Keeping Watch On

The Japs

What RAN Intelligence Did in the Solomon Islands

COME glimpses behind the scenes in 43 the Solomons in 1942 were given to the Rotary Club of Suva, Fiji, in July, when Major D. G. Kennedy (formerly a DO in the Solomons, and now at Western Pacific Commission headquarters) gave an address entitled “Intelligence Work with the Royal Australian Navy” The following are extracts.

IHAVE tried to condense a satisfactory account of wartime activities into a thumbnail sketch. But this has proved Impossible, so I propose to con fine my remarks to the work of an orga nisation of which little has been heard in Fiji—that is, the Intelligence Service of the Royal Australian Navy. With this service I had the honour to cooperate in intelligence work for nearly two years. It was popularly known as the coast-watch ing service of the Solomon Islands.

When I say that little has been heard of this organisation, I mean little in comparison with the generous praise which my eloquent friend Harold Cooper has from time to time bestowed on the Administration and its officers for their efforts during the recent critical period in the Solomon Islands.

As you are aware the BSIP fell, for defence purposes within the sphere of the Royal Australian Navy. Some time before the war the Director of Naval Intelligence, at Melbourne, acting through the RC in the BSIP, set up a skelton coast-watching service and dis tributed some tele-radio sets for inter island communication and the transmis sion of Intelligence reports. A Naval Liaison Officer was attached to the RC’s staff. His duty was to correlate and relay the reports to Intelligence HO. The district Administration gave full co operation, and when the Japanese began to come southwards and nearly all the European population had evacuated the ST District Officers were permitted to remain behind for Intelligence duties with the coast-watch. And so, in March. 1942, I found myself in sole charge of the NW area of the Protectorate, comprising the islands of Choiseul, the Shortlands, New Georgia, Ysabel. the Russell Islands, and Florida (including Savo and Tulagi).

Mr. Marchant, the Resident Commis sioner, and Mr. Bengough. DO Malaita, were on Malaita. Mr. Clemens, a Cadet Officer, was on Guadalcanal, where the Australian Naval Liaison Officer also had set up head-quarters, and Mr. Forster, another Cadet Officer, was on San Cris toval. It was the duty of all of us to organise intelligence patrols, communica tions, services, and coast-watching sen tries in our respective areas, and to transmit our reports daily to the ANLO at Guadalcanal.

Since my area was extensive and com prised several groups of islands, I was continuously at sea in a small auxiliary vessel, from January until the end of April, 1942. During this time, besides or ganising the intelligence services within the area, I repatriated about 1.000 inden tured labourers who had been left behind on scattered plantations. I visited all im portant villages, and also Rennell Island, where I set up a secondary head-quarters, to which we might retreat if driven out of the main islands. At this time, I col lected from the bolder spirits as many of the devil-may-care type lads as were

willing to come with me, for security and o-npriiia work guerma wo .

IMADE my first head-quarters at South Ysabel; and it was when operating out of there in March, 1942, that we had our first brush with the Japs. We were making what proved to be our final inspection of the Shortlands Group, the day before the Nips came into that area Our small vessel was strafed five times by one of their reconnaissance planes; but, fortunately, we suffered no damaee or casualties.

The following day, when proceeding

into Ohoiseul Bay, we reached a hiding place behind a small island, just as nine j ap cruisers wen t swe eping up the Straits, Hugging the coasts of islands en route, we then returned to our head-quarters at South Ysabel. .

By the first week in May, after the Battle of the 9P ra LS^Qi th or.H a miiiaa? occupied both Guadalcanal and Tulagi.

They obtained news of our s^. atl s ) P.

Ysabel from a certain NMP, and sent an expedition against us.

We were forced to abandon our head quarters and go to sea again. We dodged around at sea for the next two months,

sending in reports of what we saw to the ANLO at Guadalcanal.

Although the Japs were on the lookout for us, we managed to evade them by hiding among the small islands on the north end of Ysabel. By day we camouflaged our vessel, by tying fresh green branches to the rigging every morning, and lying close in to the steep shores; and we became so adept at this that often native fishing parties passed within hailing distance, without seeing us. 5 rE Japs knew we were in the area, J nnHppri that few of the

whic^\^re o repOTted^s°arrivhig^dally n fn

Jvf^cVnaH area were passing over Ysabel. I guessed, therefore, that thev must be coming down the chain rieration we crossed nf thl The d S?ot is t the wiL strSt ' °! and nteht We of enemy shipping, nay ana mgnt. we

thnt N fhe ?nemfw°af sending

and, finding that the enemy was senoi g all his southward-moving planes over this area, we decided to make our headquarters at Mr. Harold Markhams abandoned plantation at Sege.

We arrived at Sege in early July, 1942,, and stayed until the Americans occupied New Georgia, almost exactly one year later. For the greater part of this period we had the distinct advantage of being able to watch the movements of the Japanese air and surface craft withwt the enemy knowing that he was being observed, for he thought we were still on Ysabel.

Reports on these activities were transmitted to the ANLO at Guadalcanal who relayed them to the High Command.

A S you know, the Americans landed on Guadalcanal in August, 1942, and by February, 1943, had complete command of the island, When the Marines first took Henderson Field, they had only a few old Grumman Wildcat fighting planes to support them, The Japs from Rabaul began sending down all the air strength they had, in an attempt to bomb the Marines out.

Almost every flight passed directly over Sege, flying so low that we were able to report not only the number but also the type of plane TT Sege 18 about 150 miles from Henderson

SX^eporte

mans to rest safely on Henderson Field until a when they would just nave time to taxe tne air, attain

“ofnteon fhXrinf po"'

We were later informed by the Marines

XefM XTa? onVK

that, had it not been for the timely rpnnr fo from Seee thev would not have beS able to In those . RaHnr was not so effective and far

£to-day

reaching as it is to aay. all this period daily reports J j W ere being brought in to the various coast-watching stations - by native runners, sentries, and canoe patrols. p rom the coast-watch stations they were transmitted direct to DSIO, the Deputy superintendent Intelligence Officer of the R o yal Australian Navy (Lieut. Comma nder McKenzie) known to all and sundry as “Mother.” “Mother” contacted the High Command and also relayed all re ports to Com-So-Pac.

Towards the end of 1942, the coast watch organisation received valuable additions to its personnel, when Lieuts.

Horton, Josselyn, and Wadeil, previously of the BSI Administrative staff, who had gone south and received commissions in the RAN, returned to the Territory, and were sent into my area.

Horton went to Rendova, Josselyn to Vella Levella, and Wadeil to Choiseul.

Each of these officers brought in with him a complete tele-radio outfit. The increased volume of Intelligence reports covering every aspect of enemy activity during the next six months must have helped greatly in the preparations being made for the Allied invasion of New Georgia, which took place in July, 1943, and virtually ended the war in the Pro tectorate as a major operation.

The coast-watchers, in addition to their own intelligence duties, were called upon, from time to time, to search for, and bring in, Allied airmen who had been shot down. Not less than 100 fliers were rescued by coast-watchers, many of them grievously injured.

They were also required to direct and provide protection for US reconnaissance and survey parties who were flow r n into this no-man’s-land from time to time The success which attended all aspects of this vital intelligence work, spoke well for its organiser, the Director of Naval Intelligence in Melbourne (Commander Long), and for his very capable field assistants in the NW area, Commander Eric Feldt and Lieut.-Commander Hugh Mackenzie, the ever popular “Mother” of Guadalcanal.

IHAVE attempted to sketch the origin and scope of the Naval Intelligence Service in the British Solomon Islands from the European point of view.

I should now like to refer briefly to its native personnel, without, whose loyal aid very little of the work could have been accomplished. These were men from ail walks of native life, in part-time or full time service with the various Intelligence Officers, plantation boys, missionaries, traders, policemen, and Government clerks. They were all excellent bushmen, and could move within a stone’s throw of the vaunted Japanese jungle fighters, without being detected.

They and their people gave freely of their resources, canoes, vegetables, fruit, eggs, and fowls to isolated officers in no man’s-land. We could not rely on sup plies from the rear areas, since para chute-dropping was out of the question in enemy-infested territory, owing to the danger of our secret positions being dis covered.

I have time left to narrate the various exploits of individual natives, some of whom you have heard mentioned as re cipients of honours, but I should like to refer to a few incidents, which, although serious or ordinary enough when they occurred, seem, in retrospect, to have cer tain elements of humour.

The enemy had a habit of leaving his motor barges nosed ashore on the beach while he went inland to forage for native poultry and vegetables. On one occasion we were able to pull out a 57 ft. barge and get away with it before the enemy party came back.

On another occasion we signalled some fighting planes to shoot up a couple of barges which we saw nosing the beach.

Water flowed in and submerged the sterns sufficiently to cover the starting batteries. The Japs, about 50 of them, returned to find that they could not ride home that night; so they set off along the shore on a weary walk back to their head-quarters. We plugged up the bullet holes, pumped out the water, and took the barges away during the night. Two days later, another barge came along with a spare engine in a crate, to re place an engine in one of the damaged barges. They put the engine ashore on the beach while they went off to look for the barge. During the night we lifted the

(Continued from Page 44)

engine jind added it to our collection of trophies. It was a new Swedish Diesel of 50 horse-power.

The boys referred to these incidents as “good fella palay. Japan him he cross too much me fella win ’im. Me fella happy too much.”

In reporting enemy and Allied planes they had their own identifying names.

A Grumman Wildcat was “square wing,” a Lightning was “two bod,” a P 39 was “long nose,” a Liberator was “big fella too mush four engine two steer.”

The boys learned to tell an enemy plane by the distinctive whining noise it made.

A scout would come in with the report “Aeroplane, Master—him he Japan.”

“What fella you savee him be Japan— you look ’im?”

“No, Master, me no look ’im, me hear ’im no more —him he sing sing alia same Japan.”

Often, if it was an American plane the

report would be from a runner: “Sentry him he say aeroplane belong Morica, Master, him he look ’im star, him he say.’

The phrase “look ’im star” later became so popular with an American ack-ack battalion on New Georgia that they named one of their supply vessels the USS “Look-’im-Star.”

All of us who had the privilege and honour of serving in it or with it look back with pleasure on our association with the Intelligence Service of the Royai Australian Navy, and the splendid officers who organised and inspired it.