New Guinea Uneasy At Swift

Build-Up In The West

From Angus Smales, who was a Press observer in West New Guinea when Indonesia assumed control there on May 1.

Like the cargo-cult gods of New Guinea legend, President Soekarno of Indonesia came out of the west one morning in May to dazzle a primitive land which he had won with bluff, with rabid nationalism, and with a sprinkling of world apathy.

/CLOAKED largely in the technology V, of R uss i a> America, England and Europe he set foot for the first time that morning on the shores which he had dreamed about for 14 years.

His arrival, with its seasoning of spectacular showmanship, was on the harbour-front of Kotabaru (previously Hollandia) in the Province of West Irian (previously the Dutch territory of West New Guinea).

Two days earlier—on May 1— Indonesia had formally assumed ad ministrative control of the territory from an interim United Nations ad ministration.

These two occasions were the big stage props which backgrounded the Indonesian takeover in West New Guinea—the forced ballyhoo marking the actual transfer of authority on May 1, and the more successful psychologically - timed visit which President Soekarno made two days later.

Sudden Change

Today Dutch influence has been savagely sliced from the territory, and all too frequently the interim United Nations influence is remembered by Indonesians merely as an object of derision. Change has come to the land with devastating suddenness.

Four factors, which to a large extent are interwoven, come under focus as a result of the change in West New Guinea. They are: The part which United Nations played; The fate of the West Papuan native population; Indonesia’s future plans and atti tudes; and The effect of events on the adjoin ing Australian-administered Terri tory of Papua-New Guinea.

As to the UN’s part, it is true that the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) in West New Guinea achieved a bril liantly trouble-free changeover. This was achieved at a cost, however.

The cost tended to be a “peace at any price” policy, and an increasingly noticeable trend to meet Indonesian

wishes as the period of temporary ad ministration ended.

UNTEA used the very laudable excuse that in the interests of the people rowdy political meetings or big public expressions of opinion should be avoided. This was true enough, but it tended to shove the West Papuan native into the position where he was almost a non-participant observer in his own land.

As handover day approached, Indo nesia used increasing doses of “little Djakarta” treatment on West New Guinea. Armed patrols sped through the streets with sirens pushing other road-users aside, and contentious posters blossomed on streets and buildings.

Even the UN Commissioner of Police was held back at one stage while an Indonesian military police party screamed through the streets.

Development Activity

Despite Indonesia’s showy military style tactics in West New Guinea, it is open to question whether the or dinary native will be better or worse off in his own land. With funds begged and borrowed, and with an obvious desire to show the world what she can do, Indonesia will ob viously rush into some sort of de velopment activity.

The more sophisticated West Papuan is today either a stooge man for the Indonesians or has gone to live in Holland. In either case, he will face many adjustments but for the immediate future he will be com paratively secure.

The real tragedy lies in the fact that whatever happens in the future, he will never know whether he would have been worse off or better off.

Too many West Papuans obviously have no idea of what the whole affair is about. One even asked innocently after President Soekarno’s visit, “When will the Dutch be back?”

Indonesia’s future plans and atti tudes, insofar as Indonesian state ments are concerned, are very clear cut. Dr. Subandrio, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, in a Press con ference before handover day made the following points: • Fifteen thousand troops would be in West New Guinea by May 3 (they were), but they would be merely for civil patrols and national developmental works. • That Indonesia had no terri torial aims, but in West New Guinea she had merely obtained what was rightfully hers. • That a policy of “great friend ship” would be observed with Australia, particularly in the mutual administration of adjoin ing territories.

To Dr. Subandrio’s statement of policy, Dr. Soekarno made the follow ing remarks in public addresses: • Although Indonesia had no terri torial ambitions, she was ready to free any group of people who were chained to a power they did not like—even to the extent, he said, of “liberating” an Aus tralian State from the Common wealth!

The most dangerous symptom of Indonesian attitudes in West New Guinea lies in her assumption that she has sovereign power there al ready, when in truth she has merely administering power.

Weak Point One of the weak points in the Dutch-lndonesian agreement is that the native people shall make “an act of self-determination” by 1969 to determine their future. There is general belief that such an “act” is a plebiscite, but such belief is not necessarily substantiated by the words of the document.

Indonesia has already started an all-out campaign of “no plebiscite in 1969”. In other words, she con siders her sovereign right in West New Guinea as already accomplished.

This is borne out in the savage cam paign which she has started in re moving Dutch place names and sub stituting Indonesian names.

President Soekarno even held a ceremony in an aircraft in which he re-named mountain peaks over which he was flying. One of the peaks has become Mount Soekarno.

As a result of Indonesia’s actions and policies, Australia is becoming steadily enmeshed in a situation which will be of far-reaching moment.

On the one hand, the Australians of Papua-New Guinea, many Aus tralians in Australia, and a large

section of the Australian Reti Servicemen’s League are expn fears of military and political £ from Indonesia.

Put shortly, they just don’t Indonesia and her military bui in West New Guinea.

On the other hand, the Austi Department of External Affair! pears to be pushing a policy tha fears are ridiculous, and that Indonesians are nice friendly p who will live forever as neighl now that they have achieved they wanted.

Both attitudes are probably tremist ones.

The Indonesian is a showman likes to display his brass anc power and his almost tar nationalism. He uses his arm; any case, for a wide range of are civil duties in other countrie If any real danger exists it in the future attitude to be ad( by the native poeple of the Austr territory, and to a smaller extei the future attitude of the Papuans.

Open Invitation

Foolishly, unthinkingly, purpc or under subversive proddings people could one day concen say that they want a national chs Even if only a small group takes action, it would constitute an invitation to Indonesia to exe her “liberation” policy.

The obvious answer is for tralia and the world to exercise utmost circumspection, realism common sense in the managemei Papua-New Guinea.

If this is done—and the recor far is a good one—then Indo: will have no lever to take fu action; and if she does, then the world would undoubtedly be ag; her.