Effect Of Canberra Control

In New Guinea

'T'HERE is a growing feeling that

Australia is not efficiently discharg-

ing her responsibility for the adminis-

tration ot me Mandated territory of

New Guinea. There is discontent,

more or less outspoken, in connection

with the following matters :

(a) The Administration appears to have no set oolicv for controlling rHrootino- an d stimulating the development of the Territory’s enormously rich resources. (b) it is difficult to discern any connected and intelligent policy for connatives—in tion is giving the native people little if y h wtte n rn“fat?o e n 3 TM S deficiency is especially noticeable in connection with the education of native children—the Administrations shortcomings in this direction are outspokenly condemned in D n ecembe C i e 2. in the Sydney Bulletin of (O There appears to be something wrong with the administration of justice.

Excessive jury less Supreme Court in New Guinea.

Another and more serious aspect is the

apparent failure of the Department of PeMy ° rime amons <a) There seems to be no policy under which medical work is controlled and directed, other Territories have sue-

SlSo„°e™d

Papuans, Solomon islanders and other a ? e - d *° lr l? go £ d ™, ork ’ 1 he New Guinea Administration has done ? othing ’ beyond imparting a little medical Tefrit° natlVe hospital assistants in e erri ° ry ' A recent development—a meeting of European residents of Rabaul to pro

test against dangerous conditions

among; natives in that area-was given scare-headings m the Sydney news papers on December 3. The headings c j •

u V^^y e Mornmg

H . erald CnmeS by NativeS mst Women mid Children a, U? m ew Guinea ; those in the m “* abaul Native 1 ienace Meeting Deplores Crimes

Against European Women—Alleged

Growing Lack of Discipline.” Criticism of conditions in New Guinea has rattled in vain, for a long time past, against the deadwood in Canberra; hut even Canberra, we imagine, will he compelled to take notice of that kind of agitation.

In an economic sense, New Guinea has had extraordinary luck. The ad ministrative deficiencies to which we refer existed in New Guinea in the period prior to 1930; but New Guinea received so high a price for its pro ducts, especially copra, that it was able to show a reasonably good financial condition from year to year, and so Canberra closed its ears against vari ous attacks. Then came the Depres sion; and Pacific Territories which were entirely dependent on copra found themselves in desperate finan cial straits. But, in the meantime, a gold industry had been established in New Guinea, and the N.G. Adminis tration received so substantial a revenue from gold royalties and from , import duties which it imposed upon the huge and expensive equipment re quired for goldmining and transport,

that it escaped serious embarrassment.

If it had not been for the courage and enterprise of British, Australian, and American investors in establishing the gold industry in the face of colossal natural difficulties, the New Guinea Administration would have been in a serious condition between 1930 and 1935—and probably, as a consequence, it would have been brought under the analytical examination that is so long overdue.

The Administration’s failure to use its considerable revenues to stimulate the development of the Territory’s rich natural resources, is conspicuous.

It maintains a large and apparently

efficient Department of Agriculture:

but that valuable organisation has not been used noticeably in extending the

planting industry. The experimental

plantations at Wau and Lae have been closed up. There has been agricultural and pastoral activity of a remarkable character in the Bulolo Valley, near Wau; but experiments there have been carried out at their own expense by Mr. Wilde, Mr. Barker, and others, and not by the Administration. Years ago—about 1931—expert advice was obtained about copra grading; the planters were assembled and consulted; far-reaching amendments of the Copra Ordinance were formulated and agreed to —and nothing further was done.

The same old Copra Ordinance is in existence to-day —and N.G. producers of high-grade copra continue to receive a price which is from £1 to £2 per ton less than what it ought to be. At this moment, as an article in this issue shows, the planters of N.G. are up in arms against the present Administra tor’s proposal to wipe out the zone trading system, which was introduced some three years ago, after very care ful inquiry, as a policy designed to remove certain difficulties surrounding native trading, and to encourage agri

cultural development.

In our opinion, the trouble in New Guinea does not lie in the rank and file of the Public Service. One of the best things about the N.G. adminis trative system is the method of select ing young men for appointment to the service. The result is seen in the rank and file of officialdom, which in educa tion, personality, and efficiency, will compare very favourably with any other tropical administration in the world.

The trouble lies in sheer fatheadedness, and lack of vision and imagination, among the departmental chiefs in the Territory; and this administrative dis ability is aggravated and made worse by

a similar fatheadedness and lack of vision in Canberra. Departmental heads in New Guinea seem to be incapable either of formulating policies, or of standing consistently by policies when they are inaugurated. rj ,, . r i » j . • The capacity of the Administrator, of course, matters a great deal When Bngadier-General Thomas Griffiths was appointed m 1932, Australia was given an opportunity in New Guinea ef establishing a regime that would have reflected great credit upon the Commonwealth in the realm of tropical administration. General Griffiths, within a remarkably short time, introduced policies in New Guinea which provided for the proper economic development of the Territory, and especially for influencing and controlling the native population during that critical period of change from primitive barbarism to European methods of life. General Griffiths showed vision and wisdom in seeking the help of the best elements among the planters and missionaries; and, literally within a few months, he had secured their genuine co-operation.

But, within two years, this experi- , , enced and capable Administrator was dnven out of New Guinea by the stupidity and incapacity of departmentalism at Canberra. He resigned and, like a good soldier, he uttered not one word of complaint or explanation. No

one has heard from his lips any ex planation of why he abandoned the task which he had taken up with so much enthusiasm in New Guinea. But it soon became clear, through infor mation derived from other reliable sources, that General Griffiths could not endure a system under which prac tically every decision of his was sub ject to “office-boy review” in Canberra.

Of the present Administrator, Bri gadier-General W. R. McNicoll, little can be said. He has been there only two years and he has been confronted with a task of great difficulty— especially as he was without experience in any phase of tropical administration.

It is possible that his hands, also, are being tied by Canberra interference.

All that has happened in the last year or two suggests that the Rabaul bureaucrats are again in charge of New Guinea affairs, and the result cannot be other than bad. Some of the reforms and new policies introduced by General Griffiths—especially in connection with native education and native affairs — have been swept away.

Some people believe that within six months the Commonwealth Govern ment will appoint the usual fatuous and useless Royal Commission to investi gate affairs in New Guinea. Thus, in competent officialdom will escape its responsibility for a year or so, while in the meantime the administrative

(Continued At Foot Of Next Column)

conditions in the Mandated Territory will just drift on.

It is deplorable that there should be troubles of this description in New Guinea and Western Samoa, which are both administered under mandate by British Dominions. The present troubles are due directly, in each case, to democracy’s curse—namely control of administrations by muddling and in experienced politicians. “Office-boy interference” in Canberra drove out the only Administrator who seemed likely to make an outstanding success of New Guinea; while the N.Z. “goodwill mis sion’s” attempted application of social istic principles in Samoa has started a glorious political row in that territory.

This muddling will go on indefinitely —that is the British way. It would be amusing, perhaps, if it were not for the tragic fact that these Administra tive failures under the Mandates sys tem sooner or later will receive pointed attention in foreign countries.