Allies’ Mediterranean Strategy
pp. 5-6 · Read in the full issue
Is Shortening The War
A Review
by
R. W. Robson
WHEN the history of this war is written, it probably will be shown that the Axis was destroyed by a plan which may be called the Medi terranean strategy of the Democratic Powers; and that the author of the plan was Winston Churchill. I think that Churchill submitted the outline of the plan (already endorsed by his own Service chiefs) to the Americans when he visited Washington in the middle of 1942, and won for it the complete support of President Roose velt and his advisers. The Americans probably improved it and, with char acteristic thoroughness, hammered in the details.
But the implementation of the plan was discussed in the shadow of complete disaster. If it were to suc ceed, it had to have an aggressive and unbroken Russia, Anglo-Ameri can dominance in North Africa, and reasonably clear sea-lanes in the Atlantic. Actually, the first news that greeted Churchill when he entered the White House on June 18, 1942, was that Tobruk, with 25,000 of our men, had been captured by Rom mel. Within two weeks, our Eighth Army was in full retreat into Egypt; the Axis armies were pouring across the Don into the Caucasus region, in pursuit of the retreating Russians; and our losses of shipping in the Atlantic, already serious, were mount ing at an appalling rate.
In such circumstances, the elabora tion of the Mediterranean plan, which unquestionably took place in Wash
ington in June and July, 1942, called for extraordinary optimism and fore sight, and lion-hearted courage. The only really bright spot in the whole picture of the global war at that time was the fact that the RAF (the “few” who saved the “many” from destruc tion in the black days of 1940) had carried out three 1,000-bombers raids —one on Cologne, one on Essen and one on Bremen.
We are inclined to think of those raids as interesting historical inci dents. Actually, although few then could see it, they marked the turn ing-point of the war. Churchill and Roosevelt, clear-visioned and resolute, sitting behind their Mediterranean plan, could see it—but only if three things could be achieved quickly.
They were three terrible “if”: IF Rommel’s armies could be defeated in North Africa; IF the Russians could hold together and strike back; IF American armies, and the growing masses of American equipment, could be brought across the Atlantic.
Churchill and Roosevelt believed that those three things could be achieved; but many prominent people, of lesser vision, can be pardoned because at that time they endorsed the Anglo- American plan with trepidation.
THE plan was brilliant, magnificent.
While Britain carried out a series of feints against the German-held lines along the Atlantic coast of Europe, a great Anglo-American force was to be assembled and secretly
transported to North Africa, where the French colonial territories of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia were to be quickly occupied. Then, while operations on the European mainland were practically immobilised by the 1942-43 winter, the Anglo-American forces, in comparatively dry North Africa, were to prepare an attack against Italy. Included in those pre parations was the elimination of the Axis forces in Tripoli; and it was essential that they be assisted by (a) a winter thrust in great force by the Russians, calculated to keep the enemy fully engaged, and (b) air attacks from Britain of such fre quency and power that they would partially cripple Germany’s indus trial and transport organisations. It was argued that this plan would have the following results:— The Axis would be struck in its most vulnerable place, i.e., Italy (“the soft under-belly of Europe”).
Italy would collapse as soon as she was invaded. The Germans, being kept very active by the Russians in the east, and the Anglo-American bombers in the west, would not be able to give much support to Italy.
The collapse of Italy would have extra ordinarily far-reaching results. The Allies then would have unchallenged con trol of the Mediterranean. This would discourage Spain (pro-German) and encourage Turkey (pro-Allies). The Ger mans could not be expected to completely replace the Italians in Crete, the Bal kans countries, and the Dodecanese Islands—thus simplifying the Allies’ task of attacking the weak Axis countries of Bulgaria, Roumania and Hungary by thrusting from Syria and Egypt through the friendly territories of Crete, Greece and Jugoslavia.
With Italy in the occupation of the Allies, the co-ordination of the Allied
forces in the invasion of Austria and Ger many, via the Balkans and the Danube Basin, would become possible. Anglo- American bombers, from Italian airfields, not only could attack southern and south-eastern Germany, but also could deny to the Germans the use of the Rou manian oil-wells, and assist the Allied armies advancing from Greece through Jugoslavia to make a junction with the Russians across Roumania—always pro vided, of course, that the Russian armies (which were being badly battered in July, 1942) could make a come-back.
The occupation of North Africa, with control of the Mediterranean, would solve two difficult politico-military problems, provided by the French and the Arabs.
At this time (July, 1942) the whole of French North Africa was under the direct and active control of the puppet Government at Vichy, and was honey combed with Axis personnel. It seemed to be only a matter of months before Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, and the French territories to the south-west, would be occupied by the Axis. Insidiously, day by day, the Germans were working to get control of the French fleet. U-boats, engaged in the Battle of the Atlantic, were using French African bases.
The Arabs, whose influence is domi nant in practically all the French North African territories, in Tripoli, in Egypt, in Palestine, Syria, and Iraq—in fact, throughout the Middle East —being troubled by events in Palestine, Syria and Iraq, were susceptible to the anti- British propaganda being poured out by the Axis. But if North Africa and the Middle East could be cleared of „the Axis, and the possibility of an Arabic Con federation suggested, Mohammedan influ ence, guided to some extent by Turkey, might be expected to become strongly pro-Ally.
This, in turn, would have a powerful influence in India, just at a time when, owing to the re-opening of the Allies’ shipping lanes through the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, the importance of India in the future development of the war against Japan was becoming recognised.
The elimination of Italy would free huge naval forces for use elsewhere— against Japan, for instance.
THAT was the plan. To appreciate properly its brilliance and power, it is necessary only to use it as a background for the measurement
and appraisement of subsequent
events.
Churchill and his advisers returned to London in July, 1942—and, pre sumably. the United Nations began
preparations to put their plan into
effect.
Meanwhile, Rommel did not take Egypt—the Axis armies were stopped finally by the British at El Alamein.
The Russians did not break—some how, they held the oil-hungry Axis armies on the Volga and along the lower slopes of the Caucasus.
Within three months, the plan was launched. The British smashed Rom mel and drove him out of Egypt, and out of Tripoli. Great Anglo-Ameri can forces made a surprise landing in North Africa in November, and rapidly occupied the whole region.
The Russians, striking in the depth of their bitter winter, broke the Ger man lines along the whole front, from the Caucasus to north-west of Mos cow, and drove the invaders back into the Ukraine. All the forces of France outside of France now rallied to the Allies; and French patriots sank the
French fleet, to keep it out of Axis hands.
OY early in 1943, the plan was " clearly and definitely taking shape. The last vestige of the Axis’
Afnca.n forces was being destroyed in Tunisia. The Germans had received such a mauling by the Russians in the east that their military power was partly paralysed, at least temporar ily. Their air losses had been terrible -so heavy that they were not able to reinforce their air strength in the Mediterranean, where the Allies gained and held marked air suprem acy. Month by month, the Allies increased the strength and frequency of their air attacks, from Britain, upon industrial Germany; so that, as the threat of the Allied invasion of Europe grew, Germany’s ability to supply her still enormous armies with munitions and equipment grew less and less.
Most important of all, the Allies, suddenly and dramatically, announced that they had won the Battle of the Atlantic—or the first round of it, at any rate.
No one knows, yet, exactly what happened. All we can say is that, where our convoys a few months earlier had been hunted and des troyed in disastrous fashion by grow ing packs of U-boats, the Allies had gone out upon the Atlantic with a new system and a new technique, embracing aircraft, surface-craft and some marvellous new devices, and had overtaken and wiped out the U-boats, or chased them back to their home ports. By April, American armies and equipment were crossing the Atlantic almost unscathed, pouring into Bri tain and North Africa, and the U-boat Nazis were admitting their defeat.
MORE recent events need only be mentioned: they are seen to fall at once into the clear pattern of the Churchill-Roosevelt plan.
The Allies mop up Pantellaria and other Italian islands, and move into Sicily in great strength. Mussolini resigns and disappears, and Italy takes the first steps towards capitu lation. British and American bomb ers, in ever-growing numbers, com mence an ever-increasing attack upon western Germany, calculated to para lyse the mainsprings of the German war-machine—namely, the factories and the railways. Germany, just at the moment when she needs all her strength to meet the attack of Rus sia, the coming invasion by the Anglo-Americans, and the collapse of her Axis partner, finds paralysis creeping upon her from the west—the Ruhr devastated, the great city of Hamburg obliterated, Berlin itself menaced. The Russians, co-ordinat ing their assault with the Anglo- American attack on Italy, are devel oping an offensive along the eastern front, and the Germans at last are being smashed and driven back by Russian armies in summer-time—a thing that seemed impossible two years ago. Fleets of American bomb ers from the Middle East go north and bomb the Ploesti oilfield in Rou mania—the only big oilfield from
whieh Germany can obtain supplies or non-synthetic motor fuel, vital to her war-machine.
The plan is now in operation, and only something completely unforeseen can stop it. The defeat of the Axis is now as certain as a mathematical calculation. But when (which is what we all want to know) is not so clear. rpHE Mediterranean plan takes care 77 J£ e Pacific situation. Once the Mediterranean is controlled by the Allies, and the Italian fleet dis posed of, the direct sea-ways from Britain and the Atlantic coast of America to India (via the Mediter ranean and the Red Sea) will be open to our warships, and to fleets of mer chantmen carrying troops, equipment and supplies. The naval position, sel dom mentioned, is most important.
Britain, America and Fighting France now have between them sufficient warships to guard against the Ger man navy and submarines in the Atlantic, while sending into the Indian and Pacific Oceans naval forces capable of overwhelming the Japanese fleets.
Probably, it is intended eventually to crush Japan with air-power. At present, as the map shows, Japan herself (the head of the octopus) is well protected by distance. No land held by the Allies is within bombing range of Tokio. So the strategy of the Pacific calls primarily for opera tions which will give us air bases within range of Japan. Everyone outside our High Command (includ ing Mr. Tojo!) can only guess at the character of those operations—whe ther they are to be land-based, or sea-based, or both; whether they will develop this year or next, or from the north, east, south or west. But obviously, whatever they are and whenever they start, they must be assisted vitally by the clearing of the sea-ways from the North Atlantic to India. We cannot get the full advan tage of air supremacy without sea supremacy; and vice versa. It is in this connection that recent and pre sent events in the Mediterranean are of such importance to the nations in the Pacific. * * * It would be folly to imagine that the worst is past, however. It was only last September that the tide of war turned, in our favour. The dis asters of three years cannot be wiped out in one. Germany ought to col lapse in 1943; hut, up to date, there is not one sure sign that German mili tary morale is breaking. On the con trary, on the Russian and Italian fronts, the Germans are fighting as stubbornly as ever. As for the Japs- Is there one well-informed observer who believes that their defensive lines and aggressive spirit can be smashed inside of two years after the destruction of the Nazis? , S® marriage of MisT~Kathleen M.
Whittle to Mr. Raymond Saunders was celebrated in Holy Trinity Pro-Cathedral.
Suva, Fiji, on June 18.
Samoan trading company for sale— see page 39.