Mr. Churchill’s Appalling Task
pp. 15-16 · Read in the full issue
October 25, the electors of the United Kingdom threw out of office the last Socialist Gov lent left in the British Empire, lin, Canada, Australia and New and now are lined up with ed States and the Western de •acies in an attempt to resist Communist bloc, and restore rliness and sanity to this dis ;ed world. it it may be five years too late.
Anglo-American Powers should taken control of the world in and held control until man had recovered from World 11. The Americans were r, but the British, in Britain, ralia and New Zealand, went n a mad Socialist spree which partially wrecked the Empire, so disturbed both the economy be nation and the morale of people that they now seem ile to offer any effective de- J to the creeping advance of mderground forces of the Reds. urchill is back at the helm in Ion; and, on the radio, one 5 in his voice the same bulldog ty that we remember so well 1940. But the old man is 1 with problems that literally ;errifying. 5 Parliamentary majority is small—less than 30. The fact nearly half the British elec e of over 30 millions voted for futile, fumbling and utterly edited Socialists suggests that range change has come upon
the people who, only a decade ago, triumphed in disaster at Dunkirk and came undefeated through the London Blitz.
PRIOR to 1939, Britain had about £2,000 000.000 invested overseas.
She spent it all in 1939-45, literally in helping to keep the world safe for democracy. British economy, and British standards of life, were partly based on the in come from those two thousand million pounds. After 1945, Britain had either to replace her enormous overseas investment by working overtime or substantially lower her living standards.
Under Socialist direction, she did neither. The Attlee Government nationalised the industries which should have been encouraged to re capture world markets; it spent countless millions and immeasur able energy on “welfare” plans for the masses; and it encouraged the natives of Empire countries in Asia and Africa to engage in all kinds of nationalist dreams and enter prises. For five out of six years of office, it refused to see that the USSR was planning world conquest.
Britain already faced bankruptcy when Attlee came in. How, then, did she carry on? Actually she has been kept going for six years by gift money from America. The United States partly from goodwill, partly because they know that the collapse of the British Empire may open the way to Moscow’s triumph, have spent countless millions in propping up
the British economy. In so many words: the American taxpayer has paid for nationalising Britain’s railways, and equipping Britain’s mdustnal masses with dentures and spectacles.
NOW, the Socialist spree is over.
Churchill, ten years older, and probably heart-broken by the things he has seen happening in those ten years, applies himself to the tasks that should have been his in the great days of victory in 1945.
Britain’s Treasury is empty, and Britain’s accounts are in the red to the appalling amount of at least £700,000,000 per annum. The re stored industries of Germany and Japan already are biting deeply into Britain’s overseas markets.
Her Asiatic Empire is almost all gone; she has suffered an enormous loss in Persia; the protection of Malaya against the Reds and of the Suez Canal against the Egyp tians, is costing her an incalculable amount; and the nationalist poison, planted by the Socialists, is work ing overtime in Africa.
And, just over the eastern horizon, the Communist Empire threatens at any moment to take Western civilisation by the throat.
Churchill may again save Britain and the Empire; but he cannot do it unaided. He must receive Americanhelp in 1951, just as he aid in 1941.
Having seen the indescribable mess the Socialist Government made of British affairs in 1945-51, and remembering that the British electors did not throw out the Socialists in 1949, and put the Con
servatives in by only a narrow majority in 1951, the United States would be completely justified in refusing further help.
But that would mean opening wide the gates to Stalin. America, alone, cannot hold back the Reds.
She can depend completely upon Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the Scandinavian nations. She can place only partial reliance upon tive other small Western countries, and upon France and Italy. Italy and, in a lesser degree, France, are still influenced by deep Socialist penetration.
A strong Britain, giving power and inspiration to the whole British Empire, is the one thing America needs to provide her with the reserve strength to defy and, if necessary, overthrow the Muscovite conspiracy WE may expect to see America making the best of it by giving all possible support to Churchill. Of all the world’s leaders, Churchill ha-s the greatest capacity for bold thinking; and,
remembering the Anglo-French Union which he proposed to France in the black days of May, 1940, it would cause no surprise at this time, if he suggested an . Anglo- American Federation, to take the control of world affairs out of the pusillanimous hands of the already discredited United Nations, Here, in the Pacific we a i rea dy have an Anglo-American Federa tion, in all but name. Here in the Pac ific, too, it would seem that France is very close to the Anglo- American set-up—much closer than in Europe, Maybe, out here, our perspective is clearer, .
Br . l .^ ai 1 n § oes > . 1S gone—the Reds will destroy us piecemeal. Our £°Pe lie ? in Churchill, supported by America. France, always realist, probably would join an Anglo- American Federation. Thence forward, the going would be safer, and easier. But if Britain, under Churchill, fails to make the grade, the outlook is not one that should be contemplated by persons of weak stomach.
Fijian Battalion —Is Malaya Sufficiently Important?
THE announcement that a battalion of Fijian troops will be sent to Malaya next year to fight against terrorists, has revived jvar-time stories of their exploits in the Solomons and Bougainville, Their fame as jungle fighters—particularly on night patrols—is known far beyond Fiji.
The “war” in Malaya is now an Empire show—Gurkhas, Dyaks, ASncan coloured troops, Australian airmen regiments of English a Scottish troops—and obviously the Fijians want to be m it. If yci look no deeper than that you must applaud their patriotism.
It has been calculated in Australia that, on a population basis (and taking the whole population of Fiji, not just the Fijians) Australia would have to send 40,000 men to Malaya to do as well as the Fijians propose to do.
Australians, when they must, make pretty good soldiers. Yet, at the present moment, volunteers for a campaign in Malaya would be more likely to number 400 than 40,000. The business of fighting terrorists in Malaya may appeal to the individual Australian a dventurer, but it makes no call at all upon mass patriotism.
In Fiji, on the other hand, it is unlikely that there will be any dim culty in recruiting 1,000 men. The average young Fijian, with the simple Fear-God-Honour-the-Kmg philosophy that much of the Empire shed long years ago, will probably regard this, or any other campaign, as a super football-game. He likes Army life with its discipline, comradeship and the business of fighting.
But is there nothing better that 1,000 of Fiji’s brightest young men can do than fight terrorists in Malaya—if fighting terrorists in Malaya is all the Battalion will be asked to do? Doubts have already been expressed as to the wisdom of it by individuals in Fiji—although it is admitted that Fijians are suited to this type of warfare. xhe anti-terrorist campaign in Malaya now has lasted longer than World War 11. It seems no nearer an end> and it . g probable that something is needed other than more Co f onial tro s In the meantime, it would be idle to suppose that the withdrawal of these young men from Fijian life is not going to have repercussions, Nor, with the example of World War IDs aftermath still with us, can we believe that soldiering ne cessarily fits a man for a bigger and better civilian life, The F jji ans> as a race< s tni bav e one very i arge domestic problem to so i ve will it be made easier by fostering this football-game men tabty which comes so fatally easy to them? Or would not the Colony, and Fm pi re) be better served in the long-term view, by encourag jng piji ans to stay home and attend to their business; to learn to wor k and plan for the future? , . Al No doubt Authority weighed these pros and cons of commonsense against the need for patriotism and preparedness in the face of pre sent world unrest, before making this decision. But something more is needed from Authority to justify this move in the eyes of the public.

