coral' Sea battle represents a milepost in the Pacific War, that milepost is also a monument to men of the AIB, for they were among those who risked their lives in getting the information that made defeat possible.
Often these Australians landed in ter ritory of which they had not tne slight est knowledge.
The 750 natives constantly needed by the Intelligence men were all trained in Queensland, near Beaudesert, in the use of small arms and in field intelligence— a course of nine months or so.
In most cases Intelligence parties were put ashore by submarine with sufficient supplies to last them for months. When it was time to replace or reinforce them, a submarine would creep into a rendez vous already made in secret code by radio. And the exchange would be made.
But all the time Catalina flying-boats in the Solomons and sth Air Force planes in New Guinea and other areas were dropping supplies by parachute to parties already in position. Hundreds and thousands of pounds of such supplies have been landed thus in the last three years.
The Japs had an idea that the Aus tralians were working “inside,” watched for them constantly, often made it so hot for them they had to leave in a hurry, always kept them on the move, but they apparently never intercepted or made anything of'their code signals.
Watchers on the coast in the Solomons in the early days of the war were able to advise the commander of the US Forces of the approach of enemy planes, giving the Americans time to get their Forces into the air. They are thus reckoned to have 780 kills to their credit.
Japs Puzzled
BUT the Japs were often puzzled by the accuracy of the Allied informa tion about their movements. That is why—and because one small hint might mean death to numbers of men— censorship wisely kept this story secret throughout the war.
A hint of it did get out at one stage— of all places from the BBC. It has never been quite cleared up how the message got through.
But in the middle of the Pacific War, Allied Intelligence officers were aghast one night when the BBC (regarded so often as the epitome of correctness) broadcast to the world that a Japanese Navy Force had been observed at a cer tain spot.
That spot happened to be an observa tion post that had given vital informa tion on enemy movements for so long.
It is believed that the Japanese- heard that BBC broadcast, for they comoed the place for weeks.
But AIB had seen the danger, radioed its men. They left one night in a sub marine,
In Heart Of Ng
IT was not only on the beaches that these men were landed and worked.
Other parties pushed into the heart
of Jap-conquered territory in New Guinea, won over natives, surveyed and observed. They were the men who pre pared the way for the Forces that later swept the Japs back.
One party, in 1943, took three months, and walked 700 miles, to get in behind Hollandia before the Allied landings.
For the submarine crews, too, it as a dangerous job. That is why so long censorship kept submarines “off the record.’’ Early in the Pacific war, it was found that the clear tropic waters round the northern coasts left the submarines clearly visible to enemy reconnaissance planes.

