Muddle In Indonesia

Americans At Last Awakening To South Pacific’s Danger

)URING August and September, con ferences between Dutch and Indonesian representatives were •oceeding in Europe—mostly at The ague—concerning the formation of a etherlands-Indonesian Union, and the iplementation of the agreements ached, this year, for the government of e Unted States of Indonesia.

The history of events in the East Indies ice the end of the Pacific War has been iblished regularly in this journal. Right Dm early 1946, following the surrender Japan, we have never altered our view at — • The Dutch, who were our valiant lies, and who suffered cruelly in World ar 11, were deserted at the end of the ir by Britain and America, and given i aid in the herculean task of restoring der in the Netherlands Indies. • The Japanese in the East Indies, len they knew Japan would be defeated, t up a puppet government of intensely iti-Dutch Indonesians, called the Re blican Government. With the assistance the Japs—who were left undisturbed in e East Indies for a long time after the p surrender —this Government strongly sisted the return of the Dutch to Indo sia. • Slowly and painfully, the Dutch re sembled their forces, and proceeded to store their rule (which represented law id order) in Indonesia. There were ells of fighting between Dutch and In nesians (“Republicans”)—in which the donesians showed no military prowess latever. • Step by step, the Dutch restored order

over all the archipelagoes, except a sec tion of Java based on Jok.iakarta. Their troops gradually drove the Indonesians into the central and western parts of Java. • Just when it seemed that the Dutch had the situation in hand (about the end of 1948) the Leftist elements in the United Nations interfered, and forced the Dutch to resume conferences with the “Republicans,” with a view to stopping further fighting and recognising the “nationalist aspirations” of the Indone sians. • Although it was well known that (a) the Indonesians could not be trusted to adhere faithfully to any agreement, (b) the Indonesians were intensely anti- European and strongly influenced by Communism and (c) the “Republicans” had the active support of pro-Communist organisations (e.g., the refusal of the Communist wharf-labourers of Australia to handle any Dutch ships), the Dutch were obliged to dismiss their leading officials in the East Indies, and enter into the discussions which led directly to the recent conferences in The Hague.

THE present situation is that the Dutch now have agreed—with manifest re luctance—to a sort of partnership with the Indonesians in the government of the forthcoming United States of Indonesia.

Meanwhile, the Americans #re awaken ing to the fact that they, quite uninten tionally (through leaving the whole matter to the United Nations) have be trayed the Dutch.

This matter is of great importance to Australia and New Zealand, and all com

munities in the South Pacific. If the Dutch are not supported in Indonesia, the Indonesians will get complete control over the archipelagoes of the East Indies, and thus in turn will provide the Asiatics and Communists of Asia with an open road to the desirable, under-populated lands of the South.

America Waking Up

SOME five months ago, the United States newspapers, belatedly trying to as certain the true position in Indo

nesia, sent a party of 15 correspondents on a tour of the East Indies. The latter reported generally in favour of the Dutch, and against the plan to give sovereign power to the Indonesians before the Indonesians were competent to exercise it.

Nearly all those correspondents were killed in an air crash. One of the survivors, Mr. William R. Matthews, the editor of the Arizona Daily Star, on August 22, delivered a public address in Los Angeles. The following are some interesting extracts.

“In a diplomatic way, we have been highly incompetent. We have pursued and are to-day pursuing a negative policy of abdication and appeasement. . . . We followed it in Indonesia, where, behind the skirts of the United Nations, we tried

to hide our support of the Jap puppet government of Sukarno and its close alliance, until one year ago, with the Communists. The results are now ap paient in Indonesia where the Dutch, out of respect for us, have bowed to our de mands. In a year or two chaos can easily come out of this situation, “From what I saw of that great archi pelago stretching 3,000 miles along the equator, Indonesia can be restored and become an asset, rather than a liability, if we abandon our past political in fantilism and slippery diplomatic intrigue, I do not believe that good international relations can be built by betraying friends, or making unnecessary trouble for them, “The Dutch were our loyal friends during those trying years of 1940 and 1941.

They denied, at our request, oil and other supplies to the Japanese. I met some of the men who, as officials of the Dutch Government in Indonesia, gave us that help. They went to prison camps, while many of their associates died or were killed.

“Imagine their surprise when they came out of those prison camps in August, 1945, and found a Jap puppet, in close association with Communists, claiming to be the government of Indonesia. I talked with that puppet in June. He admitted that he had collaborated with the Japanese, and that he had been closely allied with Communists. His excuse was that he was working for Indonesian inde pendence.

“The Dutch, after playing ball with us as they had, were naturally surprised that they should be treated coldly by our government. They were even more sur prised to see our government, at Austra lian insistence, allow the United Nations to be used as a front to discredit them and increase the prestige of the Jap pup pet by recognising him as a belligerent!

Anti-Dutch Elements

T KNOW why we did it. We thought X Ve were playing smart politics, just as we did in Eastern Europe and China, by assuming the Communists ex pressed the will of the people and would be democratic. We adopted a cold blooded policy of assuming that the Dutch were through; that we were going to become the friendly sponsors of a native government, which we imagined would become a stable and friendly one.

“I am not going to recount the detailed events that took place between 1945 and as recently as this year, except to say that our American record is a questionable arid costly one. By supporting the Dutch in restoring order, by avoiding interference in internal politics, we could have saved ourselves uncounted millions. We could have allowed a naturally prosperous region to be restored with comparatively little help. But now it could have been a great help. By now it could have been a great wealth-producing area, not needing one cent from us.

“We have messed things up, all right, and the prospects are that it is going to cost us much money, if not lives. Our policy has been anti-Dutch. The members of our party saw it and heard it. Our diplomatic officials treated us coldly. They resented the coming of our party.

“What is more, top military observers of the United Nations were openly anti- Dutch. Newton, of Scripps-Howards papers, stayed behind when our party left Jogjakarta to watch developments as the Dutch evacuated. Pour lower-rank Aussies and three American military ob servers for the United Nations sought him out to plead with him that their reports were being diluted and slanted into anti- Dutch reports to the United Nations by the top military observers. Newton quoted line and verse.

“The top American and Australian mili ry observers were openly anti-Dutch id pro-Republican. When they tried to Isify about the Dutch evacuation and ie Republican entry, he called them liars their faces. He had seen the very thing ,ey were trying to lie about.

“All of our group were shocked by the e of the power of the United Nations the World to be unfair in the destinies the people. For our government to be party to such abuse made most of us hamed and angry. . . .

“The Dutch were frank in confessing eir mistakes. They admitted that they id moved too slowly in satisfying native pirations. Quite correctly and honestly, ey saw the danger and possible futility granting immediate independence. But ey had formulated a wise plan of adual independence, which we dis edited by our direct support of the Dlence of Sukarno and his Communist [ies.

What Of The Future

all parties have agreed (and the .1 meetings are in progress in the Hague to-day) that the Dutch will msfer sovereignty around January 1, 50, to a new government being formed, be known as the United States of In nesia. Jt will represent a coalition of ideralists and Republicans.

“A part of the consideration for this ant of independence is a Netherlands donesian Union of equal sovereignties. r this means the Dutch hope to work t a programme of Dutch tutelage, as tance in government and economic de lopment. I hope the Indonesians share this ambition. . . , ‘The Indonesians have had little par mentary experience. They have a lefully small service group. A very large rcentage of the people are illiterate. As ey develop and train an Indonesian my, the native military will occupy a

more and more dominating role. Along with this, we saw a bit of the jealousy that is already developing among the various ‘liberating’ groups. The prospects for a struggle for dominance among the present individual liberators appears almost certain, unless someone Tike the Dutch has the authority to exercise re straint.

“Unless we support the Dutch in exer cising this restraint and tempering the enthusiastic hopes of the Indonesians,

chaos will develop. The stage is set by the widely seperated islands for a disin tegration which no native army for many years to come can control alone. With Dutch guidance, it can be done.

“At this point, the Communist menace will become serious. The probable chaos and anarchy that are in prospect unless the Dutch have some power of restraint, will create a revolutionary situation which the Communists always count on develop ing. (Continued on Page 71)

“If America and the United Nations do )t support the Dutch in the basic need being responsible for law and order, nerica will have to step in, because we ust not let the Communists seize this rategic crossroads and comparatively jalthy region by our default.

“Lacking other outside help, the people 11 be in the midst of chaos and anarchy, id will turn to the Communist direction a means of relief. The Communists 11 quickly restore order and their own w, by means of terror. They will recruit itive armies by force. They will have e will to do it. What has happened in lina will happen in Indonesia.

“If we support the Dutch, we shall not ly promote the welfare of the Indo sians, but of ourselves. We shall relieve rselves of a political and economic :adache. The Dutch know the native nguages; the educated natives know itch. The Dutch are humane, just as imane as Americans.

“These islands, under law and order id safety for investments, can bloom th prosperity. But, if we continue to nk on native competency, as we have en doing, we shall make a costly [stake.”