Commentary

□ nds Products and

e Common Market

[E implications of the Canadian Prime Minister’s plan—that the sh Pacific Islands Territories Id join Australia, Canada and Zealand in a Pacific Common ket, as a counter to Britain’s osed entry into the West Euro- Common Market—are a little ling. itherto, the Islands have not r n much interest in this new ern development. At first glance, d not seem that their chief pro i (copra, sugar, cocoa, coffee, ) would be directly affected, all enjoy world markets, outside British market. But that first e could be deceptive, mmonwealth copra actually en in Britain, a marked advantage the copra of non-British :ries—it is probable that the ntage of non-British copra lly crushed in Britain is very indeed. Copra from Singapore, xample, does not get easily into ands of British crushers because feared that a lot of the Indo i product is sneaked away gh Singapore under British . In other words, British copra i preference.

"re is a definite protection given itain to the sugar produced in ommonwealth; and Fiji gets a mtial benefit there, seems clear that if Britain, try -0 maintain her exports—now :ed precariously in relation to rowing imports—goes into the ion Market, she must open her its to the primary products of r estern Six; and that apparently much less protection there for odstuffs produced in such large ties by Canada, Australia and Zealand. ain. naturally, wants to have each way—she wants to hold :port markets in the Common countries (where British manu ts have preference because 1 gives preference to Common -grown foodstuffs) while still g her old export markets the Western Six. But already Dlition of tariff barriers between ‘stern Six is shutting out British actures; and Britain cannot n there now unless she admits lix’s primary products into

Britain, where of course they will compete sharply with Commonwealth countries’ foodstuffs.

It is as embarrassing a problem as any that have come before the British Government since World War 11.

Three British Ministers are now out across the world examining it— Duncan Sandys in the Pacific, and another in Asia, and another in Africa.

That is why Canada puts up the Pacific Common Market idea—it is planned as a weapon with which to fight the poor old embarrassed Mother Country. The events of the next few weeks, in this matter, will be significant; and the copra and sugar producers, at least, could be caught up in them. ☆ ☆ ☆

A New Home For

The Nauruans

T'HE principle behind Australia’s re — settlement offer to the Nauruans is excellent. Australia has been on the look-out for a suitable island for the Nauruans for years, and since there doesn’t appear to be one available, the invitation to them to migrate to the Australian mainland was about the only solution left.

The Nauruans had already looked at some islands of New Guinea, in cluding Woodlark, Goodenough and Sakar, and some in the Fiji Group (where the former inhabitants of Ocean Island bought themselves an island, Rabi) and, in fact, most occupiable areas of the Pacific, but didn’t like any of it.

The Nauruans are not, in fact, very easy people to please. They have a high level of economic con tentment which, as the UN Visiting Mission of 1959 pointed out, tends to act as a bar to further progress.

They receive royalties from their phosphate lands and have plenty of jobs to go to if they want them, but generally prefer not to exert them selves too much. The 1959 Mission remarked that, with the ex ception of Hawaii and Guam, it had not seen such an advanced standard of living by indigenous people any where as it had seen on Nauru, with its bicycles and cars (quite a few driven by Nauruan women), its cash economy, its European-type houses and its imported foods.

The Nauruan community are not Islanders in the same sense as others in the Pacific, who live by planting or fishing. The Nauruans appear to be designed for such pro fessions as teaching, medicine and law, and the technical trades— which is a very good thing.

In the circumstances (as again that wide-awake 1959 Mission noted) gradual integration of the Nauruans into the metropolitan country of one of the three adminis tering authorities—Australia, New Zealand and Britain—or into any one of their territories where living standards are comparable to those of the Nauruans’, is an excellent solu tion.

But integration means integration.

With its extensive post-war immigra tion experience in introducing almost two million migrants Australia is naturally wary of establishing a single small township of Nauruans on the mainland. It would like to see them integrated with the Austra lian people as quickly as possible.

The difficulty is that the Nauruans might not like to be integrated all in one gulp, and that is a problem that won’t easily be solved.

The scheme also raises the question of Australian immigration policy. Australia has never objected to dark skins as such—the whole matter has been economic, and the fact that Australia had offered to re move the “White Australia” immi gration barriers in this case is proof enough for anyone in doubt.

But, as our Canberra correspon dent points out, once the principle has been established, what of the people of Cocos and Christmas Island?

Our correspondent might well have come nearer home and asked what about the mixed-bloods—the Euronesians—of New Guinea, who can t get Australian naturalisation?

If we let the Nauruans into Aus tralia—as we certainly should—why not the others? i The fact that these questions are going to be asked was no doubt one of the reasons for the secrecy which has surrounded the whole Nauru situation while the pot has been boiling this last year or two. But it still does not excuse those in authori ty for having kept the lid on. Ever since the 1959 Mission to Nauru re ported that a committee appointed by Australia would shortly examine the Nauru resettlement situation and formulate concrete proposals, PIM has been making enquiries in an effort to find out the results. It has met with no success, thanks to the news blackout. (over)

Secrecy in matters of security is one thing. On matters of general de velopment in the South Pacific, the Australian Government particu larly Mr. Hasluck’s Department of Territories —has shown time and again that its view is that the Aus tralian public has no right whatever to know anything at all. ☆ ☆ ☆

Next Moves In The

Government of Fiji?

HOW it is coming, no one can say.

But it is clear that, soon, there will be a revision of the system under which the Crown Colony of Fiji is governed.

Present indications are that the pressure will come primarily from the Indians, who feel, increasingly, that under today’s conditions they, as a community in Fiji, are under a handicap.

The Indians argue that, as matters are now, too much weight is given to the Deed of Cession; that the vari ous interpretations given the Deed since 1874 should be checked over in the light of 1961; and that what is called the Salisbury Despatch, dealing with the rights of immigrant Indians, should not be ignored in the future as it has been in the past.

The majority of Europeans appear to be in favour of Constitutional re vision; but, at this stage, they gener ally are reluctant to press Indian claims in relation to (a) administra tion and (b) land ownership, at the expense of the Fijian community.

The few Europeans who have ex amined the Salisbury Despatch do not attach much weight to it. They have found no evidence that Salisbury’s propositions were accepted by the Government of India, or that they ever were regarded as an outline of policy covering the development of Fiji. But that does not mean that the Despatch ever has been authorit atively examined in relation to events in Fiji subsequent to Cession.

The Fijians, wisely and cleverly, are following the tactics of Brer Fox —they are sitting quiet, and sayin’ nuffin’. Wisely, because they are on the box seat.

One of the most difficult things facing the Colonial Office Govern ment, and the Fijian community, is the need—so strongly stated by the Burns Commission to modify or change the Fijian Native Adminis tration.

The Government shrinks from it, because it was this same CO Gov ernment (of an earlier vintage) which

encouraged Sukuna to shape and establish the specialised machinery, which now functions separately from the Central Administration, and which generally is in the hands of hereditary chiefs and privileged per sons.

It seemed good, at the time; but a later generation of political thinkers —prodded into activity by a new kind of post-war planners—is now demanding the removal of caste priv ileges, and the encouragement of the common man to express himself at the ballot-box.

In other words, the new concep tion of democratic government in Fiji insists on the merging of the pre sent Fijian Native Administration with the Central Administration, and the gradual replacement of chiefly rule by the Fijian commoners’ ballot box.

This is embarrassing, both to the Colonial Office, which endorsed the Sukuna policy, and the highly respected Fijian leaders, mostly privileged by rank and in receipt of substantial public-service salary, who implemented it. But, embarrassing or not, time marches on.

For decades the Fiji Governments —a Colonial-Office-trained team of dedicated civil servants simply trotted around in the path cut, in an unprogressive circle, by past gen erations of similar bureaucrats. It is to be expected that such Govern ments, unless forced by public opinion, are reluctant to leave that path to explore the changing terri tories alongside. For decades, they really have had no means of know ing whether there is any political change working in the minds of the

common Fijian or the comma Indian.

Now, under pressure from Londc and from non-official quarters in Fi; the Government accepts the need fi change—but is moving with exaspe: ating caution.

Only fools would urge shai changes. None is proposed by r sponsible people. In the conditio* peculiar to Fiji, the removal i British Colonial Office supervisio and direction could spell disaster..

But there is need—becoming, own to Whitehall slow-motion, mot urgent every month—for the ear leavening of the Governmental lun by introducing a larger measure self-government, and for the di closure of the Government’s plan if any—for co-ordinating develd mental activities.

The Government has announced, i proposed, a series of new things-, large grants from the Colonial El velopment Fund for public worl plans for training selected Leg; members to be Ministers, with a co responding limitation in the Gc ernor’s authority; plans to widl technical training and stimulate t) expansion of existing industries a] the establishment of new ones.

But these various announcemei have about them a flavour of catc as-catch-can. If waste and confusii are to be avoided, there should be: co-ordinated plan of administratio of social progress and of econorr development, and the plan should laid out clearly for all classes to s and understand. Lacking eviderc of such a master-plan, the Fiji cot munities are restless and unhappy.’ * * * That is why Mr. R. W. Robs has urged the Fiji communities seek an all-races Convention. A Co vention would provide a mes through which the Government o explain its plans and defend policies to vocal members of i public, and an opportunity for various races to better understs each other’s viewpoints and iron < their differences.

Failing a Convention cer t at minority groups in Fiji will almi certainly use the growing public r easiness in Fiji for serious mischi making.

The problems facing Fiji today small and manageable, compaf with the troubles developing in sc: other colonial territories. But unh they are handled with strength 8 sagacity, the situation in Fiji coc worsen quickly and seriously. Alreae investors are showing too much happiness about the future Britain’s most important Sou Pacific possession.