The Unhappy Situation Of

Japan

How the Russo-German War Has Altered the Far Eastern Strategical Set-Up

By Marc. T. Greene

r HONG KONG, July 2.

E sudden attack by Germany upon Russia has placed Japan in an extraordinary position. The Japan ese feel themselves to be between two fires, or maybe three or four. Their country is in the incredible position of being committed to two Powers, along similar lines —Powers which are now at each other’s throats.

Which side is Japan to take, if either?

If there is any answer to that one, it depends a good deal on the nature of the secret commitments in Japan’s pacts with both the Axis and the Soviet. Those can only be guessed at, of course.

But, in view of the fact that nobody now pays any attention to pacts, clauses, promises, commitments or “gentlemen’s agreements”, the Japanese game would seem to be watchful waiting for the time being. To pick a way out of the political and diplomatic labyrinth the Japanese have now manoeuvred them selves into (or been manoeuvred into) would need something even more than the silken cord of Theseus.

Chinese propaganda is now desper ately striving to “sick” the Japanese onto Russia. Disastrous as any such blundering move would be for Japan, it would be a triumph for China, because it would bring the whole of the demo cratic forces, probably including Amer ica—all now being astonishingly aligned

with the once-hated “Reds”—against her.

But any such move by Japan is unlikely, even in the event of a Soviet defeat by the Germans. The Japanese are not apt to forget that Russia has a thousand or more fighting planes at Vladivostock, and that they would make short work of the flimsily-built Japanese cities.

A wiser policy, on Japan’s part, would be her immediate resort to a more con ciliatory attitude toward both Britain and America; and there is no doubt at all that such is the policy favoured by the growing peace element in Japan.

But it dare not yet come out into the open because the military, and the big industrialists who are behind them, have the position too well in hand. They will keep it in hand as long as America continues her Japan-baiting policy.

Inside information on the internal position in Japan indicates that, through the present drastically - regimented national economy, she is likely to be able to carry on as at present, barring further expansionist commitments, for a couple of years longer. The folly of any further such commitments, especially if thby involved, or risked involving, clashes with the democratic bloc, is, then, obvious.

Undoubtedly Germany, in view of whatever secret clauses to that effect

may be contained in the Tripartite Pact, is endeavouring through her numerous agents in Japan to force Japan into an attack upon Russia, and perhaps to an all-out attack on the anti-Axis Powers generally.

It is difficult, however, to believe that the Japanese will make such a colossal blunder 3t this st3go.

The war with China, after four years, is now, in effect, a draw and should be ended on that basis. Japan has a strong

How Britain and USA Stand Behind China

By Marc. T. Greene

(This article —unfortunately delayed in transmission —was written by Mr. Greene 12 days before Germany, by attacking Russia, and thus creating what is vir tually a British-American-Russian alli ance, altered the whole set-up in the Far East. Nevertheless, it supplies a most interesting background, against which one may study the present strange posi tion of Japan. —Ed. “PIM”.)

Hong Kong, June 10.

rE Sino-Japanese conflict has once more, and for about the hundredth time since it started, reached a condition of virtual stalemate.

There is one exception, though, to this: the repeated and increasingly severe air attacks upon Chungking. The Japanese have lately declared, though not pub licly, that they intend to blast the Chinese capital out of existence, if they do nothing else. But the main obstacle —which is the United States of America —will still remain, and is not likely to be overcome.

The fact is, of course—and it is singu larly lost sight of by most people—that the present Chinese official set-up is a creature of America and Britain, and so can in no wise, and under no circum stances, be let down.

When Chiang Kai-shek was persuaded to break relations with the Chen-Boro din Moscow-dominated Hankow group in 1927, permitted to slaughter its adher ents in a fashion and in numbers not exceeded, relatively speaking, by any “purge” anywhere at any time, and sup ported in the setting up of the regime at Nanking, he was persuaded to do that by the capitalist Powers, who wanted no Bolshevism to interfere with trade and political influence in China.

The position was, really, that they had to overthrow the Hankow Government, or prepare to get out of China, lock, stock and barrel. Chen wasn’t a man who could be “reasoned with”, and Borodin, possibly the ablest of all the Bolsheviks, next to Lenin himself, and thoroughly sincere, was really the soul and the director of the Chinese revolu tion —which went out of existence at Hankow in 1927. Chiang Kai-shek, always accused by radicals everywhere of having betrayed or sold out Sun Yat sen’s revolution, became the Powers’ man—England’s and America’s man— and has been ever since. There is, then, just as much likelihood of America’s per mitting Japan to dominate China as there would be of permitting her to dominate the Republic of Mexico.

Thus, just as soon or just as fast as Japan appears to be making any real headway in China, America, or maybe America and Britain together, take some sort of counter-move, “short of war”.

Otherwise, Japan, grotesquely over rated as she is as a military Power, would have wound up the thing long ago. No radical Japanese move in the Pacific is likely as long as American naval strength is unimpaired.

At this moment, the Japanese are

bargaining point in her possession of all Chinese ports of entry, and her virtual domination of the position at both Shanghai and Hong Kong, to say noth ing of her hold on Indo-China. The best course for Britain and America is to use all possible influence to settle the China affair, and then to wean Japan away from th.o Axis 3nd into 3 Brit3.in-Arn.or ica-Russia-Japan bloc, thus assuring, if nothing else can, the downfall of the Axis.

exceedingly peeved with the D.E.1., though the Dutch are selling Nippon— through the American-British interests that control the refineries —nearly three times as much petrol, under the latest agreement, as a couple of years ago.

The Japanese position is, however, that they want a first option on all of it, just as they have by virtue of the eco nomic “agreement” with Indo-China a first option on rice and most of the other products of that rich country. It is possible that the Japanese will attempt some sort of “demonstration” against the Dutch. But nothing more than a bluff is likely—short of demo cratic disasters in Europe. rpHERE are those who would like to X see a little relaxing of the present very firm stand of America toward Japan, to the end of a possible strength ening of the large peace element in Japan, until it dares to show its hand.

Its numbers have grown greatly of late, but the military and their jingoistic adherents still have the position well in hand. An admission by America and Britain that the Japanese people, as a mass, have a right to live, and some relaxation of what seems to the Japan ese a determination to destroy them, might lead to a negotiated peace between Japan and China and would solve many problems.

And a negotiated peace must come sometime. For it is as obvious as that total victory for Japan is impossible, that anything of the sort is likewise

impossible for China —unless the United States makes a military alliance with her.

The argument that a negotiated peace would leave Japan free for southward adventures of a dangerous character has less weight than appears, inasmuch as no negotiated peace would be possible without America’s consent, and Amer ica’s persuasion of China to it, ahd neither could happen unless Japanese assurances of abandonment of any undertakings south of Saigon were given.

Exploitation of Indo-China’s resources would aid largely in rehabilitating Japanese internal economy, and resump tion of full trade relations with Britain and America would complete that reha bilitation.