Why U.S.A. Might Seek Possession of French Oceania

French Oceania

'THE suggestion—made by an American publicist in Hawaii, and referred to elsewhere in this issue that French Oceania (Tahiti, Paumotus, Marquesas, etc.) should be purchased from France by the United States, is worthy of dis cussion and serious consideration.

French Oceania is a rich and beautiful territory, comparable in some ways with Hawaii. It has a similar climate and vegetation, and the same type of indi genous people. But, whereas Hawaii has been commercially “developed,” both com mercially and as a popular resort for tourists, a great part of French Oceania remains much as it was a century ago.

People who dislike the tempo of modern life, and thankfully hide themselves away in the quiet, beautiful, pleasant islands of Eastern Polynesia, will protest most violently against the idea of French Oceania being “Americanised.” We con fess that our sympathies wholly are with them. But, unfortunately, there are other considerations.

For 150 years, ever since the Europeans came, the Pacific has justified its name, and has been an ocean of peace. At first, the so-called civilised nations committed foul crimes against the peoples of the

Pacific Islands; but, in the last half century or so, the Powers very conscien tiously have done their utmost to protect and help the indigenous races, and their administrative record generally is credi table.

But, now, the political position and outlook in the Pacific are changing. The power, the imperative needs and the designs of Japan cannot be ignored. The conviction is growing upon the Japanese nation that they must have large and additional colonies in the Pacific. Britain and the United States are awake to that situation, and all its implications. It would not matter very much if Japan sought merely tropical islands; but the ceaseless, outwards thrust of Japan menaces not only the safety of Australia, New Zealand and Fiji, which concerns Britain, but also the future of Hawaii and of Central and South America, which vitally concerns the United States. It is idle to suppose that an unchecked Japan would not soon reach out to the temper ate lands of the south and the east. The United States, as the guardian of the Monro Doctrine, will not permit any in terference with the Central and South American States. Furthermore, although

US.A. has given independence to the Philippines, it still remains as the pro tector of that large territory; and the Philippines would be the first Pacific lands to be affected by any move by Japan towards territorial expansion.

Apart from the Philippines, the Ameri cans hold Hawaii, and the small but strategically important islands of Guam and Eastern Samoa. The Americans dis claim, and always have disclaimed, any colonising urge. But a first principle of their foreign policy is the maintenance of the status quo in all matters relating to North and South America. It is ap parent that the Americans, in pursuance of this policy, will fight rather than ac cept any vital political changes in the Pacific. Thus, American possession of Pacific outposts like Guam, Hawaii, and Eastern Samoa is regarded as of first class importance.

It is in relation to this policy that the suggestion, that French Oceania be trans ferred from France to the United States, should be considered. The Americans, in their self-imposed task of defending the Americas, must face Asia; and, so long as they are in that position, the posses sion of French Oceania would enormously strengthen their southern flank, and help to protect the vital Panama Canal. At present, except for the small naval station at Pago, they must depend to some extent for the protection of their

southern flank upon Britain and France.

In considering possibilities in the Pacific, we do not know where France stands. It is assumed that France, hold ing Cochin China, New Caledonia, and French Oceania, would naturally ally herself with Britain and U.S.A. in resist ing any move by Japan to seize new territory. But that is not certain. In any event, the French maintain no fleet and no naval base worthy of mention, in the Pacific. Their two colonies in the Pacific are not of sufficient importance to justify much expenditure on defence.

The possession of Tahiti is of little stra tegic importance and of minor economic value to Prance; but it would be of the utmost value to United States.

Commercial interests in Tahiti prob ably will discuss this matter very keenly.

At present, under French rule, they are dependent for transport wholly upon the

Messageries Maritimes line of steamers, and upon calls by the Union Co.’s trans pacific freighters. The result is that the tourist traffic, never very robust, is now almost negligible. It is certain that, under American administration, Tahiti would be linked closely with the United States, and probably with Australia, by first-class steamers—and perhaps by air liners —and the tourist traffic would be vigorously encouraged. French Oceania, in an economic sense, almost certainly would flourish exceedingly. But the charm of Eastern Polynesia, the unique attrac tiveness of Tahiti, would disappear—just as it has disappeared from Hawaii, and is disappearing from other groups which are in process of “development.”

The French are very jealous of their territorial possessions, and they will not like this plan at all. The Hawaiian writer, in advancing it, has suggested that American administration, per se, would be better than French administra tion. That is not a fair suggestion.

Except for the Marquesas (where a large and fertile group, capable of carrying a large population, is now almost unin habited) the administration of France in Eastern Polynesia is creditable, and the manner in which the natives have been protected and assisted is praiseworthy.

The point is that the control of French Oceania probably would be of great strategic value to U.S.A.; and the shrewd statesmen of France probably will see that point very clearly.

The method whereby it is suggested that U.S.A. should pay for French Oceania —by cancelling a portion of France’s war-debt to U.S.A. —will not be received enthusiastically by France. It might have some force if France were embarrassed by the debt. But no one apparently intends to pay war debts to America, anyhow.