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pp. 5-6 · Read in the full issue
Why Hold Blarney Responsible for Canberra's Dead Hand?
rE way in which the Australian section of the war against Japan, in the Western Pacific, is being muddled, is remarkable.
There are well over 7,000,000 people in the Australian nation; and a very large proportion of them are in the armed Services-700,000 was a figure published a couple of years ago. Apart altogether from men in the Navy and in the Air Force, it can be assumed that Australia has at least half a dozen divisions available for war, welltrained, battle-experienced, and at full strength It has been noted as a paradox by famous observers that Australia, which is notorious for stupid and blundering political leadership, can produce fighting-men equal to the best in the world. Australia’s armed Forces, therefore, should have been able to make a’ substantial contribution towards the defeat of Japan in the Pacific. That they have not done so is attributed by men best qualified to judge to the Australian politicians.
LOOK at the present position. Except for a comparatively few Aus-
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somewhere in the vague north, all that Australia has contributed to the United Nations war effort, since 1943, in the shape of fighting units, are the Forces now scattered widely in the New Guinea area. Reference to an article on page 6 will show that Australians are carrying on three mopping -up operations in three widely-seperated areas of the Mandated Territory, and thus have dispersed their strength.
The Americans left this region over a year ago, and went “leap-frogging”
, rnu „ i„.p f away into the north-west. They left large numbers of Japs, by-passed and isolated, in Bougainville, New Ireland, New Britain and the Sepik section of New Guinea. They left those Japs to run around in circles in the primitive jungles, while-making full and ef fective use of air and sea supremacy -they drove for the heart of the Japanese Empire To see how that strategy paid rich dividends, we need only to look at the developments of the Pacific war during the past few weeks.
Everyone assumed that the hard fighting Australian divisions, which had done so well beside the Americans when New Guinea represented the front line, would move on north westwards with General MacArthur.
Instead, we heard nothing whatever about them, for many months, until it was announced, late in 1944, that they were to do the mopping-up in New Guinea. And mopping-up they have been, ever since. They have fought tenaciously, and with their usual initiative and courage; but the people of Australia are awakening to the fact that this is a wasteful, un inspiring and depressing campaign.
ANYTHING from 80.000 to 100,000 A Japs were cut off in New Guinea.
Our commanders know, as a positive fact, that these Japs were told officially that they were to stay m New Guinea and fight, and make the best possible use of local resources, for from three to five years, when they would be rescued. They were to tie up as many Anglo-American forces as possible. They made preparations accordingly. The defences they pre pared, during 1944, are what the Aus tralians are now coming up against.
In these circumstances, there were
Australians. They should ehher have set-up a containing force—a few thousand men to guard the Japs in the prisons which they had created for themselves—or they should have f a n en upon these isolated Jap armies with overw helming forces of men and mac hines, and simply crushed them, in the American manner, neither instead the
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t he fumbl ng Ind so suggestive °* with the tralian Government ; deals with the nations TOrtune sa me command iI both commana P* . .
We do not know how many divisions the Australian Army has sent to the three operational areas—and, if we knew we could not say—but we are permitted to guess (in view of the numbers of Japs in each area) that there are at least three Australian divisions engaged on the task, That might have been enough men, they had been properly equipped, As they have not been properly equipped, they are being wasted, Three times three divisions are not enough for the filthy, wearisome, costly job of clearing these Japs out 0 f the primitive jungles and moun tains, if inadequately equipped.
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traJia that there is something: wrong somewhere,, and that the Australian Army is insufficiently equipped. But peo]Assumed that the have assumed that t e individual soldiers are not equipped-, and the height of stupidity was reached by press who American 6 and differences between American in KS,, the nictures and New Guinea greeted the p
the charges relating thereto with jeers and laughter.
The Australian soldier’s equipment for jungle fighting was evolved through months of trial and error and, taken by and large, is far the best outfit for New Guinea conditions.
The Australians can carry with them all they need, and can maintain themselves for a long time in the jungles. The Americans carry with them so much personal gear and equipment that they cannot carry it themselves on difficult trails, and their track is marked by discarded stuff. But that happens only when the American soldiers are obliged to go away from transport. As a rule, no matter how bad the terrain, the magnificent mechanical equipment of the United States is there to provide some kind of transport.
IT is in regard to mechanical equip ment, and not personal equip ment, concerning which the Australian press and politicians should be howl ing to high heaven. Huge masses of machinery follow close behind the leading units of an American army on the move in the Pacific, and contrive to make life easy and comfortable for the American infantrymen, compared with what Australian soldiers have to go through.
I have had the opportunity of dis cussing this matter, in some detail, with certain high military officers of the AIF, recently in Australia on leave. Here is a summary of what they say; The AIF should be leap-frogging along the coasts, instead of foot slogging through.these terrible jungles.
But it cannot, because it lacks landing-craft, and all the other small boat gear which the Americans used so effectively. • The AIF lacks portable cranes, and similar appliances for unloading and handling goods and equipment.
Far too much has to be man-handled. • The AIF lacks building appli ances. Recently, in one of the forward areas, it was necessary to put up a large shed. The AIF did it the hard way—pick-and-shovel men dug the i or u P r ights, and man handled the logs into place. The Americans do that sort of thing in a few minutes with a glorified post hole-digger, and heavy lifting is done with cranes. •Jbe lacks road - making machinery. The Australians tramp wearily through muddy tracks, or cut roads slowly with teams of native labourers. The Americans, in a few days, would have “bulldosed” roads out in all directions, and had jeeps running along them to carry their infantrymen and equipment. ® About 6 or 7 per cent, of the AIF are engineers. But nearly 50 per cent, of the American land forces were engineers. That just about re presents the difference between the oropera?ron. fOrCeS and their methods pROBABLV it is not the fault of thi« 1 vu- 4P stralian Commander that this vitally necessary mechanical
equipment is not available in New Guinea. Probably, the AIF is handi capped by lack of ships, and by the lact that the Americans, in their tremendous drive upon Japan itself, themselves want every ounce of equip ment. Probably, they have none to spare for mere “mopping-up” in New Guinea.
If that is so—and everything sug gests that it is—why is Australia playing Japan’s game? Why is a schoolboy being sent out on"a man’s errand? Why is Canberra allowing perhaps 100,000 Japs, isolated in New Guinea, to tie up the whole Australian Army, when those good, well-trained soldiers could have gone on with the vital mechanical equipment to the north, and been much more effec tively employed?
Is this one more example of the palsied hand of Canberra adminis tration? It is unbelievable that a man with General Sir Thomas Blarney’s qualifications would, on his own judgment, scatter his AIF around New Guinea in this futile, wasteful fashion. No man knows, better than he, the importance of having ade quate mechanical equipment if the Japs are to be rooted out of these Pacific Islands without unnecessary waste of our personnel.
Why cannot they be left there, and areas near them guarded, until ships and equipment are available to allow our men to fall upon them in over whelming force?