New Guinea’S Opportunity

of the administration in New Guinea declare that, though a spirit of opportunism prevails, there is failure to take advantage of the present favour able conditions to make due provision for the future development of the Terri tory’s enormous natural resources.

The establishment of the gold industry on the Morobe field saved the New Guinea Administration from financial embarrassment during the depression years, in which period practically every other Islands government found it im possible to accommodate its fixed annual expenditure to its dwindling revenue.

But New Guinea, enjoying a steadily increasing revenue from its 5 per cent, royalty on gold produced, has been able to show, nearly every year, a substantial surplus. The accumulated surplus is not what it might be, because much of the funds thus obtained have been used to repay to the Australian Common wealth portion of the considerable loans made to New Guinea during the extrava gant regime of the war and post-war

periods. The figures are something like this:

The figures for 1934 are not available; but it is known that for 9 months, to March 31, 1934, the revenue was £264,739; expenditure, £256,933; and that £15,468 was repaid to Commonwealth. The Customs revenue for the year was not less than £140,000, and the gold royalty well over £60,000.

Incidentally, it is most difficult to examine the finances of this Territory: first, owing to the method of keeping the which are not adequately sum marised anywhere; and, secondly, owing to the exasperating delay in issuing the annual reports. The annual report for the year 1933-34, for instance, is still unavailable. However, the fact that in terests us at the moment is that the

Administration of New Guinea is deriv ing a very large and profitable and in creasing revenue from the gold industry —both directly, by way of royalty, and indirectly, by way of Customs revenue and incidental taxes and fees.

But, while the gold industry has been growing and developing, the remainder of the territory has been in a condition of virtual stagnation. The copra market, for the better part of two years, was unprofitable, or practically so, and the majority of planters have been hanging on “by the skin of their teeth,” and the assistance of the financial and trading institutions. One would have supposed, in these circumstances, that the Adminis tration would have made every effort to encourage and assist the establishment of industries other than coconut produc tion, and which would be based upon the country’s enormously rich natural resources. The Department of Agricul ture appears to have done what it could to encourage planters to cultivate crops as an alternative to coconuts, such as cocoa, coffee, kapok, peanuts, etc.; but the Administration generally has sat with folded hands and thanked God for the gold industry.

1930 £ 1931 £ 1932 £ 1933 £ Import duties .. 117,526 120,233 121,307 134,942 Export duties .. 61,419 48,058 28,079 10,635 Head tax 24,823 22.764 23,270 22,069 Gold Royalty 4,621 6,581 22,731 46,669 Public Service .. 38,305 31,601 43,499 29,988 Survey fees, etc. 43,299 12,616 17,727 30,012 Total Revenue .. 339,642 290,233 306,072 321,917 Total Expdture .. 356,312 293,377 282,404 321,567 Received from Commonwealth 7,000 Repaid to Commonwealth 1,103 1,159 8,218 29,537 Leaving due to Commonwealth 81,899 87,740 79,522 49,984

The first essential thing, in an Administration which seeks to develop a country’s primary industries, is a land policy. One of our correspondents says that the New Guinea land policy is neither intelligent nor vigorous. As a matter of simple fact, the N.G. Administration appears to have no land policy at all. By a land policy is meant a policy of selecting land suitable for European settlement; suggesting industries for which that land is suitable; encouraging people to take up the land and use it for production; and providing suitable transport facilities. All that has been done in this direction by the N.G. Administration in the last ten years could be written on one side of a postage stamp.

There are in New Guinea huge areas of fertile land, at various elevations, completely unoccupied by natives, just as it was in the beginning. It is land capable of producing any kind of tropical product. It is a country of abundant regular rainfall, where there is plenty of timber, plenty of running water, plenty of cheap native labour, and a super abundance of foodstuffs required for the labour lines. Moreover, it is a tax-free country —tax-free, at any rate, in comparison with frightfully overburdened states like Australia and New Zealand.

Medical science has made such strides during the last two decades that many of the terrors of tropical residence have been removed.

It may be said that it is no use encouraging settlement in such a place as New Guinea unless markets are assured —that settlement inevitably will follow the clear-cut and established demand for products upon which such settlement may be based. That is an unsound argument.

World conditions are such to-day that new settlement, based upon primary industries, must have a certain amount of governmental assistance; and New Guinea provides ideal conditions in this connection, because New Guinea has a very profitable gold industry, and much revenue is available therefore for the encouragement of new industries.

Now is the time to make the gold industry of New Guinea of permanent value to the territory. Gold is at an extraordinary value. It appears at present as if it will be maintained so for a considerable time, but there is no guarantee of that. The economic conditions which affect the whole world, and which govern the value of gold, are in a state of daily flux, and may be altered at any time. He is a very optimistic man, indeed, who accepts any favourable

condition arising from the gold industry as a permanent condition. He is a very wise man who seeks to use the present gold position as a means of encouraging and establishing other industries which give some promise of permanency; New Guinea, for some time to come, can expect about £50,000 per annum from gold royalties. That is a gift from the gods, and it would be a shocking thing if it were all frittered away in administration expenses. The administration of the Morobe goldfield, of course, represents an extra tax on the government: but that should be more than provided by the extra Customs revenue. A wise Administration would be indifferent to the demands of the services, and deaf to the blandishments of the Federal Treasurer, and would earmark that £50,000 per annum for the

permanent enrichment —through develop-

ment —of New Guinea.

There appears to be some truth in the criticism, which we frequently have

heard levelled against the N.G. Administration, that it is cursed with “a native complex.” It would seem that the Administration’s unwillingness to in augurate a vigorous policy of land settle ment is due to far too tender a regard for native land rights. It is the accepted axiom of British rule that native land rights shall be protected; but it is absurd and, indeed, ludicrous to argue that there are now, or ever will be, sufficient natives in New Guinea to occupy the unalienated lands. The rights of the natives can be fully guaranteed for a dozen generations or more, to come, while enormous areas of the land still unoccupied can be made available for

European settlement.

It is not necessary to contemplate a policy of permanent alienation of land.

The system under which the Government acts as trustee for the natives, and permits European occupation of the land on long-term leases, works quite satisfactorily in many tropical countries. The ownership of the lands thereby remains with the natives; and, if a position

should develop in the remote future when the native population has so increased that it requires the lands that have been leased, then the natives may resume possession. If that should not be necessary, the steadily increasing value of the lands under the occupation of Europeans is an increasing asset held for the benefit of the natives. The system that is being followed in New Guinea is of no use to the natives, to the Administration, or to anyone else.