The Neck!

The Fiji Indian—A Pain In

Dislocation of Fiji Sugar Industry Only One Angle

of an Embarrassing Problem

By R. W. Robson

rE Fiji sugar industry has been most seriously dislocated this year—first, by a strike of sugar-mills employees (mostly Indians) and, secondly, by the refusal of the Indian cane-growers to cut their cane for the mills, unless the price of sugar-cane is substantially increased.

The sugar industry, which is in the hands of the Colonial Sugar Refining Co.. Ltd., is Fiji’s major industry. The Colony exports each year between 100,000 and 150,000 tons of sugar—mostly to New Zealand and Canada, in normal times— worth between £1,000,000 and £2,000,000.

But a fatal weakness has developed in this great Fiji industry because the CSR Co. is wholly dependant, for supplies, on the Indian cane-growers. mHE Indians were brought to the Col- X ony, originally, to grow sugar for the Co., as indentured labourers. In time, assisted by the Co., they settled in the Colony, as peasants, growing sugar cane under contract for the CSR. The 1936 census showed 85.000 Indians in the Colony, of whom 60,000 had been bom in Fiji.

It seemed quite a sound idea, in the beginning. The sugar industry calls for a great reservoir of labour, so that the cane may be grown, and may be cut, and so that there may be ample labour for the mills. There is no supply of indi genous labour in Fiji—the native Fijian is a landowner, and his rich lands supply all his needs.

The Indians, who were being brought in originally as labourers, and repatriated on the expiration of their indentures, were most eager to stay in- Fiji. So the Co. worked out a system under which the Indians were permitted to lease sugar-lands, either from the Co. or from the Crown, under conditions which pre vented the alienation of native lands.

But the factor which no one, appar ently, took sufficiently into account, is the character of the Indian. He is a born trouble-maker. rE Fiji Indians, to a considerable extent, have retained their racial standards of living and their own institutions. While there has been a cordial and growing friendship between the Fijian natives and the British, the relations between the Fiji Indians and the British always have been difficult.

The Indians seem to have a kind of racial inferiority complex. They have caused a long succession of British Gov ernors endless embarrassment by their demands for racial equality with the British in matters relating to Fijian administration, by their agitation for a “common roll,” by their super sensitive ness and readiness to howl in relation to all matters in which they think there is a suspicion of racial discrimination.

The British, trying to hold the balance fairly and justly between the different races in Fiji, and especially in their anxiety to protect the Fijian people in accordance with the terms of the 1874 Deed of Cession, have found the Indians, in a political sense, an insoluble problem, a nuisance, and an irritation.

ACTUALLY, the masses of Indians, themselves, are harmless enough.

They realise that in the pleasant

country of Fiji they are immensely bet ter off than they could have been in over-crowded India, and they appear to be generally content with their present lot, so long as they are left alone.

But there are, in Fiji, a very large number of Indians who have gained sufficient education to qualify as political agitators—and the semi-educated Indian goes for political agitation as a duck goes to water. Consequently, the rank and file of Fiji Indians are divided up among all sorts of societies, clubs, unions and what not, each of which supports a busy little agitator or two, and the main purpose of which appears to be to demand something or other from the British administration.

The position has been made worse by the fact that in Fiji, from time toHime, there have been high administrative officials so anxious to do the right thing by the “unhappy, downtrodden Indian” that they have done the wrong thing.

They have tried to reason, placate and compromise; whereas the only way in which these people may be dealt with, in a country like Fiji, is for the adminis trator to decide what is fair and right, in the circumstances, and to permit no further argument. The ingenious, tortu ous, whining arguments of the Babu Indian, if permitted, will drive well balanced officials to madness.

IN the case of Fiji, the Indians have a special hate in the CSR Co. The CSR Co. is a very powerful concern, managed with great efficiency in the interests of its shareholders, and holding an extraordinary record of profit-making.

It is not so all-powerful in Fiji as is the “Big Five” in Hawaii; but there is a parallel.

Fiji owes the CSR much, because the CSR has made of Fiji the most pros perous British Crown Colony; but there is no need for Fiji officially to rally to the defence of the CSR —that Co. is extremely well able to take care of itself. The CSR, as part of its profit making motif, will drive a hard bargain with anyone—Government, or shipping line, or Indian cane-grower.

EVERY pinheaded traveller who step ped off in Fiji, for two decades, drew attention to the contrast between the very rich CSR and the very poor Indian cane-grower; and some harsh criticisms were published—espe cially by the less responsible type of American journalist.

The fact is, of course, that Fiji sugar has t£ be sold in a highly competitive market: and the price of Fiji cane or mill-labour is fixed, not by an avaricious board in Sydney or a stony-hearted manager in Suva, but by the rates which mill-labourers and cane-growers are pre pared to accept in East Africa, or the Wtest Indies, or somewhere.

No one loves the CSR shareholders and directors: but it must be conceded, in all fairness, that they make their luscious profits, not out of grinding the faces of the Fiji Indians, but out of superlatively good management and properly-con trolled, large-scale operations. Maybe they could have made some concessions, in the past, to the Fiji Indians. But they could have been only very small concessions—and some margin had to be

maintained, for the world sugar-market is a very tricky and uncertain thing.

BUT, of course, the Fiji Indians have never entertained the slightest doubt about the Fiji set-up. As they—or, rather, their ceaselessly active leaders—see it, the GSR is callously ex ploiting the Fiji Indians, and is being aided and abetted, and protected, by the Fiji Government.

I have personally examined this situa tion, in Fiji, half a dozen times. I instinctively dislike big companies with long records of big profits and a clear hankering after monopolies; and I hate bureaucracies. If I had believed that the GSR and the Fiji Government were aiding and abetting each other, at the expense of the Fiji Indian peasant, I should have shouted my belief aloud, come hell or high water.

But I could not find any such set-up.

I believe that the GSR Co. has done a remarkable developmental job in Fiji, and now is doing the very best it can for all classes concerned; and, having seen a great deal of Governments based on adult suffrage, I am prepared to say that the non-Parliamentary Government of Fiji, so long as it is directed by men of the calibre of Fletcher, and Richards, and Luke and Mitchell, and their verv able lieutenants, is as fair and just and incorruptible an administration as any thing in the world.

But the Fiji Indians cannot be ex pected to believe that. They have been told, so long and so often, by their political agitators, that they are the mis erable. helpless slaves of the GSR and the British community in Fijij, that it is sheer waste of time to offer them any other assurances, or present another point of view. The history of recent events in Fiji bears out this contention, to the letter, rE price of sugar-cane is arranged in periodical contracts, between the GSR Co. and the cane-growers.

Then the Co. proceeds to make contracts, far ahead, for the sale of its sugar. The last contract was made in 1940, and was for ten years. It provided that, if the Co. got an increased price for sugar, the growers should get an increased price for cane. The growers got about one third more for cane, in 1940.

In March, 1943, the Kisan Sangh (an organisation of cane-growers) demanded higher rates, owing to greatly increased costs. The Co. refused the request, pointing out that all sugar now was bought by the British Department of Food, at a fixed price, and that the higher costs were the result of war con ditions, and were felt as much by the Co. as by the growers, Kisan Sangh, in April, appealed to the Fiji Government (which, in any event, had to take control of the situation, because in November, 1940, the Fiji sugar industry had been declared an “essential service”). Would the Governor point out to the British Ministry of Food the need for paying more for sugar, so that cane growers could get more?

The Governor agreed. The growers’ representations were telegraphed by him to London in June.

A few days later another growers’ organisation, the Maha Sangh, came to light. It bluntly informed the Govern ment that, unless rates for cane were raised, the growers would not cut their cane.

Maha Sangh did not seem very fond of Kisan Sangh.

IN the meantime, a labour dispute arose in the sugar mills at Ba and Lau toka, and elsewhere. Operatives,

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mostly Indians, struck for considerably increased wages. The Government set up an Arbitration Tribunal to investigate and make an award.

On July 12, 1943, a Mr. Lakshman, who appears to be a leader of the Kisan Sangh, demanded the appointment of a Commission, to inquire into the price of cane sugar.

The Governor suggested the matter stand over until the Tribunal had dealt with the strike. But the Kisan Sangh said the matter was very urgent.

So, the Governor, at Lautoka, on July 19, met representatives of the Kisan Sangh, the Maha Sangh, and anyone else interested. The growers said their cane was not worth cutting, at ruling prices: and they wanted a Commission of inquiry.

The Governor pointed out that the price of cane depended on the price of sugar, and he could not increase the lat ter. But he would set up an inquiry into the conditions of cane-growing; and if—as he expected—there was a case for a higher price for cane, he would pass that information on to the Food Ministry in London. He promised that both bodies would be represented on the inquiry.

THAT same day, the Governor received a communication from still another body, the Rewa Cane-growers’

Union, It said its members definitely would not cut cane, and it demanded representation on the inquiry. One gathers that Rewa Union disliked both the Sanghs.

By this time the situation was becom ing farcical. But the patient Governor, on July 21, duly set up a Commission, composed of the Attorney-General, Mr, H. H. Ragg, MLC, and Mr. Apabhai Patel; and the various growers’ organi sations were invited to nominate persons from whom the Governor might appoint their representatives.

The organisations declined to nominate anyone.

On July 25, a deputation of these Indians, including those who previously had asked for a Commission, asked the Governor to cancel the Commission, and set up a Court of Arbitration.

The request, very properly, was flatly refused.

By this time, the Tribunal had made some progress in settling the labour strike at the mills: but the growers, with ever-increasing clamour, insisted that they were not going to cut cane.

THE Commission opened at Ba on July 27. The Kisan Sangh not appear. Two Indian lawyers, Mr.

Said Hasan and Mr. Sharma, appeared for the Rewa Union and the Maha Sangh, and said they would not proceed —they wanted a Court, whose award would be binding.

The Commission refused the request.

The Governor could not go beyond his promise of July 19 —that, if the growers made out a case before the Commission, he would present that case to London.

The growers refused to appear before the Commission, which, therefore, was closed down on August 3.

The mills strike had not ended. Addi tional police were sent to Ba and Lau toka. The Governor refused to discuss matters any further with the growers: if they were silly enough to let their cane rot, rather than cut it at the ruling price, while presenting a case for better rates, that was their affair —and their loss.

IT was then learned that 162 growers in the Ba district were prepared to cut cane, if given protection against possible violence.

Troops were sent accordingly to Ba.

Growers began cutting on July 30. By August 19, 443 growers were cutting cane in the Ba and Penang districts, and one mill was thus kept going.

Early in August, it was clear that Indian agitators were out among the cane-growers, trying to persuade them to cease cutting. The Governor acted promptly, under Defence Regulations, and two agitators were arrested and sen tenced, Soon afterwards, half a dozen others were arrested and sentenced.

Being slick lawyers—or assisted by same—all these men appealed, and were released on bail. Clearly, the processes of law were being employed to defeat the interests of the Colony.

That was the position at the end of August; and there was little improve ment a month later (at the end of Sep tember). There was no trouble on Vanua Levu, where the large Labasa mill is working; but there is only one mill operating on Viti Levu.

All the circumstances indicate that, although the Indians were together in a pack, trying to embarrass both the CSR and the Government, there was even greater trouble within the pack itself.

There appear to be a number of growers’ unions and agitators, who are fighting each other bitterly.

EVERYONE interested in Fiji must consider the future of the Colony, in the light of this deplorable situation.

The Empire is at war. Fiji is almost in the front line. Europeans and Fijians in the Colony, side by side, have offered to their country everything they have: their sacrifices have been great and glorious.

But these Fiji Indians, who everlast ingly cry for all the privileges of Fiji citizenship, have not only made a most miserable contribution to Fiji’s war effort —they also appear to take a mis chievous delight in embarrassing the Government at a most difficult time, and dislocating the Colony’s most important industry.

There is only one way in which these people should be treated: and it is to be hoped that the British authorities will not, too long, delay its application.

If the Indians will not accept the dis cipline for which their conduct cries aloud, the proposition that the whole 90,000 of them (or the proportion of them that has forfeited the right of residence in Fiji) should be returned to India.

This, at first glance, may seem a fan tastic idea* But, is it? Why should the fine territory of Fiji—one of the best in the Pacific—be permanently harmed by the establishment of a community like this?

If it is considered cruel to return them to Indi#, why not transport them to one of the fertile, depopulated groups in the Pacific —the Marquesas, for example.

They would probably end by clawing each other to death, within ten years: but at least we could count on a quiet and decent future for Fiji.

No one, in all this, has much sympathy for the CSR. After all, the Co. brought these Indians to Fiji. As I have said, Indian immigration may have seemed a good idea, at the time; but, unless some thing really drastic is done within the next ten years, so that the Indians may be removed or controlled, Fiji will be a place unfit to live in.

The problem must be seriously tackled —not for the sake of the poor, suffering CSR or the badgered British, but because of the Fijian natives. Unless something is done to properly and permanently con trol the Indians, this fine Melanesian race is going to get a very raw deal.

CSR States its Case

ON the last day of the sitting of the Commission of Inquiry, Sir Henry Scott, KC, counsel for the Colonial Sugar Refining Co., Ltd., made the fol

lowing statement:—

Before the Commission closes I desire to make a few observations on behalf of my clients: — (1) The company considers the refusal of the cane-growers to cut their cane is wholly un justified, as the cane agreements between the growers and the company have a period of approximately 7 years to run. (2) There is a guaranteed minimum price for cane, no matter how low may be the price of sugar. (3) There is also provided an increased pay ment, above £ll per ton, which is shared by the company and the growers. The agreement has the effect of increasing the cane price paid by the company to the grower from 15/- per ton pre-war to about 21/- (estimated) per ton in 1943—i.e,, assuming the quality of the cane is normal, and assuming the cutting of cane starts at once and continues without inter ruption, and that sugar is sold at current market price. This represents to the grower about 40 per cent, increase. (4) The company cannot be held responsible for the increased cost of living. If the Colony needs imports (as it does—i.e., clothing, food, etc.), then exports (sugar) in return are essen tial. This is an added reason why the cutting of cane should proceed at all mills immediately.

In any event, the company should not be asked to bear the whole burden of the increased cost of living. (5) Continued refusal to cut cane by the growers would result, not only in loss, to the growers, of their crops, but would retard the war effort by presenting realisation of the Allies’ expectation that Fiji will supply sugar for the Pacific peoples, and back loading of ships for east-bound vessels. (6) This Colony requires Empire markets for sugar in times of plenty, and should reciprocate by meeting the Allies’ present requirements owing to war conditions. (7) The company views the “boycott” of the Commission by the growers as wholly unjustified, as there can, in the circumstances, be no room for doubt that the Kisan Sangh, through its President, asked for the appointment of the Commission—and now, having got the Com mission appointed by His Excellency the Governor, and all the attendant expense having been incurred, counsel for the Rewa growers and the Kisan Sangh and the Maha Sangh re fuse to co-operate. And it will be remembered that, at the opening of the Commission at Ba, the company agreed to give to the Commission every assistance, as I so stated.

A prisoner of war card, dated July, 1942, has been received from Mr. John Arnold Crockett, formerly of Bulolo, TNG.

His address is “Osaka Prisoner of War Camp, Kawasaki Sub-Camp, and he says that he is “in good health, well treated and well fed—mostly on rice.”