The news magazine of the South Pacific · since 1930

Pacific Islands Monthly, 16 May 1942Vol. XII, No. 10

The War In The Pacific

p. 9 · Read in the full issue

Battle of the Coral Sea —And After

T'HE Battle of the Coral Sea was fought, between May 6 and May 10, “*■ in that wide area of sea southwards of the Louisiades, and between the coast of Australia, on the west, and the chain of islands represented by the Solomons, the New Hebrides and New Caledonia, on the east.

There are no details of the battle. But the brief official com muniques issued make it clear that the Japanese forces were badly mauled by a combined force of American and British ships and planes, and returned to their bases in the New Guinea area.

ON what may be called the North-east ern Australian front, the Japanese now hold (naming the places from west to east) Lae and Salamaua, on the mainland of New Guinea; Gasmata. on the south coast of New Britain; Rabaul town and harbour, at the eastern end of New Britain; Kavieng and other points in New Ireland; Kessa, a good sheltered anchorage on the western side of the island of Buka: Kieta, a harbour on the south-east of the large island of Bou gainville; Faisi and some other ports (we do not know how many) in the British Solomons; and Graciosa Bay, on the main island of Santa Ci'uz, Southern Solomons, between the Solomons and the New Hebrides.

This Santa Cruz position is the most southerly at which the Japanese have been officially reported in these islands.

They have not been officially reported in the New Hebrides, from which it may be assumed that the Allies have some strength thereabouts. It is well-known that the only harbours worthy of the name, between Rabaul and New Cale donia, are those in the New Hebrides.

The Japs would have entered the New Hebrides, if they could.

How The Battle Started

IT had been reported, during late April and early May, that the Japs were assembling forces, presumably naval, in the New Guinea area, and some sort of thrust southwards was anticipated.

We now know, from official communi ques, that the enemy had distributed naval vessels and transports at Rabaul, Kessa, Kieta, and in the British Solo mons, and he also placed a seaplane force at the Deboyne Islands, in the Louisiade Archipelago (eastwards of Samarai), pre sumably to assist his ships when they made their southwards drive.

The Japs seem to have made their move south on May 5 or 6, and they came through into the Coral Sea from the general direction of the Northern Solo mon Islands. We have no details —only that there were heavy cruisers, at least two aircraft-carriers, and a large num ber of lighter warships. The transports seem to have hung back, waiting.

Air Forces Employed

rE Allies were waiting for them —but how, and with what, there has not been the slightest indication. They must have had strong forces. An hys terical communique from Japan, about May 8, claimed that the Japs had sunk two American aircraft-carriers, two American battleships and the British battleship “Warspite”. Washington later described these claims as “fantastic”. It is clear, at any rate, that if they were not battleships, the Japanese did run into something pretty solid.

Were The Japs Trapped?

IT has been officially announced that the Japanese lost one or two air craft-carriers, and one or two heavy

cruisers, in addition to seven or eight smaller vessels; and from this, plus the fact that the battle was broken off about May 9, owing to the Japs retiring to the north, it is possible to guess what hap pened. American commentators insist that the Japs fell into a trap.

So far as naval and ship-based air craft were concerned, the Japs evidently were prepared to join issue completely with the Allied forces; but when thev met the full weight of the Allied naval force, plus the great air power disclosed by the Allies, the Japanese found that they were getting the worst of it.

When they lost their aircraft-carriers they could not cope with the Allies’ air power. The Allies could call up reserves of land-based planes, if needed. The nearest land-bases for Jap planes were at Rabaul, Gasmata, and Lae, far away in the north.

There was nothing else for it—the Japs, headed for their New Guinea bases, skedaddled back behind the shelter of the Louisiades, which lie like a screen between the Coral Sea and New Guinea.

The battle was broken off —and Allied bombers proceeded to search out those seaplanes in the Louisiades and give them “curry”.

The Known Facts

MUCH of the foregoing is guess-work, of course, but these are facts:— The battle commenced about May 6 in the north-eastern corner of the Coral Sea —that is, over towards the Solomons.

The battle continued for at least three days, and the area affected extended rapidly towards the south westward.

The Japanese lost 11 ships, altogether.

The Allies losses, though not pub lished, were much smaller.

The Japanese withdrew to the north ward of the Louisiades.

And What Now?

AND now, what? Where were the Japanese going, and will they resume the attack?

The Japanese have withdrawn, but they are by no means defeated. They will come back. This commentator, dis cussing the New Guinea position, has said again and again that the Japan ese cannot stand still in New Guinea — they must either advance, thrusting south-eastward towards New Caledonia, and the Coral Sea, and attacking Port Moresby—or they must retire from New Guinea towards the much more easily defended line of Marshalls, Carolines and East Indies.

The Japanese, now, are cock-a-hoop and arrogant. So far, they nowhere have retreated. They believe they are invin cible. The mauling they received in the

Coral Sea represents their first serious set-back. They cannot bear such a loss of face. It seems certain that they will call up new forces from the Philippines and East Indies, and attack again.

But there ir o_.e difficulty. This Paci fic war is primarily a job for naval and air forces and the Japs are beginning to feel the need for economy in those forces. They can produce very large armies, but the Allies, week by week, are increasingly outbuilding them in planes and ships, and the time must come—if Japan cannot get a decision first—when the Allies will have such superiority in the air and on the sea that the Japs must fall back to a defensive war, and defeat.

Before that time comes, however, the Japs are likely to make a great effort to smash in on Eastern Australia, now the Allies’ most important base for the pro secution of the Pacific war.

From this viewpoint, the Battle of the Coral Sea was but an incident with sig nificance, but of no great value.