For Britain Or Australia?

Future of N. Hebrides and Solomons

by R. D. BLANDY, CMG, OBE, Lately British Resident Commissioner in New Hebrides.

T is not generally realised that ■ Australia was very probably saved ■om invasion during the late war y the use that the Americans (and iter, other Allied Forces) made, suc sssively, of the New Hebrides and alomons.

By checking the enemy’s southern rive at the Battle of the Coral Sea le Americans gained time, not only i secure their communications with ustralia and to reinforce the quite [sufficient Australian garrison, but so to construct most important ises, first in New Caledonia, then in e New Hebrides.

It was the build-up in these islands -and the rapid construction therein airfields—that permitted the plan ng and timely launching of the suc ssful flank attack on Guadalcanal, i operation which history is likely confirm as the critical offensive ittle of the war with Japan, just as e Battle of the Coral Sea was the itical defensive battle. Moreover, its ccessful outcome finally destroyed

the threat to the Australian mainland.

It is relevant here to record that this vital operation had been facili tated by two important occurrences, both with their genesis in the New Hebrides Anglo-French Condo minium.

Firstly, in the dark days of 1940, the French population of the Con dominium—inspired by the gallant M. Henri Sautot, then French Resi dent Commissioner, who was later awarded the OBE as a mark of recognition—had promptly rallied to de Gaulle. This led, soon after, and logically, to the overthrow of the Vichy authorities in New Caledonia by the local de Gaulle partisans, and to the installation of M. Sautot as Free French governor.

Thus the Americans, when they had urgent need to use these terri tories as bases, were saved the em barrassment of finding Vichy (with whom they were still maintaining diplomatic relations) controlling the French administrations in these

islands, administrations with which they would certainly have had to force the issue.

The second important event was the establishment, after the Solo mons had been overrun by the Japanese, of teleradio communication by the British Administration in the New Hebrbides with the Resident

Commissioner of the Solomons and 1 his chain of coast-watchers hidden at strategic points throughout the islands, thereby establishing a vital intelligence service.

These two occurrences contributed materially to the timely capture of the Guadalcanal airfield (a few days before it was to be ready for use

by the Japanese) and to the successful campaigns in the Solomons which were supported chiefly from New Caledonia and New Hebrides bases.

In fact, the base at Santo was the first predecessor of Manus.

The preceding narrative should be sufficient to prove the great value these islands have for Australia—at

least, from the defence angle. IfJ therefore, Australia, as the farthest flung bastion of “Western Demo cracy,” and in pursuance of the “White Australia Policy,” aspires to consolidation of her position as an eventual Great Nation and Power (not to be attacked with impunity from the North), her interest in these islands as a prolongation of her de fensive screen eastwards and south wards from New Guinea, appears unquestionable.

Consequently, it seems appropriate to examine the present position of the New Hebrides and Solomons and how it affects, or may affect, Aus tralia.

The New Hebrides

OPHE New Hebrides group is administered by treaty between Great Britain and France under a form of condominium. It is not a true condominium, in that only cer tain matters are jointly controlled, each Power maintaining, indepen dently of the Condominium (or joint) Government (i.e., the British and French Resident Commissioners “act ing jointly”), a complete sovereign administration of its own, with sovereign rights over its own na tionals and “dependants.”

There can, then, be (and not in frequently are) conflicting national

policies. Consequently, as the Joint Administration is a “government by agreement” (or disagreement), it is not unnatural that it has no fixed or stable policy of its own.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the “System” laid down in the Angio- Frencn Protocol of 1914 has gen erated, both in peace and war, a host of anomalies, difficulties, em barrassments, confusions and agreements, which have multiplied themselves progressively as the group has “grown up.” Indeed, it is rare that a positive answer to any question affecting the New Hebrides as a whole can be given.

Each Power pays for its own sovereign Administration. All (legiti mate) revenue goes into the joint treasury to finance joint expenditure, which—as in the case of joint policy —cannot be controlled except by agreement (or negatively) by either Power. Each Power must pay half of any budgetary deficit regardless of its own share of material interests and population (which are at present, and likely to remain, preponderantly French). Therefore, the administra tion of the group is not an interest ing financial (or any other) proposi tion for Great Britain, particularly as trade is shared chiefly by France and Australia.

However, the British connection did, as narrated above, pay a hand some dividend during the last war.

It has been suggested in the Press from time to time that Australia might logically replace Britain in the Condominium. Britain might well be glad to get rid, without “loss of face,” of such an embarrassing and unprofitable responsibility. But it seems doubtful whether Australia would care to take up Britain’s share in what would be to her, without Britain’s long local experience of this unorthodox international experi ment, a step into the completely unknown.

Consequently, if Australia did eventually desire to establish a foot hold in that area, it is likely that some simpler formula would have to be devised.

AUSTRALIA has, incidentally, already a “stake in the land” in the New Hebrides, in the shape of very considerable properties —or claims to properties not yet regis tered—handed over to the Federal Government by the late Sir James Burns (as a gift, or in trust) with a view to encouraging British settle ment. The bulk of these properties consist of potentially rich arable lands, but they have mostly re mained undeveloped, awaiting a

clear-cut policy—and partly owing to the labour position.

Economically, the New Hebrides group has distinct potentialities, par ticularly for a nearby “growing” major country like Australia, which already supplies the greater part of the Condominium’s essential require ments—though, owing to trade bar riers, at present she receives very little in return.

The chief export is copra; but good cocoa and passable coffee are also produced. Moreover, the climate range is so varied, the soil so rich and the rainfall so adequate that a very large variety of other tropical and sub-tropical products could be grown with success. Even

sheep do well on one island, and cattle luxuriate everywhere.

One of the chief things which has held up development (and the group is still virtually “unscratched”) is the meagre supply of native labour, a result of the relatively small native population. A great deal of the de velopment which has been carried out was achieved pre-war by the

ench, by means of imported in nture Asian labour, the source of lich has since dried up.

Given a solution of the labour oblem, this group could have a :h future.

The Solomons

IHE Solomon Islands Protectorate is administered under the aegis the Colonial Office in London d, as a straight-out British depen ncy, presents none of compli :ions of the New Hebrides “con minium.” Any advance towards istralian responsibility in the Pro torate would, then, be by, arrange nt between two British partners of British Commonwealth.

Fhough there may be differences detail in native administration, idamentally the British and Aus lian native policies are not greatly ergent, and the Solomons natives mostly akin in race to those of w Guinea and the Bismarck Archi ago. There should, therefore, be insuperable difficulty, if and ;n Australia may desire to ex id into the Protectorate, in find a formula, particularly as the omens should logically be far re valuable to Australia than to :at Britain.

Economically, the Solomons are

less rich than the New Hebrides, having a much poorer soil and a climate suitable only for extreme tropical agriculture. However, the population is about double that of the New Hebrides and, owing to the comparative difficulty of growing food, the plantation labour position is much easier (and cheaper). Again, there is always the possibility of striking payable gold on Guadalcanal.

By and large, it seems as if an expanding and vulnerable Australia (whose needs in tropical produce must necessarily increase with a mounting population ) will be driven sooner or later to look for definite respon sibilities in the New Hebrides and Solomons, even though at the moment circumstances do not seem propitious for the Federal Government to in crease its financial and administrative commitments—and the incidental burden on the Australian taxpayer— in the development of territories other than New Guinea-Papua.

The Chinese Consul-General at Sydney, Mr. Liang Rung Wang, visited the New Guinea area dur ing January, and his itinerary in cluded short stays at Rabaul, Lae and Madang. Latest statistics on the Chinese population in the New Guinea region indicate a total of 1,949.

Mr. R. K. Wilson, FRCS, who has been Medical Officer, Rabaul, NG, for two years has been transferred to Port Moresby headquarters where he will be Surgical Specialist —a surgical unit will be formed to visit all Territory centres at inter vals. Mr. Wilson’s place in Rabaul Will be taken by Dr. K. Pike, at present in Sohana.

In a recent issue we reported that a large party of big game fisher men from Hawaii would go to New Zealand in April for a game fishing contest with the Bay of Islands Swordfish and Mako Shark Club of Russell. The Hawaiian party now advise that they will not be able to go this season, but look forward to testing their

skill with the New Zealanders next season.

Mr. Harold Gatty of Fiji went to Auckland in January to complete work on a book on fundamental methods of navigation for hikers, mountaineers and desert wanderers —a companion piece to his famous Raft Book.