Discontent And Hopelessness

In Mandated Territory

Urgent Need for Revision of Native Labour and Commercial and Mining Conditions and for New Statement of Policy :: The Evils of "Canberra Control"

By R. W. Robson

RABAUL, August 20.

FROM one end of the Territory of New Guinea to the other, within a crowded ten days, I found grumbling and discontent. I heard the Administration charged with every offence from calculated procrastination to matricide, and I have been

presented with 304 different recipes for bringing prosperity back to New Guinea —304 being approximately the number of persons with whom I dis cussed Territory affairs.

After all this, it would be simple and easy to solve all these feverish problems by hanging Walter Ramsay McNicoll to a sour journalistic tree.

I am no apologist for W.R.M., and— since he came to the Territory with out any discernible right or title to the Administratorship—he can be held blameworthy for much; but it must be said, in all fairness, that most of the Territory’s present curses should be directed at Canberra rather than Namanula.

Canberra drove out the only Ad ministrator whom the whole Territory respected and acclaimed—namely, General Griffiths—and Canberra has created no bed of roses for the well meaning but inexperienced Sir Walter McNicoll.

Here are set out what, in my opinion, are the causes of the present unhappiness in the Mandated Terri

tory, and I thihk that this is the order of their importance:— The complete and lamentable failure of the Administrator and the Commonwealth Government to formulate any policy, either consistent or comprehensible, for the government of the Mandated Territory.

The weakness of the Adminis trator in permitting “Canberra office-boy control”, so that the decisions of the Administrator and his advisers are frequently over-ridden by petty officials and ignorant politicians in Australia— little being done, nowadays, with out reference to Canberra—and the Rabaul Administration con sequently is not held in respect by New Guinea residents.

The depression in the copra industry—revealing the failure of the Administration, during the past twenty years, to introduce other forms of agricultural enter prise, so that the planters, in a time like this, are left with all their eggs in one basket; and the Treasury has to depend largely upon the fortuitous gold industry.

The failure of the Administra tion to provide new opportunities and encouragement for the “small men” among the gold miners, so that the industry now is mostly in the hands of the big

companies, while the "small men”, whose individual enterprise and initiative have done and could do so much for the Territory, are frozen out.

At the end of this article I shall set out the kind of policy which I believe is urgently necessary if the New Guinea Administration is to be anything other than an expensive muddle. But the formulation of a real policy is not easy—there is so much dead wood to be cleared away.

Some Anomalies.

CONDITIONS in the Territory are a mass of maddening contradic tions.

Judged on personnel, here probably is the finest administrative service in the Pacific—keen and capable young Australians, clean-cut, healthy lads who are ready to go anywhere and do anything. Yet, judging by what is being accomplished, and by what appears to be the feeble and un certain purposes of the Administra tion, this is a partly useless and de finitely expensive service, top-heavy and over-staffed.

Here is a country so rich that it brings water into the mouths of every international scout that happens along—a great expanse of fertile land and the widest range of climate. This country, like Java, could carry mil lions of little peasant-producers. As it is, after 20 years of Australian rule, and, although the Administration re ceives £lOO,OOO per annum alone out of gold-royalties, there is very little real development outside the gold fields, and the Administration to-day cannot make financial ends meet.

The Big Companies.

WITHIN the Territory there are operating half a dozen rich and powerful companies, controlling mer chandising, transport, planting and mining. Their dominating purpose, of course, is profit-making. This is no new phenomenon. But in other new countries, during the last two centuries, wise Governments usually saw to it that the enterprise and driving-force of profit-making com panies were not only controlled but were woven in with governmental programmes of development and pro gress. Shrewd and capable men usually direct these New Guinea com panies, and are quite ready to give their services also to the Government.

But in New Guinea one cannot find any real co-operation between Ad ministration and companies, in the fundamental job of governing New Guinea so that it will become in creasingly a bulwark of Australia. In stead, they face each other like duel lists; they are very courteous and sweet to each other, but neither trusts the other for one moment. The re sult is that the hard-boiled, non cfficial residents of the Territory, almost without exception, snarl and sneer whenever the name of a big company is mentioned. The casual visitor goes away with the impression that pirates of the baser sort still operate in this part of the Pacific.

Which is funny enough, but not a very good thing. People of all des criptions are always drifting through here, and few look far enough under the surface to see that most of the progress and development here in the last twenty years is due directly to the operations of the big firms, and very little to the Administration.

Of course, I know the Administra tion’s petulant answer to all this:— "Have we not provided the com panies with all the facilities and pro tection they ask for? Have we not made the way very easy for them?”

And I can answer, in chorus with Territory residents, "Too right, you have!”

My point is that the Administration has failed to use the activity and energy of the companies for the per manent development and advance ment of the Territory, just as it has failed to use the providential revenues of the ephemeral gold industry for the permanent establishment of new agricultural industries.

One could go on quite a way, enumerating these contradictions.

But it can be all summed up in a sentence. In New Guinea, Australia has all the personnel, and all the material, and all the money necessary for the establishment of a flourishing tropical Empire, but because she lacks leadership and any kind of policy, conditions are static, and she is just fumbling about.

Whither?

WHAT are you trying to do here?”

I asked the question of depart mental heads, directors of commerce, field officers, miners, members of the Legislative Council. And the usual pious answer was “God knows!”

One capable and earnest man, who takes seriously his job as head of an important department, told me about the Mandate. “We do not hold this as an Australian territory, to be de veloped for the benefit of Australia” he said. “We hold it in trust for the natives, and our main responsibility is to train the natives so that they may be able to govern their country for themselves.”

I sneered, as behoves one who be lieves neither in the Versailles Treaty nor the League of Nations. “And how many hundreds of years is it going to take to train them to govern themselves and to protect their coun try against Asia?” I asked.

“Well,” he said. “There’s the Man date.”

“And there are the Japanese” I said.

He looked glumly out of his win dow. A Japanese training-ship of some sort was visiting the port, and the avenue, outside, was sprinkled o’er with parties of little yellow men, complete with smiles and cameras.

Politicians like Mr. W. M. Hughes —written down a “statesman” be cause of his aptitude in finding the right word, but as an administrator one of the most futile fumblers Australia ever has placed in a posi tion of responsibility—like to quack about “the Australian record in New Guinea”, and they quote figures from the annual report. They love to show that, when Germany surrendered the Territory, the white population, and the trade turn-over, and the natives under control, were one-tenth or one twentieth of what they are to-day.

And the fool public, and the fool

newspapers which instruct the fool public, insist that figures cannot lie.

But the facts are that all the new population, and most of the new trade are the direct result of the establishment of the gold industry. If those original tough prospectors had not fought their way into the Morobe mountains, and if British and Ameri can companies had not found un limited capital and technical genius wherewith to develop the gold dis coveries, the condition of New Guinea to-day would have been wretched and lamentable.

The Administration and Mr.

Hughes—cannot see that this for tuitous and ephemeral gold industry has no permanent value to New Guinea, unless it is used to establish new settlement and agricultural in dustries.

The rich gold revenues (royalties, license fees, a huge total of Customs duties collected off machinery, equip ment and supplies) have allowed the New Guinea public service to be doubled and trebled. And to what end? Control has been extended over considerable areas hitherto uncon trolled; Administrative machinery has been placed on the goldfield; a few roads and wharves have been

built, and a few navigation lights in stalled. The balance of the Adminis tration’s achievements comes mostly under the heading of providing equip -

merit and the amenities of life for the constantly expanding administrative service. Years of time and incrediblc sums of money have been frittered away. The manner in which both revenue and accumulated surplus have disappeared is now one of the main topics of conversation, here, HY are there no new agricultural industries? There is a Depart-

ment of Agriculture, staffed by eager, competent men, who ought to be assisting and guiding new planting enterprises. But there is little new planting. Of all the returned soldiers who were placed on the expropriated plantations in 1920-21 by the in effable Mr. Hughes, few are indepen dent. Most remain hopelessly in debt, and In many cases the plan tations are deteriorating. New plan

ters, who have come into the Terri tory and established plantations, could be counted on the fingers. Why keep these agricultural experts on the Administration staff, when there is no new land being made available, and no new planters?

There are two forestry officers in the service, and there is much tim ber, and very numerous inquiries by timber-interests from as far distant as America; but when I asked what the forestry officers were doing I was told, vaguely, “Oh, just making sur veys and calculations”.

There is an exceedingly well equipped and active Public Works De partment; and, heaven knows, this country needs roads and bridges. But, under the new financial stress, its operations almost certainly will be curtailed. It and the Lands Depart ment have been using up their energy, and large sums of money in trying to give practical effect to the plans enunciated by the impetuous Mr. Hughes, over a year ago.

THE Administration is supposed primarily to be caring for, and educating and training the natives.

Actually, its achievements under this head make a most miserable showing.

Except for a few village schools—the recent joint offspring of the Mala guna training school and of the Nodup school, conducted by the en thusiastic and self-sacrificing J. H.

L. Waterhouse—the Administration has left education mainly to the Missions. Each Mission has its own system, probably good in itself—but there is no co-ordinating authority, and not a sign of a central, domin ating purpose.

I asked a Mission teacher: “What are you educating these natives for?”

He looked vague, and a little startled, and then he said, “For the glory of God”—which was Mission like and proper.

There are quite a lot of medical officers in the Territory now, and a couple of dozen “medical assistants”, indefatigably attending to whatever native sicknesses come under their notice—the whole system being like an old woman attacking a locust swarm with a fly-spray. There must be nearly a million natives, mostly re quiring medical attention.

I could not find anywhere any evi dence of a co-ordinated native health policy. The Administration does a bit, and the Missions do a good deal more, and the employers, for their own sakes, keep their labourers clean and healthy; and the rest just lies on the knees of the age-old gods. As a matter of fact, the labour-recruiting system, bad though it may be in principle, probably does more than any other agency in cleansing the natives of the many disease due to dirt and lack of sanitation.

The magnificient work being done by the Suva Medical School, in train ing native medical practitioners, is ignored, and apparently unknown, in New Guinea.

The Native Labour System.

lASKED myself, finally: “What is this elaborate and expensive Administration really doing for the natives of New Guinea?” And I had to answer: “Mainly, providing over 40,000 indentured labourers for the gold, plantation and transport indus tries, and keeping check over them”.

There, probably, is the crux of this New Guinea problem—the native labour system.

The Territory needs about 40,000 native labourers —about half for the gold and associated industries. So large a proportion of the natives live under entirely primitive conditions that the provision of 40,000 men for the labour lines not only disturbs, but in many cases completely dislocates, the balance of native social and economic life. The Administration — very properly—is worried about it. To protect native life and institutions, it is closing considerable areas against recruiting, and insisting that time expired labourers be repatriated, al though the labourers themselves are quite willing to re-sign for another three years.

Far-reaching troubles can be traced back to the new mining industry’s insistent demand for 12,000 or 15,000 labourers.

The Administration, honest but nervous and fumbling, is trying to do its best for the natives. The em ployers are cursing, because they can not get enough labourers, even at the heavy recruiting cost of £lO per head.

They blame the Administration and howl to Canberra. Canberra nags at the Administrator, and it is pointed out that the country cannot be deve loped by private enterprise if the em ployers cannot get sufficient cheap labour. The Administration then plays its trump card—its obligations to the natives, under the Mandate.

Nevertheless, it tries to obey Can berra and please the employers.

And so they chase each other’s tails around, in a vicious circle, and get in each other’s way.

Under the drive of these circum stances, the main relationship be> tween the Administration and the natives has become one in which the Administration is practically com pelled to provide machinery for in denturing 40,000 natives, and for policing the system. At the risk of giving offence to powerful interests, I say that that system is fundamen tally wrong, and (anomalous as it may seem) it is the chief cause of the paralysis 6f administrative and developmental progress in New Guinea. The Administration is kept so busy looking after the indentured labourers, required by private enter prise, that it has little time for the education and training of the natives generally, and no time for the pro per encouragement, control and dir ection of private enterprise in the development of the country.

Territory Pessimism.

THIS absence of a policy, and of clear-cut leadership, is having a demoralising effect.

Never, in any tropical country, have I found such pessimism as exists among the non-official Europeans in the Mandated Territory—and I do not forget that Australians are notorious grumblers and non-co operators.

The few free planters are depressed because the price of copra is low, and they have had no real assistance and encouragement in growing alternative crops. The bound planters have reached a condition of “don’t care”— they see no hope of ever getting rid of their debts to the Expropriation Board and the big firms, and so they just carry on grimly, without any confidence in anything. The small traders have reason enough for gloom —they are fighting a losing battle against the Chinese, into whose hands all the small storekeeping business is passing.

Plight Of The Small Miner.

A VOLUME could be written about the lamentable condition of the

small miner—that dogged, tough in dividualist who found and opened the Morobe goldfield.

Ten years ago, there were hundreds of “little men” scattered all over the Morobe valleys, bending a primitive and inhospitable country to their gold-seeking purpose, and so taming it for the white settlers to follow— after the manner of California and Australia, New Zealand and the Transvaal. To-day, few of them are left. Nearly all the gold-bearing flats and valleys and hillsides along the Bulolo, from Wau right down to the Markham, now are held by big com panies, who operate with mills and sluices and treatment plants.

Of every “little man” I have met, in recent years, I have asked this question: “If you had an open go on company land, do you know of any place that you could peg out and turn into good money?” And, in prac tically every case, the answer was en thusiastically and blasphemously in the affirmative.

But, although they were certain that they could go immediately on to good gold, in not one case would they even indicate its locality—they all hope that some day, somehow, it will be possible for them to go back and work that undisclosed patch that is rich enough for the little man, but not rich enough for a tribute. I gathered that they would cut out their tongues before they would tell the companies where these rich patches are.

Many times, in the past, in this journal, New Guinea Goldfields, Ltd. have been described as the black beast which sits upon the neck of Wau and chokes the future out of the Morobe gold-mining industry. For

many years that stupid, blundering, mismanaged and monopolistic con cern squatted upon nearly all the gold-bearing country around Wau. kept out the little men and muddled about with the richer leases. It was one of the worst exhibitions in the checkered history of gold-mining.

And the New Guinea Administration, listening to the yappings of the titled gentlemen who controlled the con cern from the distant London board room, permitted the company to squat indefinitely on country that should have been worked for the benefit of the little men and the glory of the New Guinea Treasury. The principal muddlers now are elimin ated, and more practical men are shaping the operations of New Guinea Goldfields, Ltd., so that big-scale mining is going on in five places and tributers are being given a chance; but N.G.G. still are the bete noir of Morobe.

If the grip of the company could be removed from the lands which now it merely squats on and does not use, there would be pitofitable working places for hundreds of little men all along those flats and hillsides, from Wau Creek right down to the Bulolo power house; and the town of Wau, instead of being merely the home of a few hundred pessimistic employees of companies, would be a centre of perhaps a couple of thousand Euro peans.

New Guinea Goldfields, Ltd. is the chief sinner; but Bulolo Gold Dredg ing, Ltd.—whose extraordinary suc cess literally has put New Guinea upon the map—does not escape criticism. The little men declare that there is much rich ground around the edges of the Bulolo flats, which the dredges cannot reach, and which either should be worked, or opened up under reasonable conditions to the little men.

Despite the choking grip of the big companies, a few “small shows” are operated along the Bulolo, especially in the Gorge. Here and there, “little men” are at work in the creeks, with half a dozen boys and a box—mostly on tribute. H. T. Allen is one of the lucky ones—he has a five-years lease, and a good head of water, and he is sluicing a fortune out of blue wash, just north of Wau. In the Gorge, in addition to the valuable property owned by Mrs. Doris Booth, I noted areas being worked (mostly sluiced) by Tex Thomas, Charles Blake and Bob Day, Norman Neale, Fred (“Yukon”) Smith, and Lee and Sid Ashton. There are other “small shows” over in the Black Cat gorges -—despite terrific transport costs.

These are not “little men”—they could not get their water-races and sluicing equipment into position with out substantial capital. It is foul country—mostly perpendicular, and sliding on its bottom—and they have been washed out by floods a couple of times; yet it is so rich that, if only they are permitted a few months of uninterrupted work, they will make fortunes.

But—and note this, Rabaul and Canberra!—these men mostly are on tribute; and it is well known that if they get on to a really rich patch, and disclose good gold, the tributing company immediately kicks them out, so that it may work the ground for itself.

This limited activity by “little men” and “small shows”, in spite of handi caps like tributing charge and enor mous transport costs, indicates what would happen if there were cheaper transport and freer access to the un used, gold-bearing land.

From the national viewpoint, it is monstrously wrong that rich country should be merely squatted upon by companies, and not used; whereas, if Governments did their duty, hun dreds of European individualists, in stead of a limited number of com pany employees, could make a good living and rear their families in this comparatively pleasant climate. This beautiful Bulolo Valley could become the home of a large European popu lation; and, from such a centre, pul sating waves of colonising energy would flow out over this undeveloped and almost unknown land of New Guinea —described recently as “a second Kenya”.

That is the position that might be.

The position that actually exists is that the Morobe goldfield now is worked by two large companies, three or four small ones and a dwindling corps of individual miners, and the Morobe population comprises mostly the employees of companies, who have little interest in the country, and literally count the days from one leave to the next. The field is producing gold worth over £2,000,000 (Australian) per annum; but, as p centre of pioneering energy, it has deteriorated in a very tragic manner, compared with what it was ten years ago.

The Kind of Policy Needed

in New Guinea

WHAT should Australia do with New Guinea? Here is an out line of policy that is guided by the errors of the past, takes cognisance of the present confusion and discon tent, and seeks to envisage both the domestic and international necessi ties of the future.

Australia’s future occupation of New Guinea is based upon cer tain fundamental considerations, as follow: The country must be held by Australia, because its possession is vital to Aus tralian safety.

The protection of the natives, and their adaptation to a Europeanised world, must be the first responsibility of the occupier.

Australia’s occupation of this vast, rich country cannot be justified unless there is an organised and intelligent effort to make use of the country’s economic resources.

Development can be secured only by encouraging private enterprise, and by training and assisting the natives to make greater use of their country’s re sources.

Developmental activities require money.

Australia has not, and is not likely to have, any money to spare for this pur pose. In actual fact, through the provi dential discovery of gold. New Guinea has ample resources of her own, for the development of the country—provided always that there is reasonable economy in administration.

The administration and development of New Guinea is a job for trained men —for experts, who should be selected with great care, and then given plenary powers.

Based on these fundamental con

siderations, the policy to be followed

by Australia in the Administration of New Guinea should be somewhat as follows;

Constitutional.

The world has changed since the Mandate was given, so let the Man date be interpreted as Japan has interpreted her Mandate over the Caroline and Marshall Islands— namely, that the possession of this country is vital to Australian defence.

If this is incompatible with Aus tralia’s obligations to the moribund establishment in Geneva, let the Mandate be revised.

Administrative.

The Administrator to be a man trained in tropical administration, and his appointment to be freed en tirely from political influences. He should be given practically the authority of a dictator, within the limits of a carefully formulated policy, but would be expected to con sult regularly with his Executive Council (consisting of his senior de partmental heads and one or two non-ofßcial residents). He should be directly responsible for the efficient administration and proper develop ment of the Territory, and his ap pointment might be subject to re view, in special circumstances, by some competent, non-political auth ority. (This would remove the factor which constantly has disturbed the Territory’s political and economic balance and partly has demoralised the Territory’s senior officials— namely, control of the Administrator by Canberra officials, and persistent, frequent and irresponsible inter ference in Territory affairs by un respected politicians. Nominally, the Administrator is responsible only to the Prime Minister of Australia; actually, the latter invariably dele gates “charge of the Pacific Terri tories” to an inconspicuous Assistant Minister, who usually is so ignorant of the Territories that he can be influenced and directed by bureau cratic officials, self-seeking politicians and cunning lobbyists. It is, for ex ample, a notorious fact that prac tically every big concern operating in New Guinea and Papua has at least one “tamed politician” in or near Canberra, who will go arguing or protesting or whispering to the Assistant Minister and attendant officials whenever his firm’s interests are affected by some turn of affairs in the Territories.

Conditions in New Guinea can not be satisfactory until the Ad ministrator really is the Adminis trator, and has the authority, as well as the personal strength and courage, to tell the Canberra officials and politicians, and the commercial ear-biters and the local gentlemen who threaten to howl their grievances in the South, to go and jump in the sea.)

Administrative Service.

This should be built around an organisation of first-class, well trained, highly-paid men—but the whole service should be planned with a closer regard for financial limi tations than is now the case. At present, the service is in danger of breaking down under th’e financial weight of too many unimportant people, who enjoy all the expensive privileges of tropical employees. Un important and routine clerical and

similar duties could be performed by trained Chinese, half-castes and local Europeans, under a local instead of a special Australian contract of service.

Reform in this direction will be very difficult, however—the service has been staffed up lavishly with a com petent and deserving class of people, and it could be reduced only slowly, if injustice and hardship are to be avoided.

Natives And Native Labour.

The training, education and medi cal care of the natives should be the first responsibility of the Adminis tration.

Inevitably, one way or another, these primitive natives will be “civi lised”. Is the process to be hap hazard, as at present, or according to a defined plan? Are the natives to be trained for a particular pur pose, or merely to be “brought under control”, so that they may provide a huge labour supply for private enter prise?

At present, by far the biggest fac tor in training and “Europeanising” the natives, and providing them with a medical clean-up, is the indentured labour system, under which at least 40,000 men—mostly young primitives —are kept under fairly strict labour discipline, with no end in view other than the exploitation of their labour.

By comparison of influence, the num ber of children being trained in the schools is insignificant. Not even the most ardent commercialist will argue that that is a good system.

If there is to be a wider education system, what will be the purpose of the education and training? There can be only one—namely, to train these people to become producers on their own lands. Fifty thousand native peasants, growing their own food and producing sufficient of marketable commodities to permit them to buy the European goods to which they will have become accus tomed, would give New Guinea a far greater economic importance than all the European planters who might be induced to settle in the Territory.

But the establishment of ALL the natives in New Guinea as peasant farmers would still leave plenty of room for as many white planters as might wish to enter. Fifty thousand native peasant farmers would create immensely wider opportunities for traders, manufacturers, artisans, etc.

There should be no interference with any natural flow of New Guinea native labour to the native labour market; but all semblance of forced labour should cease, and the energies of the Administration should be diverted to the task of training the natives to become peasant farmers.

If the inevitable, growing demand for labour cannot be supplied normally by the Territory, it should be met by bringing in Asiatic labour, under a strict system of indenture and re patriation.

Economic Development Of

Territory.

The Administration’s second im portant responsibility should be the economic development of New Guinea, by the encouragement of private enterprise generally, and of Australian enterprise in particular.

Companies should be encouraged to invest in the Territory; but this does not mean that the present system (probably not .deliberate) of discour aging small individual enterprises should continue.. On the contrary, the individual should be protected against the companies—as, for ex ample, in Wau, where at present a large company has squatted for years upon big areas of gold-bearing lands, while individual miners—whose en terprise and industry are among the Territory’s greatest assets—are drift ing away. It should be the obligation of the Administration to provide ade quate labour—by importing contract labour from India or China, if neces sary, subject to repatriation guaran tees. (Continued Overleaf)

The Administration should accept, under this heading, the obligation to provide cheap transport—probably the Territory’s most vital necessity to-day.

Co-Operation With Big

Companies.

The Administration should expect and receive the co-operation of the big trading, mining, transport and

planting companies, as well as of the Mission organisations. Because the big companies necessarily are directed by clever, shrewd men, who play their own hands grimly and tenaciously, it is assumed that usually they are anti-Administration. Actually, in practically every instance, they are men of wide vision and strong patriotism: and if the Administrator were strong and courageous enough

to take them frequently into con sultation, and able enough to advance and advocate the national interest when it ran counter to sectional com mercial interests, he would receive help of almost incalculable value.