How Japan Got The Marshall

And Caroline Islands

Story of a Cheat at Versailles, as Told by W. M. Hughes

By R. W. Robson

ON the evening of October 26, at a meeting in Sydney of the Pacific Islands Society, I heard the “inside story” of how Japan came to be in pos session of the Marshall, Caroline and Mariana Islands, and the manner in which bases were constructed in those islands as part of a carefully-planned attack against Australia, New Zealand and the South Pacific Territories.

The speaker was Right Hon. W. M.

Hughes, Prime Minister of Australia during World War I. and Australia’s representative at Versailles during those historical conferences, when a Mandate over the Marshall and other islands was given to Japan.

It was foreseen, 20 years ago, that the treacherous Japanese would use their Mandated Territory for the organisation of an attack against us in the South Pacific; and, on many occasions since then, Mr. Hughes has been bitterly blamed for agreeing to such an arrange ment. I myself have written and pub lished articles in which I laid the respon sibility for the Truk-Ponape-Jaluit-Moje line of fortifications —so obviously directed against New Guinea and Australia —upon Mr. Hughes. Why (we all asked) had the naturally astute and far-seeing “Billy” been so blind?

In the address referred to, Mr. Hughes gave us the true story of what occurred.

It provides him with a watertight alibi and, incidentally, supplies us with a revealing sidelight on the Peace Confer ence of 1919.

IN the 1914-18 war, Japan, through her adherence to the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, became one of the Allies against the Central Powers (Germany, Austria, Turkey and Bulgaria). Japan took a very small part in the war. Her military strength was not employed, but her warships helped very much in assist ing the British Navy to guard the water borne commerce and troop transporta tions of the Allies, In 1917, there developed one of the great crises of World War I. So success ful was Germany’s submarine campaign against Allied shipping that Britain, at one period, had only six weeks’ store of food available. She was within 50 days of being crippled by starvation. It was about then that the convoy system was developed—a system which eventually beat the submarines, with no margin to spare, but a system which demanded a very large number of small, fast war ships. At this time, the small warships of the Japanese Navy were of incalculable value to the Allies, IT was in this crisis that the Japanese Ambassador in London made a vel vet-footed advance upon Sir Edward Grey, then Britain’s Foreign Secretary.

Japan, it was pointed out, was now in occupation of the former German colony, the Marshall, Caroline and Mariana Islands. Japan felt that permanent possession of those islands was import ant to her future welfare.

The British Minister pointed out the obvious fact: The future disposition of German territories now occupied by the Allies was a matter that should await the consideration of a Peace Conference,

at the conclusion of the war.

The Japanese smiled, and purred, but insisted. Japan was very unhappy about the possibility of losing the islands —in fact, she could not bear the thought of any other nation having a foothold there.

Sir Edward Grey raised his eyebrows, and uttered the 1917 equivalent of “So what?”

“The Japanese Ambassador then made his position perfectly clear,” said Mr.

Hughes. “Unless the British Government would agree to recognise Japanese sov ereignty in these islands, Japan would feel herself free, not only to withdraw from the Alliance with Britain, but also, if she considered it desirable, to enter into discussions with Germany.”

What could Britain do? Japan’s naval help was vital, at that stage of the sub marine campaign. A promise was given to Japan.

SOON afterwards, Mr. Hughes was in London. He learned, for the first time, of what Japan had done. It was a fait accompli. He asked Sir Edward Grey what he would have done had Australia objected. He was informed that that would have made no difference —the position, from the Allies’ viewpoint, had been so grave that Australia’s sen sitiveness regarding her North Pacific contacts could not be even considered.

So that was that. The war eventually ended in victory for the Allies. The armistice was based on the Fourteen Points of President Wilson. The Points included “no indemnities and no annexa tions.”

The British Dominions were not unsym pathetic to the idea expressed in “no indemnities and no annexations”; but that idea had to do mostly with condi tions in Europe. The British Dominions, taking a long view concerning the security of their own future, felt that they must have control over certain ter ritories which, in unfriendly hands, might menace their own future.

At an Imperial Conference discussion in London prior to the Peace Conference, in 1919, attended by Mr. Hughes (Aus tralia), Mr. Massey (New Zealand) and General Botha (South Africa), it was definitely and unequivocally agreed that, for security reasons, Australia must hold New Guinea, South Africa must hold South-west Africa, and New Zealand must hold Western Samoa. The man dates system, then being offered tenta tively as an alternative to the “no annexations” policy of the Fourteen Points, was regarded as utterly unaccept able to the Dominions.

The thing came to a head in Paris, during the Peace Conference. It was proposed that the late German colonies should be governed by the Allies under Class A and Class B Mandates —the dif ference between A and B representing the difference between the amount of self-government permitted the inhabi tants of the territories concerned; and that territories governed under Mandate should be open equally to the commerce and immigration of all the members of the proposed League of Nations.

“Such a plan was emphatically rejected

by the Dominions Prime Ministers,” said Mr. Hughes. “Imagine what it would have meant to Australia in the case of New Guinea! In no time at all, New Guinea would have been full of Japan ese, a gift to Japanese traders —we should have had Japan pressing in upon our northern borders.”

BUT Mr. Lloyd George came to the Dominions Prime Ministers. The position was acute. President Wil son insisted that the acceptance of the Mandates plan was fundamental to the principles and the whole structure of the League of Nations. If it was not accepted by the British Dominions Prime Minis ters, President Wilson would retire from the Peace Conference.

“I told Mr. Lloyd George definitely and finally that I would not accept a B Class Mandate for New Guinea,” said Mr.

Hughes. “I said such a system would destroy the White Australia policy.”

Mr. Bonar Law and Sir Maurice Hankey then got to work, seeking a compromise, and the C. Class Mandate was evolved.

It was a Mandate to be applied only to countries which held a primitive, back ward people, incapable of governing themselves; and it differed from A and B Class Mandates in that territories so governed became virtually a part of the country which administered them, sub ject only to periodical review by the League of Nations.

That was accepted by the British Prime Ministers for New Guinea, Samoa and South-west Africa —and by Japan for the Marshall and Carolines.

BUT that did not end. the difficulties.

Japan insisted that there should be inserted, not in the Mandates, but in the Covenant of the League of Nations, a racial equality clause, under which it would have been impossible for one member of the League to close its frontiers against the nationals of any other member. Such a clause would have opened all Australian territories, includ ing Australia itself, to Japanese immi gration. It was entirely unacceptable to Australia.

“Baron Makino, of Japan, came to see me about this,” said Mr. Hughes. “He was all bows and smiles, and he purred gently. But he had the kind of eyes that were very awkward—one eye went around and around, and the other stood still — very awkward.

“The Baron said; Tf I go back home without that clause, they will shoot me!’

“I replied: Tf I go back with it, they will shoot me ’ ”

From then on, there was a bitter underground struggle. It was clear to Mr. Hughes that President Wilson was in favour of the racial equality clause.

So the American newspaper men cover ing the Peace Conference were apprised of what was going on—and all the west ern States of America suddenly realised that, if the clause were agreed to, there was nothing at all to prevent all those States from being forced to accept so many Japanese immigrants that their jealously-guarded living standards would be destroyed. Within a few days, Presi dent Wilson received a flood of telegrams from those western States which left him in no doubt about American public opinion. The racial equality clause disappeared.

“TAPAN, in international affairs, does J not play fair,” said Mr. Hughes.

“She never has played fair. She boasted about her loyalty to the Anglo- Japanese Alliance in the First World War. But she used her advantageous position there to extort from Britain, by means of threats, a promise that greatly

embarrassed Britain in other directions.

“She obtained a C Class Mandate for the Marshall, Caroline and Mariana Islands. C Class Mandates do not per mit fortifications, or any armed activi ties whatever within the territory con cerned. So Japan cheated —she cheated callously and deliberately. Under the shelter of the Mandate, she fortified those islands. We did not cheat—we did not fortify our Mandated Territory of New Guinea. And so Japan, from her forti fied mandated islands, was able to descend upon and occupy our unfortified mandated islands.

“She cheated in the 5-5-3 naval limi tation agreed upon at the Washington Conference —she has cheated in every thing. She will always cheat . . . But history will write her epitaph—her epi taph, or ours.”