Reassessment Of South Pacific

Editorial . . .

Responsibilities Now Desirable

r[E rapidity with which Britain and France are being deprived of their colonial possessions, and ie even greater rapidity with liich the Asian races—especially bin a, Japan and India—are get ng into a position where they will emand a larger share of the world’s unsettled and un eveloped areas, pose for the South acific countries a few problems of to-easing urgency, fender present conditions those mntries speak with six voices—the Dices of Australia, New Zealand, fitain, France, United States and blland, to list them in their order I territorial importance. France, i an extralordinary degree, and ritain to a degree that is em arrassing and increasing, are in Infusion over a large section of leir colonial empires; and both re increasingly surrendering con ol in Asia and Africa to the in

tgenous peoples.

France certainly, and Britain to degree that is increasing, are he lming less and less competent to svelop and sustain an intelligent, ear-cut and effective policy for ie development and security of leir South Pacific possessions— ritish Fiji, Solomons and Gilbert id Ellice Islands Colony, and •ench Oceania, New Caledonia and »w Hebrides. These are all im irtant territories which, if not operly occupied and made secure the Europeans, surely will be ken over within the next three tfour decades by the Asians.

Holland’s only South Pacific in rest arises through Western New ainea which, for strategic and reasons, is in a category

[its own.

United States comes into the fcture territorially only through istern Samoa and the Micro sian Trust Territory; but, politic y and strategically, United States [vitally interested in the future the South Pacific lands. In that ipect, United States lines up with tstralia and New Zealand.

Hie latter two not only hold im rtant territories (Papua, New linea, Nauru, Western Samoa, ok Islands) but their actual istence as nations is bound up th the future control and well ng of the South Pacific Islands a whole. iLsian possession of any of those and territories would be a menace t only to the future of Australia d New Zealand, and of the in [enous Pacific Islanders, but also

to the line of Pacific defences with which United States maintains her security against Asia.

WHILE the Asians were under control, and being kept at home in Asia, it was possible to leave the future development and wellbeing of the South Pacific Islands to be a six-nations affair, often idealistic and completely divorced from politics, as expressed for example in that painstaking ad visory body of the post-war years, the South Pacific Commission. But now that France, Britain and Holland have abandoned, or are

abandoning Southeast Asia to a hotch-potch of races strongly in fluenced —if not dominated —by Communism, it is vital to the in terests of the three other nations concerned —Australia, New Zealand and United States—that there be a new and realistic assessment of strategic and political values in the South Pacific.

Britain and France, of course, will bitterly resent the suggestion that their weakening hands in Southeast Asia represent a grave menace to the South Pacific; but in the light of what has happened already in Indonesia, Burma and Indo-China, and what is happening in Singapore and Malaya, th e peoples of the South Pacific should make their own security their first consideration.

Because of defence considerations, Australia since 1950 has disclosed a clear-cut policy in Papua-New Guinea: while native welfare is a most important consideration, the chief thing there is to develop the

country rapidly, so it may be the more easily held against Asia, for the benefit of the South Pacific Europeans and of the indigenous peoples who are in their care.

Why cannot a policy of similar character be framed and extended over the whole of the South Pacific?

And why should not Australia and New Zealand, with the active assist ance and eventual backing of the United States, be made chiefly re sponsible for the implementation of such a policy?

Such changes would involve the transfer of administrative control of Fiji, Solomons, New Hebrides, and Gilbert and Ellice to Australia and New Zealand: and of New Caledonia and French Oceania from France to some authority with a keener appreciation than France has shown of the developmental and security obligations involved in the posses sion of important territories in the South Pacific.

THE British Government probably would display, in this connec tion, a reasonable and under standing spirit. Britain would be happy to hand on her unprofitable Solomons, Gilbert and Ellice and New Hebrides responsibilities to Australia. She would be reluctant, however, to surrender control of the rich Colony of Fiji, with which she has valuable trade relations.

France, of course, will not volun tarily surrender a square yard of territory, in the South Pacific pr anywhere else. That is inherent in the French character. But the French to-day are doing many things under duress concerning which they should have taken action and sought compromise a couple of generations ago.

The grave troubles which have fallen upon the French Colonial Empire in recent decades and now are falling upon the British Colonial Empire, are the direct result of the high-nosed intolerance and arrog ance of rigidly-trained bureaucrats, left in command by hopelessly ignorant politicians. These things should not be forgotten when the time comes —and the time really is now —to consider the future of the the South Pacific Territories.

AMOVE for a re-assessment of the whole territorial situa tion in the South Pacific should start somewhere; and the logical place is Canberra.

After all, the future security and wellbeing of Australia herself, quite apart from the Islands, are closely bound up now with events in South east Asia, and with the obvious failure of Britain and France to maintain control over political de velopments there.

But is there sufficient statesman ship in the Australian Government to see the real implications of SE Asia events since World War II?

And is there enough strength there to enable Australia, seeing the danger, to force action of some kind

upon the British and French Gov ernments?

It is remarkable—and in other circumstances might be amusing— to see the impatience, if not con tempt, with which any Australian representations regarding British and French diplomatic activity in South-East Asia are received in London and Paris. Australian diplo mats are put into the same category as American diplomats; and the latter are treated by the British and French as a plain nuisance. It is time that Australia, and New Zealand, as well as the United States, developed a will and an arrogance of their own regarding South Pacific affairs, and made the safety and wellbeing of the Aus tralians, New Zealanders and Islanders a paramount considera tion.

THERE should be a Convention, at an early date and at a high Governmental level, of the six South Pacific nations (Australia, Britain, New Zealand, France, United States and Holland) to con sider the future administration of all the South Pacific Islands Terri tories in relation to the problems of defence, as created by recent political developments in Asia generally, and in SE Asia in par ticular.

Defence, in this connection, neces sarily includes such matters as the development of the Islands’ natural resources, the care and wellbeing of the indigenous people, and their more rapid preparation for the re sponsibilities of nationhood —anything, in fact, which will assist in keeping the Asians out, and in pre serving the Islands for the indigen ous races and Australia and New Zealand for the Europeans.

A good start already has be« made in this direction by the estal lishment of the South Pacific Con mission which, if only a researf and advisory body, has at leas created machinery for the co-ordii. ation of policy and administratio in relation to native wellbeing.

The next logical step might the creation of some sort of Souj Pacific Federation, to pick up fc recommendations on administratis at the points to which they hai been carried by the SP Commissia shape them in accordance with policy of self-defence and self-pn servation, and implement then Britain and France might subscrii to some such plan, where they will contemptuously opposed to any suj render of their powers to AustraL and New Zealand. . .

It does not matter how it is don so long as something is done. Ai. the first move should come fro

Australia.

Rwr.