Solomon Islands Battles
pp. 15-17 · Read in the full issue
Complete List, and the Results of Each
'T'HERE have been so many naval and L air battles in the Solomons between Americans and Japanese, with the stor'ies of one running imperceptibly into the stories of the other, that the whole pat tern of this campaign had become con fused and confusing.
We are glad, therefore, to find that Mr.
Winston Turner, Sydney “Sun” corres pondent in the Solomons, has supplied a complete and detailed list of the eight actions that had occurred, up to Decem ber 20. Mr. Turner sets them out tidily in this fashion: — HENCEFORTH, the Solomons Islands sea actions will be referred to by the US Navy as:— First Battle of the Solomons, August 7-8.
First Savo Action, August 8-9.
Battle of Ontong Java, August 24-25.
First Buin Raid, October 5.
Battle of the Russell Islands, October 11-12.
Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands, October 25-26.
Second Battle of the Solomons, November 13-15.
Second Savo Battle, November 30.
These actions, in a nutshell, are:— First Solomons. —This covers the actual landing by US Marines in the Solomons, the establishment of a beach-head on Guadalcanal and capture of Tulagi.
Makambo, Gavutu. Tanambogo and Florida Islands. The Japanese lost a vacht, 37 bombers, 18 seaplanes and 15 fighters, and 1,200 Japanese were killed.
US losses were a destroyer (the “Jarvis”), a transport (the “G. F. Elliott”). A second destroyer was damaged. High light of the day’s fighting: Attack by 40 Jap planes on the “Elliott.” Every one shot down either by fighters or ack-ack.
First Savo.—ln this night engagement the Australian cruiser “Canberra” and the US cruisers “Quincy,” “Vincennes” and “Astoria” were sunk.
Battle of Ontong Java. —Takes its name from the island of Ontong Java (also known as Lord Howe Island), and might equally well be called the “Battle of the Carriers.” Fought at a range of 250
miles between opposing carrier forces. A clean-cut victory for the Americans. US airmen destroyed 92 Japanese planes, for the loss of only three Americans, hit some cruisers and battleships and dam aged and probably sank the small Jap carrier “Ryujo.’* First Buin Raid. —Carried out entirely by carrier-based planes. Americans bombed and hit a force of Jap cruisers, transports and destroyers: also hit the runway on Kieta. They destroyed six Jap aircraft during the raid.
Russell Islands. —Admiral Scott’s task force of cruisers and destroyers attacked a similar force of Japanese, sank a heavy cruiser and destroyer, severely damaged (probably sank) two heavy and one light cruiser: sank four destroyers. Lost the US destroyer “Duncan.”
Santa Cruz Islands. —ln this (flash a carrier task force attacked a Japanese carrier task force, and severely damaged two Jap carriers—one a Shokaku class carrier. The American force also dam aged by bombs or torpedoes a Jap battle ship, a heavy cruiser, and a light cruiser.
No less than 115 Japanese aircraft were destroyed for certain, and 46 more were probably destroyed. The American force lost a carrier and the destroyer “Porter.”
Second Solomons.—So named because, whereas in the opening engagement, on August 7-8, the Americans were all out to capture the Solomons, in this action (November 13-15), the Japanese were all out to win them back. The three-day battle was a sweeping victory for the US Navy. Japanese lost two battleships, six heavy, and two light cruisers, six destroy ers. eight transports, and four cargo ships. A third battleship, another light cruiser and seven more destroyers were damaged. The American Fleet lost two light cruisers and six destroyers—and saved Guadalcanal.
Second Savo.—ln this battle, which indicates that the Japs still are willing to face heavy losses on the chance that they may get Guadalcanal back, the American force sank two Jap light crui sers, or heavy destroyers, four destroy ers, two transports, and one cargo vessel.
The American losses were a heavy cruiser sunk and several other ships damaged.
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IT is possible that the future historian will say that the most decisive battle of the South Pacific in 1942 w'as the Second Solomons Battle, November 13-15.
The following is a donnected account of the battle by Winston Turner, an Aus tralian war correspondent:— The battle was fought in five phases over the period from the night of November 12-13 until the morning of November 15.
Phase one, in which American cruisers and destroyers daringly attacked Japan ese battleships and cruisers, and phase four, in which American and Japanese battleships exchanged broadsides for the first time, took place in the waters enclosed by Guadalcanal, Savo and Florida Islands.
The position in this area on November 11 was that the American cruisers, destroyers and transports were off Gua dalcanal. During that day thev were attacked by 10 dive-bombers and later by 25 twin-engined Mark I Navy bombers.
On the 12th more American cruisers and transports arrived.
On the evening of the 12th the entire force left, all going out of the area enclosed by Guadalcanal, Savo and Flor ida Islands by way of Sealark Channel at the south-western end. (See map, page 13.) When the force had passed through this channel it divided. The transports and destroyers continued on.
But the cruisers and destroyers, having tricked the Japanese into believing that they had left and were not returning, boldly turned and re-entered Sealark Channel in the darkness to give Tojo a surprise.
MEANWHILE, a Japanese naval force much stronger than the American force had entered the deserted Guadalcanai-Savo-Florida Islands area.
These ships were in three formations when the American force came out of Sealark Channel. (1) East of Savo Island were two Japan ese battleships and two destroyers.
Thev were in battle formation. (2) South of Florida Island were six or eight warships, in cruising forma tion. (3) Two miles east of Cane Esperance (on the northern coast of Guadal canal) were eight Japanese warships, also in cruising formation.
The American force consisted of heavy cruisers, light cruisers and destroyers.
These ships came out of Sealark Channel (which is only 300 yards wide at one point) in battle formation of line ahead —a string of destroyers, then the cruisers, with more destroyers bringing up the rear.
They were through the channel at 1.30 a.m. November 13 and shortly after wards they located the battleships dir ect! v ahead of them off Savo Island.
The force changed course 40 degrees to enable the cruisers’ broadsides to bear and the destroyers at the head of the line went in to attack. As these destroy ers were in the line of fire of the cruisers, those vessels did not open up until the destroyers had pushed home their attack.
Destroyer No. One discharged four torpedoes from a range of only 200 yards at one battleship.
The other destroyers also got torpedoes home. One battleship was not seen again and may have been sunk. The other was located next day, badly dam
aged and was destroyed by American aircraft.
But the small destroyer force could not carry out an attack at such close quar ters without loss.
Destroyer Two was caught by a full broadside of 14 or 16 inch calibre shells and blew up with a terrific explosion.
Her magazine and depth charges were apparently hit simultaneously and flames 300 feet high split the darkness.
Destroyer Three was badly damaged.
The torpedo . attack completed, the American cruisers were in the process of changing course when the scene was illuminated by a dazzling cluster of four big searchlights from off the port bow.
Jap force No. Three (off Guadalcanal) had disclosed itself.
Cruiser X’s guns slewed round and her own searchlights switched on to reveal a Japanese light cruiser and the outline of other cruisers. Cruiser X opened fire before the Japanese were able to do so, and other cruisers in the American line swiftly followed suit.
Cruiser X fired for three minutes, opening at a fairly long range and clos ing 2,000 yards nearer.
The first return salvo from the Japanese cruiser killed Admiral Scott, second in command of the American force, who was on the bridge of Cruiser X.
During this hot exchange, a Jap cruiser raced across the port bow of Cruiser X and at a range of only 600 yards gave her tw r o torpedoes. The cruiser went dead in the water when the torpedoes exploded, but slewed her guns round and at almost point-blank range blew the Jap cruiser out of the water.
THEN shells began to lob over from starboard of the Americans. Japan ese force No. 3 (off Florida Island) had disclosed itself. Shelling by this force was not very effective and the American ships pressed on.
Cruiser X. which had dropped out of the line when she was torpedoed, con tinued to fire her guns until only three of her eight turrets were operating. All the others had suffered direct hits.
Then Turret No. 2 received a direct hit and power went dead in No. 7.
The cruiser fired a few more shells from No. 8 turrek—her only remaining unit—then ceased firing.
In a hectic few minutes of night firing she had hurled many shells at the Jap anese. She was afire, with flames rising 50 to 100 feet above her bridge. Bucket brigades finally brought this blaze under control and the cruiser remained afloat.
Meanwhile, the American force steamed on and either because they had had enough or wished to consoli date their forces, all three Japanese formations turned and began moving out northwards.
There was a melee off the east side of Savo Island, and it was here the Ameri can ships got in their best blows. They rained shells on the Japanese cruisers.
Those watching from Cruiser X saw two ships blow up and later saw another three Japanese vessels belch flame from internal explosions that shattered their hulls and left them sinking.
The American force turned round in the darkness, well satisfied with what it had accomplished. But the two confused Japanese cruiser forces continued firing at each other.
The engagement, as described to this point, had lasted 15 minutes.
After this there was intermittent firing between individual ships. For instance, a Japanese destroyer passed close bv Cruiser X while she lay dead in the water and shelled her, without success.
Dawn on November 13 in the Guadal canal-Savo-Florida Islands area revealed that the fires were out in American Cruiser X, but her bridge and turrets were a shambles, and she was listing.
Three American destroyers were burn ing. One had been abandoned and the fires on the other two were being dealt with. The remainder of the American force had left the scene.
As the dawn brightened, a fourth destroyer was seen, lying dead in the water.
FOR a moment an American cruiser studied her, then, satisfied she was Japanese, opened fire on her. The cruiser fired four 8 inch salvos—and all four salvos landed on the destroyer.
At the end of the firing the Ameri cans saw a tremendous column of smoke. When it cleared there was no sign of the destroyer.
Landing boats from the American-held section of Guadalcanal then came out and picked up American wounded, also some Japanese who had been picked up from the water earlier.
Cruiser X’s crew stood by her despite the danger of Japanese air attacks, which, however, did not eventuate. At 4.30 p.m. they abandoned ship and went ashore to Guadalcanal in Marines’ land ing boats.
At 8.15 p.m. charges of TNT were placed in Cruiser X’s engine room-and she was sunk.
During this second day of the Second Solomons battle, American aircraft located the Japanese battleship damaged by destroyers the previous night, limping along at three knots, escorted by five destroyers.
She was then north of Savo Island, and during the day she travelled 40 to 50 miles, plagued by American aircraft.
Torpedoes and heavy bombs hit her, and towards dusk the escorting destroy ers took off her crew. She either sank or was scuttled during the night. The attacking aircraft also hit one of the escorting destroyers.
That night a Japanese cruiser force, with, possibly, a battleship, came into the waters where the previous night’s action had been fought, and shelled Henderson airfield on Guadalcanal. They opened fire at 1.30 a.m. and shelled steadily for 45 minutes.
They were to pay dearly for this bom bardment, which did little damage. At 8 a.m. American aircraft picked up a Japanese force between Russell Island and Ysabel Island. This force comprised 12 transports, one battleship and several cruisers—probably those which had called on the Marines a few hours earlier.
American aircraft attacked this force all day, shuttling backwards and for wards, staying at their bases only long enough to refuel and bomb up—then returning to the attack.
The attack became so hot during the afternoon that the Japanese warships left the transports to their fate and hur ried north.
Eight of the 12 transports were sunk.
A Marine aviator told me: “There were so many Japanese heads in the water you could almost walk on them. The sea was just black with heads.”
Fourth phase of the battle was fought that night, when surface warships clashed again. American battleships and destroyers came in Sealark Channel dur
ing the night and caught a Japanese force coming around Savo Island.
THE Americans tried the same tactics that had proved so successful in the first engagement—sending destroyers in close for a torpedo attack.
Japanese battleships and cruisers and American battleships fired on each other for 20 minutes. Marines ashore on Gua dalcanal enjoying the show from the dress circle, saw several explosions among the Japanese force.
In the final check-up it was found that the Japanese had lost six war ships (a battleship, three heavy crui sers and one destroyer).
Final phase of the battle was fought at dawn. The first grey light revealed a 12,000 tons Japanese transport beached on Guadalcanal and three 8.000 tons transports moving in to the beach.
These were the only surviving ships from the transport fleet of 12 shattered between Russell and Ysabel Islands.
Their captains were making a final des perate effort to get their troops ashore.
They did not attempt to anchor, but steamed straight for the beach.
The 12,000-tonner beached herself within artillery range of the Marines’ position on Guadalcanal. Japanese troops were pouring out of her when the Ameri can land batteries opened up.
Meanwhile American planes took off and within "half an hour the other three transports were afire also.
Japanese jumped overboard with packs
on their backs and carrying their rifles and tried to swim ashore. Some suc ceeded. Some did not.
Shelled from sea and land, strafed from the air, the Japs just melted away.
Those who did get inland contributed only more rifles and more empty stom achs to the Japanese forces. They had none of the food, artillery and other equipment the Japanese need to main tain their narrowing territory on Gua dalcanal.
By noon, the four transports were smoking hulks, the 12,000-tonner lying with her back broken.
So ended the second battle of the Solomons, and Japan’s biggest effort to win back Guadalcanal. It was a clean cut victory for the US Navy—a victory that has lifted morale to victory peak, and convinced every man operating in the South Pacific that at least they have the edge on the Japanese.
Mr. H. L. Freshwater, who was a member of the Melanesian Mission in the Solo mon Islands before he resigned in 1939 to return to commercial pursuits, recently reached Sydney from Guadalcanal, after many adventures. He expresses his ap preciation of the kindness shown to him and to others by the American forces in the area.
Mr. Freshwater is remembered particu larly for his work at the Mission’s experimental farm at Pamua on San Cristoval Island.


