Urgent’ Plea for Papuan

Natives Present Conditions Threaten Extinction of Race

THIS is an attempt to sum up, im partially, the present set-up in Papua—and particularly the set-up as it affects the Papuan. No matter whose eyes regard the Papuan scene it must be realised that in the ultimate wash-up, the needs of the native are para mount—if for no other reason, than be cause the country is untenable for Euro peans without his help.

The work and conduct of Papuans dur ing the invasion of their land has, generally speaking, been good. This, not withstanding the fact that the Papuan possesses no patriotic incentive to serve; and that his limited realisation of what Japanese domination would have been was not sufficient to force him to work with his white masters for his own safety.

Much might be said of the minor mis haps that have befallen the natives of Papua in wartime, but they all pale into insignificance in face of one major con sideration —that is, are the Papuans to survive as a race? Or will they be allowed to die out in a few decades?

This latter possibility is not universally recognised, but evidence of approaching extinction, in many areas, is clearly visible to those who are prepared to face the truth. rE factors tending to the disappear ance of the Papuans as a race are: • Excessive use of native manpower.

In pre-war days it was considered that the employment of 10,000 natives away from their homes was the limit of safety, but now over 30,000 have been conscripted.

The danger has been pointed out to Army administrative officials in many reports, yet the means of alleviating this danger have been neglected.

No one questions the right of the Army (or ANGAU) to conscript natives —nor the urgent necessity to utilise their ser vices in the dark days of 1942 and 1943 but native manpower is now being used out of all proportion to needs; it is be lieved by many experienced Papuan residents, now in the Army, that essential work on plantations and Army adminis tration could be carried on by not more than two-thirds of the present number of conscriptees—the other third being per mitted to return to native life. • Fatalities from hostile action and sickness among conscripted natives. This is far greater than is realised. It would not be unreasonable to state that five thousand potential fathers have been lost to a race that was never very numerous nor very fecund. • Separation of'husbands and wives for 2 and 3 year intervals. This needs no further comment. • Birth control or the unwillingness of Papuans to have children. This is wide spread and dates back long before the days of ANGAU.

CAN the race be rescued from this state of affairs? The means of attempt ing this immediately are at hand. Im mediate repatriation of all unnecessary conscripted labour; utilisation of labour not engaged in useful or necessary work for ANGAU in fencing and preparing gardens to improve food supplies. And, finally, the termination of conscription as soon as possible, leaving the native com pletely free to choose whether he will go to work (as indentured or casual labour) or remain in his village to reconstruct native life and increase the population.

These things imply restriction of new European development in Papua; and perhaps the hampering of existing white enterprises by lack of labour. But better to face facts and some immediate sacri-

fice now and in the next five years in order to preserve the native, who is in evitably the most important asset in the development of Papua. As it is, the decline of native population has been

greatly accelerated during the war period and will remain a disturbing factor for the next couple of decades.

THE time is perhaps opportune to present an assessment of the good and the harmful effects—and there have been both—of ANGAU’S term of administration.

The history of ANGAU’S three years of rule reflects, to a great extent, the successive military 'phases of invasion, defence, and liberation.

The formative period was marked by jealousy, manoeuvring for position and power, and discussion between Papuan and Mandated Territory elements in the new Administrative body. Concurrent with this somewhat discreditable be haviour at the top, was the good work performed in the field by the more insignificant, but infinitely more useful members.

Much gallant rescue work was done; field improvisations became more and more effective; and many members of ANGAU took an active, self-sacrificing part, in close proximity to the enemy, in defending and subsequently liberating the land. Theirs was a concept of duty and achievement rather conspicuously absent back at base. And, from this early ram shackle set-up, a very creditable organi sation has been built up.

This first phase was followed by a period of effective and altruistic work through out every section of the unit, which stands wholly to its credit and cannot be ignored.

This phase coincided with the Japanese invasion of part of Papua, and the threat of complete conquest by the enemy.

FINALLY, the past and present stage— after the Japanese were cleared from the country. This was (and is) a period of deterioration in principles and goodwill to the natives.

Certain elements had discovered what wide powers they possessed, and used them to the fullest extent. But, even in this phase, the good work performed by the Administrative, medical, and labour sectors have done something to redeem the Unit’s honour. The entrance of former experienced Papuan officials and the commonsense and high ideals of many of the younger, and so-called “in experienced” elements, stabilised and im proved the general work of ANGAU.

A recent deterioration in the general conduct of affairs is marked by exploi tation of the natives, and the tendency of certain ambitious elements to prevent the return of the civil administration— which to many officers would mean les sened importance and even an exit from the Papuan scene.

It must not be overlooked that even to-day the reliable elements of ANGAU, especially the younger and un-self-seeking men, have carried on to the benefit of the country. But during 1944, however, certain ANGAU leaders have discovered that enormous sources of revenue exist in the exploitation of natives and settlers —a state of affairs that would never have been tolerated by the former civil government. For ANGAU to “cash in” on the natives and exploit the old established settlers is, at best, unethical.

NEVERTHELESS, the future govern ment of Papua, even if labelled “civil,” must now be grafted bn to the existing ANGAU organisation. The only leader acceptable to the best ele ment in Papua is their former chief, Leonard Murray.

With his return, provision must be made for the exiled Government servants, and especially for those who volunteered early in the war. This latter class dis

played much patriotism, and are entitled to priority in administrative posts.

Officials who have been absent from Papua during its time of stress must, however, recognise that a new and im proved spirit, largely generated by the younger, keener, and less bureaucratic elements, has been introduced. They must adjust themselves to it.

It will be found, too, that much of the old red tape, official superiority, aloofness from the natives and their needs, and some of the old-time petty tyrannies which existed in spite of Sir Hubert Murray’s benevolent rule, have been cut out —and for the good of Papua, should remain out.