What Comes Next In

N. Guinea?

By R. W.

Robson

HOW MURRAY GOT OFFSIDE :; LAND AVAILABILITY NOW A VITAL FACTOR :: CANBERRA TIMIDLY AVOIDS BOLD STATE MENT :: WILL AUSTRALIA DEFY TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL?

:: Something Pertinent About Missionaries

WHEN, as he departed from Port Moresby and the P-NG Administratorship, Colonel J. K.

Murray cut loose with a bad tempered, querulous “statement,” none was more sorry than I. Until then, he had behaved with restraint and dignity, under considerable pro vocation; and I thought he was going to leave Port Moresby with a certain amount of moral victory.

Even under the aegis of Socialist Minister Ward, Colonel Murray was not suitable for the Administrator ship of a tropical sub-dominion like Papua-New Guinea; and, after Ward departed, and new political concepts dominated Territories planning, the squareness of the Murray tempera ment and outlook was seen to be completely hopeless in relation to the roundness of the hole into which he was expected to fit.

But, because he is a fine type of scholarly gentleman, quite sincere and honest within the limitations

imposed by his politico-economic creed, he gained many well-wishers among his critics. They felt that the Minister in forcing Murray’s re tirement, was taking the only course open to him, if Papua-New Guinea is to play its proper part in rela tion to Australian economy and Pacific defence; but they really did wish to see the Administrator retire in circumstances which would be in accord with his fine character and the dignity with which he had filled his high office. That he failed to do so, of course, merely provided justi

fication for some of the things that had been said against him.

We had called his Administration —the earlier part, at any rate—the Ward-Murray regime; and his retir ing statement was conceived and phrased in the true Eddie Ward tradition. He was entitled of course to defend himself against official criticisms; but he could have chosen the time and the phrasing more hap pily and effectively.

The official criticism had not been aroused by Colonel Murray himself.

It came because certain Mission organisations, foolishly and with sad lack of judgment, had rushed in to attack the Minister and the Govern ment for seeking the Administrator’s retirement. Stung by some of the! lopsided statements made by the mis-1 sionary leaders, and quite properly/ resenting the attempt by the latter to interfere in what obviously was a

delicate matter of Government policy, the Minister attempted some defence of his attitude; and in doing that he could not avoid making some reflections upon the fitness of Colonel Murray for his office.

Naturally, Colonel Murray wanted to reply; but in the manner and timing of his reply he delivered him

self completely into the hands of his critics and ill-wishers.

Since then, there has been a series of attacks on the late Administrator.

All the things in his favour had already been said when he departed; the things now said against him are too many to bear recapitulation.

Within a week of his departure,

two writers in the South Pacific Post, Mr. Norman White and Mr. A.

Bethune, expressed themselves with out fear or favour in relation to the Administrator’s shortcomings, and to missionary “interference.” Else where in this issue we have reproduced an article by Melbourne Herald’s Osmar White, probably the best-informed writer on the daily press in relation to Pacific Islands affairs. It sums up, admirably, the case against Murray.

The two aspects of this affair 1 wish to discuss here are (a) the chief underlying cause of Colonel Murray’s retirement, and (b) the stand taken by certain Missions ir relation thereto.

THE fundamental differences be tween the present Australiar Government and Colonel Murray be came focussed in one matter tc which there has been no direct public reference. It is the availability ol land.

When Australia took over the Nev Guinea Trusteeship—we can forge all previous history—the first plan! of the Ward-Murray policy wai “New Guinea for the New Guines natives.” The old labour laws were drastically revised; old Europeai private enterprise was hamstrung anc new enterprise was discouraged

schemes of native education and I health, to cost Australia countless I millions, were introduced; war I damage compensation was paid to I natives on a scale literally fantastic.

How much of all this represented Ward-Murray love for the natives, and how much expressed the ideas i of uninhibited Socialist planners turned loose in a primitive world, we could only guess. And we all guessed.

It is possible that, if the world had returned to normality, the Ward- Murray plans would have been pro ceeded with until they collapsed—as all Socialist enterprises collapse—and even had there not been a change of Government.

But the world did not return to normality. Long before the Ward- Murray regime had run its course, and while the pro-native anti-private enterprise policy was becoming snarled up in its own contradictions, a new outlook in relation to New Guinea was being forced upon Aus tralia.

Russia refused to disarm; set up her confederation behind the Iron Curtain, to prepare for World War III; and proceeded to organise a Communist Asia, to challenge America through the Pacific, while directing the ideological struggle in Europe and Africa. So far as Aus tralia, New Zealand and all the South Pacific Islands are concerned, New Guinea now has one vital and dominant purpose—it must be pre pared as our first barrier against the Asiatic Communist power, south wards-thrusting through Indonesia.

That is so plain to see that even the Australian Socialists accept it, and have said so.

WHETHER the Ward-Murray native policy in New Guinea is right or wrong now does not matter —it no longer can have priority.

Priority must be given to the clam ant need to prepare New Guinea as the South Pacific’s first defensive barrier. To the extent that a native welfare policy can be integrated with this, plans for the natives may be implemented. But if there is conflict between native welfare and South Pacific defence measures, then native welfare must be set aside. Self-pres ervation still is the first law of nature.

Even as the Australian Govern ment moved swiftly towards the pre paration of New Guinea for its defensive role—training of native units, establishment of bases, en couragement of an economic develop ment which would provide essential supplies—the Ward-Murray Socialist set-up was collapsing. Plans to keep

all distribution under State control were the first to go; bit by bit, the ownership of all shipping by the State was abandoned; only the sale of produce still is State-controlled.

Native labour laws have been eased to encourage private employers; new enterprises have been tempted with all sorts of promises.

The establishment of new industries in the New Guinea archipelagoes, and the encouragement of

European settlement, are planned primarily in order to give economic strength to the preparation of this area as a defence barrier against Asia. But it also has another pur pose.

On Indonesian and Philippines standards, this huge area is capable of supporting a population of 50 or 100 millions, instead of the U millions now estimated to be there, If Europeans do not occupy and

develop this area, Asiatics certainly will. Asiatics will have no tender regard for the land rights of the H 7 millions of primitive natives.

The effective occupancy and de velopment of the great islands of New Guinea, New Britain, New Ire land and Bougainville demand, not the planting of a few more coconut trees, but the encouragement of primary and secondary industries to move in on a very big scale. In the past year or two, the Australian Government has announced its readi ness to assist the establishment there of enterprises based on timber, fibre, coffee, cocoa, tea, cattle, hydro electric power, and various others — most of them sound and proved.

But, while there has been much talk and endless publicity, there has been remarkably little real development.

That is because there is little land available—certainly not enough for any industrial movement on a big scale. And this is where we return to the subject of Colonel Murray and the Missions.

If the Menzies Government of Australia discloses one characteristic more than another, it is political timidity—it shrinks from making any bold announcement on matters of deep-seated policy if it thinks it thereby may give offence to a large body of voters.

This was shown in its complete failure, up to the end of July, to make any enlightening statement about native land rights in New Guinea. It knows quite well that its New Guinea area defensive policy 1 cannot be implemented unless large i areas of suitable land are made i available for the use of private enter prise. But, because it is afraid of a combined yell from Socialists and ! Missions, it has refrained from mak ing any declaration, and is engaged hidden, under-surface moves with the idea of somehow making land available in the archipelagoes with out upsetting anyone.

In the period between 1946 and 1950, Colonel Murray shifted his standpoint quite a lot in relation to native welfare matters; but there was one thing on which he was uncom promisingly stubborn —native land rights. On that, he would not budge an inch. For years, although the world was clamouring for sawn tim ber, and a score of enterprising Aus tralians in New Guinea were clam ouring for licenses to cut the almost limitless stands of timber there, there was no development. Port Moresby’s official files will show why.

Eventually, the irresistible force of Canberra’s New Guinea plans, which require a lot of land, met the immov able object in Colonel Murray’s de

termination to preserve all land rights for the natives, irrespective of all other considerations.

There could only be one logical end to this —either the abandonment of all plans for European develop ment in P-NG, or the removal of the Administrator. The Administra tor went. (Continued on Next Page)

But even then Canberra’s timid czars would not explain that this was the logical result of the land difficulty. They preferred to let certain Mission leaders broadcast the charge that a good, efficient and co-operative Administrator had been “sacked” in order to make room for a political favourite. The stupid Australian Government lost far more in kudos over this than if it had been completely frank in relation to its difficulties with Colonel Murray.

It was afraid of the Socialists, and of the Trusteeship Council and of the Missions, all of which are com pletely one-eyed on the subject of native land.

HERE and there in New Guinea’s limitless spaces you will find a settler in possession of land, acquired in the last ten years. In many cases, he will tell you of the fight he had tc make against some missionary oi other, before he could get that land, In such cases the “old hands,” whc know the natives, usually have nego tiated with native headmen for the purchase of selected areas. If the natives agree, all such purchases must be vetted by Administratior officials; and the latter generally tr> to hold the scales fairly, as betweer government policy, native needs anc European plans.

But certain missionaries, members of sects not exactly noted for realism use their influence with the natives to oppose uncompromisingly al proposals to sell land to Europeans and many a plan to purchase has been killed accordingly.

All missionaries do not oppose settlement by Europeans. In relatio® to policies of native welfare, there seems to be as wide a divergence oi opinion among missionaries a: among the ungodly. (By the same token, there was no unanimity o view among P-NG missionaries con cerning the retirement of Colone: Murray.) By the nature of thei work most Pacific Islands mission! aries are realists.

But, during his period of office; Colonel Murray probably was closei: to the missionaries than to any other class of non-official civilians in hii area. The more strongly a mission! ary believed that New Guinea shoulo be kept as a close preserve for tin natives, the better disposed he wai towards Colonel Murray.

It is impossible to generalise or the subject of mission work in thii Islands. There are so many sects with different points of view; am the influence of the missionaries or the natives varies so definitely wit! the characters of the men in charge

The influence of the great majority is good, however; in fact, the record of the Missions in the South Pacific Islands probably is equal to the best in the history of Christianity. Most of the Islands races have been saved from extinction by the missionaries.

To-day, as for a century past, the missionaries provide most of the medical and educational facilities which the Islanders receive.

Therefore, we may not say that the circumstances surrounding the retirement of Colonel Murray reflect adversely upon the Missions, gene rally. Rather, we can say that when Mission leaders abandon their ancient rule of keeping out of poli tics, and get involved in public controversies, the effect is bad for the Missions.

The head of the Anglican Mission in P-NG, Bishop Strong, believing that Colonel Murray was being victimised by politicians, dashed in furiously to his defence, without waiting to learn the facts behind it all. The Minister, knowing what was behind it all, naturally resented the Bishop’s “interference.” Many of the P-NG public, knowing how ready was the Administrator to make common cause with some classes of missionaries against the legitimate desire of the Europeans to use native labour and native land for purposes

of profit, were outspokenly cynical.

The Methodists, who sometimes have been charged with too great an eagerness to bend public affairs in the Islands to the objects of their very large and successful Mission organisations, did not improve matters by also rallying to the sup port of Colonel Murray. Public re

action generally was summed up in the phrase: “Tell the Missions to keep oitt of political arguments.” * * * ♦ Meanwhile, the next moves are awaited with interest.

The Territories Minister can get

(Continued on Page 85)

no further with his elaborate plans for the establishment of new indust ries in P-NG unless land is made available.

Murray, who opposed the alien ation of native land, is gone. Will his opposition be maintained by the Mission bodies?

In view of the vital defence con siderations involved, will the Aus tralian Government defy the Trus teeship Council which, dominated more or less by Reds, is certain to

oppose any policy changes affecting

New Guinea lands?

Does the Australian Government possess sufficient “intestinal forti tude” to do the only logical thing— namely, take the necessary steps to remove New Guinea and the Bis marck Islands from “Trusteeship,” and make of them an Australian Territory? Only in that way can we get an assurance that this area—the South Pacific’s first defensive line

against Asia—will be effectively

guarded.

Miss Claire O’Sullivan who has been in Port Moresby for the past three years, returned to her home in Brisbane recently to marry Mr.

Norman McLeod, an engineer, also of Port Moresby.