Fiji Franchise and Indian Community

franchise situation in Fiji—the two sides of which are presented very ably in contributed articles in an other part of this journal—probably is unique in the history of the British Empire.

The Colonial Sugar Refining Co., bringing in indentured Asiatic la bourers to establish the sugar industry —and there seems to have been no other way, for the well-endowed Fijians will not work—gave Fiji this special problem. All the Indians were not repatriated; sufficient were allowed to settle in Fiji* as peasant farmers and contract growers of sugar-cane, to pro vide a community of a numerical strength practically equal to that of the Fijians. The latest available statistics (1934) show that the population is: Europeans 4,763 Fijians 98,479 Indians 83,289 Later developments gave no surprise

to those who know anything of Indian colonisation. A special franchise was introduced to meet the special condi tions : representatives elected by the Indian community sat on a Legislative Council with similarly elected men from the European and Fijian com munities, and the Governor retained control by appointment (by nomina tion) of official members. This did not suit the majority of Indians, and they began their usual agitation for the “common roll,” in which Indians, Fijians, and Europeans would have equal voting power.

Indians generally—and this cer tainly applies to Fiji Indians—are not competent to exercise administrative control; and that must have been the view taken by the Colonial Office, even if there had been no Fijians in the pic ture. But the presence of the Fijian community made the Indian demand intolerable. It is true that the Indian claims a “common foil” for the Fijian

as well; but anyone with a knowledge of the .two races knows what would happen. The Fijian is just as intelli gent as the Indian; but in the realm

of political intrigue, compared with the

Indian, he is as a child in arms. A Fiji administered under the “common roll” would very soon be an Indian Fiji. The Europeans could take care of themselves, perhaps, but what of the Fijian? Inevitably he would become a sort of slave of the Indian. Such a development would have had serious political reactions far beyond the bor ders of Fiji.

Britain, of course, will not permit anything like that. Fiji was ceded to Britain by the Fijian chiefs, in trust for the Fijians. Britain has given her energies to the commercial develop ment of Fiji, just as she has done in other lands; but the record of British colonial expansion throughout the world shows that the fundamental policy of Britain in all the overseas countries of which she has taken pos session is the protection of the rights of the indigenous natives, and especially

their rights to land. When the natives are of a superior type, like the Poly nesians (with whom we may include the Fijians), Britain has taken her trust very seriously. Maoris, Tongans, Samoans, Cook Islanders, Nauruans— all have been protected against the op pression of the land-grabber. That is Britain’s first responsibility in Fiji.

The rights of the Fijians must be con sidered first; then the interests of the British; while the interests of the late comers, the Indians, come last of all.

The Fijians do not like the Indians; there is practically no racial inter mingling—a surprising thing, consider ing the readiness with which other Asiatics, especially Chinese, mix with the Polynesians. The Fijians have made it very plain to the British that they do not desire a “common roll” with the Indians—they realise what it would mean.

Britain clearly was embarrassed in Fiji because she has an equal trust, and an equal regard, for her Indian subjects. The great majority of Fiji Indians are not of good class —although they are improving with every genera tion born in Fiji—but there are a minority of them who are men of superior intelligence, and who have been loyal to the British Crown and helpful to the Governor, Britain is anxious to retain the goodwill of the Fiji Indians, and especially of some of their leaders. What was she to do to provide for the present problem, and against future embarrassments ?

The course she has taken, which is the withdrawal of the elective system altogether, and the substitution there for of purely nominative Councils for the Legislature and for the municipali ties, was the only one possible in the circumstances. Actually, it will pre serve the status quo, for although the system which has been withdrawn was nominally elective, actually it was under nominative control by the Gov ernor, for the official (non-elective) members, plus those nominated by the Governor, always held the majority.

In the future, the various interests still will have a voice in the Council. If the Governor is wise he will see to it that the men he nominates are thor oughly representative men. If import ant sections of the communities are robbed of representation, there inevit ably will be trouble, and this purely nominative system will break down.

But if the Governor exercises his pre rogatives wisely, the great majority of people in all three communities will

be satisfied, and an extremely awkward problem of administration can be re garded as shelved indefinitely.

Of course, there are always agita tors ; and, in this case, there are also short-visioned gentlemen who bawl about the “rights of democracy.” The former can be ignored, while the latter must be endured. If they cannot see that, in the peculiar circumstances of Fiji, the only possible course has been taken, they are pretty hopeless people, and nothing can be gained by arguing with them. Democratic government is an idealistic condition—one man, one vote, seems to go to the very root of human liberty and justice. But, under the acid test of war, and of economic dislocation, democratic government has been proved unreliable, inefficient, and frightfully expensive; and, almost in variably, countries have saved them selves by placing themselves under the control of a wise and benevolent dic tator. Those Fiji Europeans who are so busy demanding their “rights” should remember those facts, and also should try to see the situation from a standpoint outside of Fiji. There are considerations involved which are far more important than the question of whether the individual European in Fiji should have a vote.