The news magazine of the South Pacific · since 1930

Pacific Islands Monthly, 1 March 1952Vol. XXII, No. 8

Evatt: Gate-Opener For Asia

pp. 19-120 · Read in the full issue

Disclosures About New Guinea and Manus, 1945-47.

AUSTRALIAN Parliament and press wallowed in Pacific politics early in March, when the Pacific Mutual Security Pact (between United States, Australia and New Zealand) was up for acceptance.

Australia and New Zealand are very small countries, and it seemed unnecessary for the world’s greatest Power (USA) to bother about such a Pact. But the Pact gives Australia and NZ some security against the deadly menace of Asia; and Australia and NZ have received it in return for the British Commonwealth’s approval (most reluctantly given) of the new American-Japanese Treaty.

The Western Powers regard it as vital, in their struggle against the Communist world, that they

should keep Japan in the Western camp.

The South Pacific communities recognise this fact, and accept the Jap treaty in return for the Pact but they make little effort to hide their hatred and fear of Japan— the nation which treacherously attacked and cruelly raped them in 1942-44. “They tried once to overwhelm us. and they will try again, when they have the chance” say the Australians, and with reason . . . But that is another story.

OUT of the Canberra talks and newspaper discussions of early March there appeared, for our inspection and appraisement, the arch-villain of Pacific politics of the 1945-50 period—Dr. Herbert de Vere Evatt, now Leader of the Socialist Opposition, and almost certainly Prime Minister of Aus tralia after the next election Concerning Dr. Evatt, these things seem clear: • In 1945-6, when Australia could have annexed New Guinea —and, by her sacrifices in defend ing that country, would have been fully entitled to do so—Dr. Evatt (then Australian Foreign Minister) insisted that the Mandate be transferred to the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations.

Consequently. Australia has not got the control over P.-NG. • In 1945-6, when the United States offered to share with Aus tralia the maintenance, upkeep 'and use of the huge Manus base (north of New Guinea), Dr. EVatt was non-co-operative; and USA aban doned the base, and sold the equipment to China. • In 1945-7, Dr. Evatt, as head of the United Nations Organisa tion, took a large share in the pro ceedings by which the Dutch were driven out' of the East Indies, and the chain of archipelagoes (“step ping-stones between Asia and Australia”) handed over to the in experienced and wholly untrust worthy Indonesians.

The first charge was made by Australian Minister H. L. Anthony, in a speech on March 4.

The second charge was made by Australian Foreign Minister R. G.

Casey, in various statements, and especially a speech on March 4.

The third charge has been made by this journal at intervals over the last six years, and has been supported by various disclosures.

It lines up exactly with charges 1 and 2.

Australians have every reason for labelling their Dr. Evatt. in the face of history, “the Gate-Opener for Asia.”

(Continued on Page 117)

IPEAKING amid angry Socialist ) interjections, Minister Anthony argued in the Australian arliament on March 4 that no ation had more right to claim trritory essential to its security lan Australia had to New Guinea :ter the war. Australia had bought ew Guinea with its blood; and, 5 the country was essential to ustralian security, it should not ave been handed over to UNO.

Foreign Minister Casey disclosed om official files that on March i, 1946, United States suggested i informal discussion for long rm rights, jointly with Australia, •r the occupation of the Manus ise, on which USA had spent be /een 500-600 million dollars.

Foreign Minister Evatt had re ied with a plan for the reciprocal ;e of Pacific bases generally. He aparently forgot that USA was ic most powerful nation in the orld, while Australia was small id unimportant.

D’scussion went on for 15 months in til the middle of 1947), not on le American plan for joint :cupation of Manus, but on the vatt proposal for a regional Tangement; and the Americans len abandoned the base. “Dr. vatt overplayed his hand. He med too high and misjudged the ood and temper of the United ;ates.”

The vociferous Mr. Caldwell leputy leader of the Australian pposition) came in with the leering remark that evidently essrs. Churchill, McKenzie King, nuts, Chifley and Fraser were rong, and the Governor of Ben ll (Mr. Casey then was in that isition) was right.

Mr. Casey replied that the ritish Commonwealth Prime inisters’ . conference (to which r. Caldwell referred) had dealt ith a series of American claims Pacific Islands, which had arisen r er a period of years, and not ith the Manus base specifically.

Refuting Dr. Evatt's claim that anus was only a staging base, r. Casey said it had been a first ass naval base, with two float g docks capable of handling the ggest ships afloat; it has one of te biggest and safest harbours in ie world; there had been five rips capable of taking the largest imbers; and there were barracks id amenities for tens of thousands men. “We are very much eaker from the fact that America not now a joint user with us of anus,” he said.

He said that if he told members bat Manus was to-day, compared Ith five years ago, they would irn red with shame. “Manus to

day is a sentry-box without a sentry” he remarked.

IT is worth recalling that in September, 1946, and in every one of the next six or seven issues, the Pacific Islands Monthly pointed out the monstrous blunder that Australian Foreign Minister Evatt was making, in squabbling with American over the occupation of Manus.

On page 56 of September issue, 1946, the PIM suggested that Dr.

Evatt was so drunk with a sense of his own importance that he was irresponsible, and proceeded:

“Why in the name of plain com monsense does Australia not now make common cause with the Americans, who are her friends, and who saved her in 1942, and not

only assist America in her wish to control the Manus base, but make available to America any other territory which the American strategists believe is necessary for the effective policing of the Pacific?

“The Australian Prime Minister offers the feeble argument that the

Manus base might be needed by Australia in some war in which America is not engaged. It may be taken as fundamental that the small Australian nation has no chance of survival in any Pacific war in which America is not in volved. She may as well face plain facts.”

America did not finally break of the discussion until mid-1947. B£ then, it was very plain that Russii was directing an international con spiracy to force Communism upoc the world, commencing with Asis.

But the extraordinary Dr. Evat in 1947 was still prattling abouj Australia’s “sovereign rights,” am the Americans were tired of him They probably classed him witi the Socialist Governments o Britain and New Zealand, whicH by this time, were very definite!

America’s pains-in-the-neck. S America 'went on her own—am Manus went over to the jungle am the Chinese. Much of that mag nificent equipment that the Chines took out of Manus has since used against us in Korea.

Editorial Comment.—lt is, o course, very easy to be wise afte the event. In 1945-46, the Westen nations had only one thought—ft disarm, and get back to a life o peace. Russia then seemed friendlj There was no Iron Curtain. Asi had accepted fully the victory an the prestige of the Anglo-America! nations. There was little suggest tion of a Red China. If Dr. Evati In 1946, had foreseen the world o 1951, he might perhaps have act© differently in . relation to Manm But, being the kind of thinker h is, he probably would still hav sacrificed New Guinea and tH East Indies to the UNO ideal.