Angau Hangs On In Papua

Disturbing Aspects of a Very Complicated Situation

T HE fl r( p ort ’ published in many A Australian newspapers early in September, and re-published in the September issue of this journal, that civil administration would be reestablished in Papua earlv in

P \ i iy4a ’

W ™ Sl w SBC 2 le *lf ly contradicted. • .

Mr. Ward, the Territories Minister, who apparently was unofficially responsible for supplying the report to the press, later announced officially and untrue^ 61 " 611 * WaS unauthorised ana untrue.

We said at the time that the report had created a situation so confusing and baffling that we questioned its

authenticity.

DURING the past month, more information has become available It appears that the actual situation now is about as follows- • The administration of Papua and of the liberated sections of New Guinea is completely in charge of ANGAU- while ANGAU’s subsidiary, the Production Control Board, has almost equal authority over whatever remains of the economic structure of the two Territories • ANGAU is verv stronelv pntrpnrhpdis verv happy and comfortable • is iealous of any Interfterence by the External Territories Department and bv civilians generally; and is not likely to move over and make room for any returnfnl dvU administration without a fight • The Army is unwilling that ANGAU should move out of Papua* until ANGAU has some place to move P to Onlv a small part of New Guinea (Morobe the region around Vitiaz Strait) is as clear of Japs as is Papua and that is not enough to give ANGAU a home and a job. Time enough (argues the Army) for ANGAU to move out of Papua into New Guinea when New GuineaTreLonably stme tfrneTi and that may not be fo ' • sateimls w nhhJiip?’ through its 22 ° btamed A r^ mar 1 ka ble thP wSLS Fapua -. A JL is always me case when Government officials enter

into commerce, there are waste, mud dling and inefficiency on a large and growing scale in Papua—wherever, in fact, ANGAU and Co. are acting as planters, traders and shippers. • An official inquiry which has been ordered into the circumstances surround ing the cessation of civil administration in Papua in February, 1942, has extra ordinary features, and is described by some observers as an attempt to blacken the Murray Administration and corres pondingly strengthen the grip of ANGAU, and certain ambitious gentlemen con nected therewith. • It is asserted by certain people that, when the post-war settlement comes in the Pacific, Papua, the Mandated Terri tory of New Guinea, the British Solomons and (perhaps) the Condominium of the New Hebrides will be attached to Aus tralia as a sort of Austral-British Oceanic Dominion; and the administrative jobs connected therewith already are seen as plums of beauty and magnitude. The name of a prominent Australian com mander already has been freely mentioned as the first Lieut.-Governor of the Aus tralian Commonwealth’s rjew Dominion.

FEW people realise what has happened administratively iji the Territories; and how deeply ANGAU is dug into their administrative structure.

Civil administration ceased in the Mandated Territory about January 21, 1942, when the Japs invaded; and in Papua on February 12, 1942—n0t because the Japs had invaded (they did not enter Papua until several months later) but because the Australian Army had ordered complete civilian evacuation, and wanted to be rid of the civil government.

Since the latter part of 1942, the enemy has been driven out of Papua, and out of the Morobe, Huon Gulf, Western New Britain and Madang districts of the Mandated Territory. ANGAU took charge of all Papua in 1942, and in 1943- 44 extended its jurisdiction over the liberated districts of New Guinea.

In 1943, a carefully-selected score of civilians were allowed to return to Papua to grow rubber and copra; but they are controlled almost completely by ANGAU

and its step-child, the Production Board.

There is no trading except by the Gov ernment. Private enterprise is strictly tabu—outlawed by Canberra, no doubt, because that is the policy of Mr. Eddie Ward, and discouraged by the Army be cause private enterprise means recogni tion, in some form or other, of pesky civilians—and civilians are not wanted in Papua.

While thousands of homeless people have been waiting in Australia for the eviction of the invaders, confident that Australia then would re-establish civilian government and assist the return of civi lians at the earliest possible moment, two years have passed. It is two years since the enemy was defeated in North-east Papua—and there is no more indication now of the re-establishment of civilians in Papua than there was then.

IN those two years, the Brass Hats have become well established.

The original defensive organisation provided by Australia in the Territories, between 1939 and December, 1941, appears to have been in charge of a then un known professional soldier, a South Aus tralian, Brigadier Basil Morris, with head quarters at Port Moresby. Between the time that Japan attacked the Territories (January, 1941), and the arrival there of powerful and experienced American and Australian units, six months later, General Morris commanded in this area. Later, in 1942, as new Allied forces moved in to the attack, General Morris remained at Port Moresby, in charge of Administra tion.

At first, observers found the situation most confusing. Mr. Elliot Smith, of the Papuan public service, appeared at first to be head of the new Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit (ANGAU); but he soon was joined by Mr. “Ted”

Taylor, of the NG service.

Very quickly, most of the younger officials of both Territories’ services were summoned to ANGAU. It soon became a substantial corps; Major-General Morris (he seems to have received that rank in 1942) was in charge, and nearly all the officials received commissions, from lieutenant-colonelcies downwards. There were few men below the rank of warrant officer.

SINCE those confused, formative days, ANGAU has grown. It was origin ally intended as an organisation which would provide experienced adminis trative officers to take charge of areas as

they were liberated by our combatant forces—men to be responsible for the interregnum between actual war condi tions, and the return of civilian adminis tration.

But it has not worked out that way: and the suspicion now is growing that ANGAU has dug itself in so deeply, in very comfortable jobs, that it will be shifted by nothing short of a charge of political dynamite.

In pre-war days, Papua and New Guinea were nearly self-supporting, and thev were governed by a team of about 130 officials in Papua and some 300 in New Guinea.

To-day, in place of that, we have the enormously expensive set-up called ANGAU. It has a European personnel of over 2,000; and this is how it has estab lished itself during the past two years:

Headquarters

Major-Genferal Basil Morris, who appears to have the status of Governor over the two Territories; assisted by Brigadier Cleland (who is also chairman of the Production Control Board), Colonel J. H. Jones (formerly District Officer at Madang), Major S. A. Lonergan (formerly of the New Guinea Secretariat), Major W. R. Humphries (formerly Senior Re sident Magistrate in Papua).

The ANGAU organisation now is divided up as follows:

Southern District (All Papua,

Including Eastern Islands)

Lieut.-Colonel D. H. Vertigan (formerly New Guinea) in charge, assisted by T.

Grahamslaw and Claude Champion (both formerly Papua). Headquarters are out side Port Moresby.

Northern District (North

Eastern New Guinea)

Lieut.-Colonel K. C. McMullen (for merly New Guinea) in charge, with head quarters at Lae.

Islands District (Bismarck

Arch. And Bougainville)

Lieut.-Colonel N. Penglase (formerly New Guinea) in charge, with temporary headquarters at Finschhaven.

Except the top-rankers at headquarters, all these names are familiar to us. We knew them, before 1942, as experienced and efficient officials of the Adminis trations. We do not know them quite so well as Brass Hats, Mr. Elliot Smith, originally very pro minent, in ANGAU, is now DO at Mam bare, with rank as major, Lieut.-Colonel “Ted” Taylor, also prominent originally, is still in hospital, after a long spell of illness.

All the old administrative divisions have been abolished and new ones created.

Officials are District Officers and Assistant DO’s: the Papuan titles of RM and ARM have been dropped.

Each of the three Districts? or Regions, named above, has its own Marine Section, and is thereby made responsible largely for its own transport.

It can be seen, from the foregoing, that ANGAU has completely revolutionised the administrative machinery of the two Territories, and created its own far reaching and deep-seated 1 organisation. Is it likely that it now regards itself as a temporary thing—a mere stop-gap?

Except that they are both responsible to Major-General Morris and the Army (not to the Department of External Terri tories), the exact relationship between ANGAU and the Production Control Board is not clear. It seems clear, how ever, that ANGAU supplies the Board with transport, and with all the native labour required on the plantations (both

those run by the returned planters and those run directly by the Board).

A WORD about native labour. Here, again, is an extraordinary position.

We have heard Mr. Ward, and the Bishops, and the anthropologists, on the subject of the pre-war exploitation of indentured native labour by ruthless private enterprise, until we are sick of it. Apparently, neither the Red Poli ticians nor the Bishops know anything of what is going on now in the Territories — and has gone on for two years.

Native labour is conscripted by ANGAU.

That probably can be fully justified on the grounds of necessity.

ANGAU has to supply all the native labour needed by the Army, and by the Administration Unit, and by the plan tations. No time is wasted in attempting to induce native men to “make paper,” as in the old days, condemned by Mr. Ward.

ANGAU’s District Officers simply send a message to the headman of a village, informing him of the number of native workers needed. If they are not “volun tarily” supplied, native police are sent out to attend to the matter.

This “forced recruiting” necessary under wartime conditions —has created special problems which are giving the more experienced officials some concern.

A large proportion of men have been away from many villages for 21 years now, and there is grave depopulation in some areas.

ANGAU has an abundance of personnel, money and equipment, and the Territories to-day should be better governed than ever before in their history. Any country, of course, can be well governed if there is plenty of funds, and no call for a balanced budget.

SOME strange things are going on in connection with Territories adminis tration.

The confident announcement by all the Australian newspapers that civil adminis tration would be restored in Papua early in 1945, and its subsequent contradiction by the Minister for the Territories; the thoroughness with which the personnel of the old New Guinea and Papua civil administrations was broken up; the grim purposefulness with which ANGAU has dug itself in, in the manner described; and, finally, the kind of heresy hunt which appears to have been launched against Mr. Leonard Murray—these things add up to something that is ugly and malodorous.

From the moment that civil adminis tration was withdrawn from New Guinea and Papua, the Brass Hats followed a policy of ignoring the administrators and their senior officials. Unfortunately, it is difficult to get detailed information. Sir Walter McNicoll is not kindly disposed towards this journal, and has no data for us; the Hon. Leonard Murray has

courteously but firmly declined to supply any information to the newspapers. But, from various reliable sources, we have assembled the following details, which we believe to be true: Sir Walter McNicoll now has retired from the post of Administrator of New Guinea: and, prior to his retirement, he was not consulted regarding future ad<ministrative policies.

The appointment of Mr. Leonard Murray as Administrator of Papua was made in 1940, for a period not exceeding five years, and the appointment has not been ter minated. He is still the Administrator; but, for two years, he has been con sistently and pointedly ignored in all matters relating to Papua’s adminis tration. Some aspects of the Brass Hat policy must haye been humiliating to Mr.

Murray. For example, the Brass Hats and Mr. Ward selected two anthropologists, and sent them off to the Territories, with rank of Lieutenant-Colonels, to advise on matters relating to native affairs. Yet there was available to the Government, in the person of Mr. Murray, an experi enced officer whose knowledge of New Guinea natives is second to that of no man in the world to-day.

Owing to the muddling *of Australian Brass Hats (and this is a matter concern ing which a great deal will be heard in the future) most of New Guinea’s senior officials were trapped in Rabaul. But Papua’s senior men got away. Were any of the senior Papuan men who were closest to and most loyal to Leonard Murray invited to assist the Port Moresby Brass Hats in setting up the new adminis tration? They were not.

Finally, there is afoot a mysterious “inquiry” regarding the circumstances surrounding the cessation of civil govern ment in Papua. We have sought details, but officialdom, on this matter, is very, very shy. But we do that Mr.

Eddie Ward has requested a leading Mel bourne KC to carry out the inquiry; and we know, also, that a junior lawyer, apparently representing that gentleman, has been in Port Moresby recently “assembling information for the purposes of the inquiry.”

Well-informed people are quite sure that the object of the inquiry is to blacken Mr. Leonard Murray, and the reputation of the Murray regime. It is indicated that neither the Port Moresby Brass Hats, nor Mr. Ward, are well-disposed towards Mr. Murray. Mr. Murray is a Menzies Government appointee, and is a member of a very famous family—two good reasons why he should now be hated in Canberra. He also is the one remain ing man between the Brass Hats and the fat jobs which will be available in Aus tralia’s Pacific Territories, sooner or later, for out-of-work generals. Verhum sapienti sat est!

Remarkable Economic Muddle In Papua

SO much for the purely administrative side of the Papuan set-up. It has its shortcomings; but, with abundant personnel, and endless funds, it is providing the Territories with what probably will be regarded in times to come as the most luxurious Government in all Territones’ history.

But, when we turn to the economic side we find a different picture. Private enterprise (except for a few plantations) has been barred out, and ANGAU and its satellites actually are the traders, planters, storekeepers, recruiters and transporters of Pamifl Hpro wriffpn for fhp inf ormation of Australian interests, is the summary of a keen and experienced observer who recently visited the Territory; J The planters are compelled to look to

the Production Control Board for every thing, whilst the Board, in turn, has to compete with ANGAU for its coastal shipping and its labour; with the Army for the usual plantation rations and some of the stores, whilst the balance of the planter’s requirements are purchased through the Department of External Territories in Sydney, by the Board.

Getting stores and general plantation requirements is a very costly business, in volving long delays in getting delivery.

Wheatmeal and flour, which normally cost about £l2/10/- per ton in Port Moresby, now costs over £3O. Trade fish, which used to cost 30/- a case, now costs 80/- a case. Many other lines are simi larly priced.

It is a common thing for a planter to

wait two months to get supplies, after the order has been lodged.

Motor trucks are unprocurable at any thing like reasonable prices. The Depart ment of External Territories says there is no drawback of duty on 30 cwt. Fords, which sell in Sydney at £470; so the price in Moresby is £640. Spare parts are even more difficult to buy, with the result, that transport on plantations is held up for weeks on end.

Agricultural knives, 16 inches, used in keeping the undergrowth down on plan tations, as supplied by the Board, are useless —the average life of each is about two days. This is an unbranded Aus tralian knife, sold at the same price as the best imported. To requests for the English knife, the Board replies the Commonwealth will not. import them.

The result is idle labour units by the dozens on most plantations.

NATIVE labour, which is a monopoly of ANGAU, is conscripted by that unit, and the boys are drafted to various forms of employment in different parts of the Territory, often without regard to the native’s previous experience. The re sult is dissatisfied labour. This is aggravated by the fact that there are two ration scales—one for boys working on plantations (i.e., the ration found from 20 years’ experience by a benevolent Gov ernment to be best suited to the native), and another ration scale, much larger than the plantation scale, which is issued to all ANGAU labour.

The upshot of this is seen in innumer able desertions from the plantations to the villages, where rations are issued for the asking by the nearest District Officer.

The ANGAU scale of native rations in cludes 4 tins of meat a week (one, pre viously), 16 oz. of margarine per week (none previously), 1 tin of tomato juice per week (none previously), and so on.

How Papua is to again have a contented native labour is hard to understand, quite apart from the economic aspect.

It may be noted that the Papuan villager, under the benevolent rule of ANGAU, and enjoying the unlimited financial resources of the Army (per grace of the Australian taxpayer) actually gets more meat and butter per week than the Australian citizen.

OWING to the haphazard coastal ship ping service, boys are often kept waiting for months at one port on the coast, to get to another. This happens, both going to and returning from plantations.

This directs attention to coastal ship ping, and the chaos it is causing and has caused. For twelve months, now, there have been large quantities of produce stored on most plantations; but this has of late reached such proportions that a number of plantations are contemplating closing down, owing to lack of storage space.

V, '5 h ?^ 1 who are handling the ships have had little or no experience of shipping, so that a large proportion of the ships are continually idle. Native captains who, for twenty or more years, have had sole of ships, now find they have an ANGAU non-commissioned officer put over them, with no previous knowledge of the coast. Native captains and en gineers have in some cases had their pre war wage cut from £l5 to £3/10/-, and from £lO to £2 per month—all of which St S isfild n mad 6 th 6 Cr6WS 0f vessels dis Yet Mr. Eddie Ward says that the Big Firms exploited the natives! g rE prices paid by the Board (ie De partment of External Territories) for the produce of Papuan plan rv/pvc g <a r 65 proof °? - the deal the planters are now receiving.

In the case of copra, the Board has fixed the prices for the period October, 1943—June, 1944, at; Hot-air and Sun-dried, £lB/10/- per ton.

Smoked and Sun-dried, £l7/10/- per ton.

From July 1, 1944, the price has been tentatively fixed by the Board at: Hot-air and Sun-dried, £l9 per ton.

Smoked and Sun-dried, £lB per ton.

Meantime, Canberra says the Depart ment of External Territories is receiving £29/10/- per ton for Hot-air and Sun dried, and £2B/10/- for Smoked, from the Department of Supply, who in turn sell it to the manufacturers at £3O/10/- a ton— so that the planter is getting £ll/10/under the market.

Before the war, copra was sold in Sydney at £7 per ton—and made a profit.

Rubber prices leave even more room for comment. The prices paid by the Board to Papuan planters for the period October 1, 1943, to June 30, 1944, were: No. 1 .. .. 1/61 per lb. „ 2 .. .. 1/5-4 „ „ » 3 .. .. 1/3 h „ „ From July 1, 1944, the prices have been tentatively fixed at: No. 1 .. .. 1/4| per lb. » 2 .. .. 1/3J, „ „ » 3 .. .. 1/1J..„ „ The Department of External Territories advise that the prices they received for Papuan rubber are: No. 1 .. 1/101 per lb. » ? .. .. 1/95 „ „ ”.3 •• .. 1/75 „ „ So that it costs 6d. per pound (i.e., £56 per ton) to take rubber from Papua to the Sydney market. Before the war it cost the merchants about £2/10/- per ton to market Papuan rubber.

COMMENT is superfluous—the facts speak for themselves.

ANGAU is not only hanging on grimly to the soft and profitable job of adminis tration : its satellites—evidently with the connivance of Canberra—have virtually taken possession of the plantations estab lished by private enterprise, and together they are gobbling up all the profits